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NUREG 0933

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TASK I.A.1: OPERATING PERSONNEL AND STAFFING Complex transients in nuclear power plants place high demands on the operators in the control room. The objective of the actions described in this task was to increase the capability of the shift crews in the …
The objectives of this task were to: (1) improve the capability of operators and supervisors to understand and control complex reactor transients and accidents; (2) improve the general capability of an operations organization to respond rapidly and …
The objectives of this task were to: (1) upgrade the requirements and procedures for nuclear power plants operator and supervisor licensing to assure that safe and competent operators and senior operators are I charge of the day-to-day operation of …
The objectives of this task were to: (1) establish and sustain a high level of realism in the training and retraining of operators, including dealing with complex transients involving multiple permutations and combinations of failures and errors; and (2) …
The objectives of this task were to: (1)   Improve licensee safety performance and ability to respond to accidents by upgrading the licensee groups responsible for radiation protection and plant operation in such areas as staff size; education and …
The objective of this task was to improve the quality of procedures to provide greater assurance that operator and staff actions were technically correct, explicit, and easily understood for normal, transient, and accident conditions. The overall content, …
The objective of this task was to improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the information provided to them. ITEM I.D.1: CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEWS This item …
The objectives of this task were to: (1) increase the capability of shift crews to operate facilities in a safe and competent manner by assuring that training for plant changes and off-normal events was conducted; and (2) review the comprehensiveness of …
The objective of this task was to demonstrate by testing and analysis that the relief and safety valves, block valves, and associated piping in the reactor coolant system (RCS) were qualified for the full range of operating and accident conditions; …
The objective of this task was to improve the reliability and capability of nuclear power plant systems for removing decay heat and achieving safe shutdown conditions following transients and under post-accident conditions. ITEM II.E.3.1: RELIABILITY OF …
The objectives of this task were to perform systems reliability analyses and to effect changes in emergency operating procedures and operator training to improve the capability of plants to mitigate the consequences of the small-break LOCAs and …
The objectives of this task are: (1) to improve and expand the NRC training program for the technical staff and resident inspectors, including, where appropriate, hands-on training; and (2) to establish a program to provide technically qualified …
DESCRIPTION Because of the remote possibility of failure of nuclear reactor pressure vessels designed to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the design of nuclear facilities does not provide protection against reactor vessel failure. Prevention of …
DESCRIPTION Pipe cracking has occurred in the heat-affected zones of welds in primary system piping in BWRs since mid-1960. These cracks have occurred mainly in Type 304 stainless steel which is the type used in most operating BWRs. The major problem is …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background SRP [1] Section 3.6, issued in 1975, addressed pipe breaks outside containment by combining limited design basis breaks for mechanistic protection with unlimited breaks for non-mechanistic protection. Prior to this, …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This NUREG-0471 [1] item involved the development of a time criterion for safety-related operator actions (SROA), including a determination of whether or not automatic actuation was to be required. At the time this issue …
DESCRIPTION Applicants are required to provide confirmation of the adequacy of computer programs used in the structural analysis and design of piping systems and components. At the time this issue was identified, this consisted of applicants providing, …
DESCRIPTION Surface cracks have been discovered in control rod drive internal parts at some operating BWR plants. Although only observed to be localized in nature, this cracking, if propagated, could potentially affect the capability of the control rod …
DESCRIPTION GDC-53, "Provisions for Containment Testing and Inspection," requires in part that the reactor containment be designed to permit: (1) periodic inspection of all important areas, and (2) an appropriate surveillance program. 10 CFR 50, Appendix …
DESCRIPTION Combinations of fabrication, stress, and environmental conditions have resulted in isolated instances of stress corrosion cracking of low pressure Schedule 10 Type 304 stainless steel piping systems. Although these systems are not part of a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Structural damage to the primary system, including the reactor pressure vessel and internals, associated piping and steam generator tubing in PWRs, can be caused by vibrations of sufficient magnitude. These vibrations can …
DESCRIPTION Background Flow-induced vibrations caused by vortex shedding resulting from rapid area change, buffeting due to random flow turbulence, fluid structures interaction instability, leakage excitation, steady operation of positive displacement …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This concern was identified by the ACRS as a result of their review [1] of LERs covering a period from 1976 through 1978 and, subsequently, a comprehensive review of the problem was completed which covered the LERs and …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue apparently originated as a DOR proposal and was discussed in SECY-80-325. [1] The issue as previously evaluated [2] is whether periodic replacement of the squib charges and circuit checks of the traveling …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background A memorandum [1] from AEOD to NRR dated May 23, 1980 drew attention to the generic issue of BWR jet pump integrity. The concern that motivated the AEOD memo was a February 1980 jet pump failure at Dresden Unit 3, together …

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