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NUREG 0933

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DESCRIPTION Historical Background In the event of a LOCA in which offsite power remains available, the reactor operator may choose to shut down the emergency diesel generators shortly after the LOCA. If, after the diesels are shut down, offsite power is …
DESCRIPTION On November 10, 1979, an event occurred at the Oconee Power Station, Unit 3, that resulted in loss of power to a non-Class 1E 120-volt AC single-phase power panel that supplied power to the integrated control system (ICS) and the nonnuclear …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This concern was raised [1] because of the potential for a high-altitude nuclear weapon detonation causing a large electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which subsequently could induce large currents and voltages in electrical …
DESCRIPTION In a San Onofre Unit 1 Preliminary Notification issued in September 1980, it was reported that, during testing, the licensee had identified a problem with the design of the diesel generator sequencing circuitry. This problem occurred when a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated in response to an immediate action memorandum [1] issued by AEOD in September 1981 regarding desiccant contamination of instrument air lines. NRR responded to the AEOD memorandum by establishing a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This proposed generic issue has its origin in a January 1981 event at Millstone Unit 2. [1] An operator inadvertently opened a 125V DC main feeder breaker, causing the loss of one of the two redundant emergency systems …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
DESCRIPTION An AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR on July 15, 1980, identified the concern that some operating nuclear power plants do not have technical specifications or Administrative controls governing operational restrictions for Class 1E 120 VAC vital …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR, it was concluded that the design of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, under certain conditions, allowed manual interconnection of redundant electrical load groups, thereby …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In August 1982, AEOD reviewed a number of LERs related to Class 1E safety related switchgear circuit breakers and found a high incidence of their failure to close on demand. A preliminary report was written and …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified at an NRC Operating Reactor Events meeting on January 7, 1982, [1] and addressed fire protection system (FPS) actuations that resulted in adverse interactions with safety-related equipment at …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] by DSI/NRR in August 1982 [2] following a search of LERs which suggested that additional licensing attention was needed for certain ancillary power plant equipment. The available information …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On August 12, 1983, one of the three emergency diesel generators (EDG) at the Shoreham Plant failed during overload testing as a result of a fractured crankshaft. The failure occurred in EDG-102 and similar crankshaft …
DESCRIPTION In the prioritization of Issue 22, "Inadvertent Boron Dilution," it was found that inadvertent boron dilution events during cold shutdown operation do not constitute a significant risk to the public. Further work by DSI confirmed this …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Combustible gases such as H 2 , propane, and acetylene are used during normal operations of nuclear power plants in limited quantities and for relatively short periods of time. H 2 , the most prevalent of these gases in …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a DL/NRR memorandum [1] which called for an assessment of the high failure frequency of main transformers and the resultant safety implications. Concern for this issue arose when the North …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a DST/NRR memorandum [1] which addressed a condition in which some protective devices intended to trip active engineered safety features (ESF) components, under indication of equipment …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a RRAB memorandum [1] in March 1985 and addressed the possibility of relay contact chatter during a seismic event and its resulting effect upon safety and safety-related electrical control …
DESCRIPTION In December 1984, the staff recommended in SECY-83-357B [1] that rulemaking with regard to H 2 control for LWRs with large, dry containments could be safely deferred due to the greater inherent capability of these containments to accommodate …
DESCRIPTION Following the NRR reorganization in November 1985, EIB/DSRO was responsible for resolving three issues that were directly related to onsite electrical systems: Issue 48, "LCO for Class 1E Vital Instrument Buses in Operating Reactors"; Issue …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified by NRR/EIB in February 1986 when it was suggested that Issue 106, "Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas," be expanded to include new safety concerns associated with the …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified as an alternative approach to the Finding 15 recommendation [1] discussed in Issue 125.I.5, "Safety Systems Tested in All Conditions Required by DBA," which states that "[t]horough integrated …
DESCRIPTION This issue was identified [1] by NRR to address the concerns raised during the licensing of Nine Mile Point Unit 2. On February 7, 1985, Niagara Mohawk submitted to the NRC a report on "Non-Class 1E Devices Connected to Class 1E Power …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] by NRR as a result of a diagnostic evaluation team inspection of the SWS at Zion, a multiplant site. The inspection identified the potential for some additional shared systems to have an …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Issue 106 was resolved with the issuance of Generic Letter 93-06, "Research Results on Generic Safety Issue 106, Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas," dated October 25, 1993, [1] which included …

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