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NUREG 0933

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DESCRIPTION The concern of this issue involves the requirement for verification that the balance-of-plant equipment satisfies the design intent. This issue was identified in NUREG-0705. [1] CONCLUSION Task I.F in NUREG-0660, [2] the TMI Action Plan, is a …
DESCRIPTION Background Flow-induced vibrations caused by vortex shedding resulting from rapid area change, buffeting due to random flow turbulence, fluid structures interaction instability, leakage excitation, steady operation of positive displacement …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Cracking has occurred in PWR piping systems as a result of stress corrosion, vibratory and thermal fatigue, and dynamic loading. However, as of February 1981, no cracking had been experienced in the primary system piping …
DESCRIPTION This issue involves a potential deficiency in the ability to control leakage past the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) in BWR plants. Requirements for MSIV leakage control systems outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.96 [1] were developed as a …
DESCRIPTION Background This issue addressed the high rate of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failures that challenge the makeup capacity of the ECCS in PWRs. At the time this issue was identified [1] in 1980, RCP seal failures in BWRs occurred at a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Prior to 1981, the number of bolting-related incidents reported by licensees was on the increase. A large number of these were related to primary pressure boundary applications and major component support structures. As a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when AEOD expressed concerns about the use inside containment of a particular polymer coating that could flake off and fail when subjected to DBA conditions. In addition to the concern for …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated in response to an immediate action memorandum [1] issued by AEOD in September 1981 regarding desiccant contamination of instrument air lines. NRR responded to the AEOD memorandum by establishing a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In December 1981, AEOD completed a survey of valve operator-related events that occurred during 1978, 1979, and 1980 and submitted a draft report [1] to NRR for comment. In this study, AEOD established that motor- …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified at an NRC Operating Reactor Events meeting on January 7, 1982, [1] and addressed fire protection system (FPS) actuations that resulted in adverse interactions with safety-related equipment at …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Increasing attention has recently been focused on the integrity of RCP seals due to loss of cooling to the seals both in connection with PRA studies which are currently under review and from operating experience. [1] , …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Cracks were found in the normal make-up high pressure injection (MU/HPI) nozzles of several B&W plants following an inspection of the 8 B&W plants licensed to operate. These cracks appeared to be directly related to loose …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background PORVs and block valves were originally designed as non-safety components in the reactor pressure control system for use only when plants are in operation. The block valves were installed because of expected leakage from …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On two occasions (February 22 and 25, 1983), Salem Unit 1 failed to scram automatically due to failure of both reactor trip breakers to open on receipt of an actuation signal. In both cases, the unit was successfully …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background The HPCI steam supply line has two containment isolation valves in series: one inside and one outside of the containment. Both are normally open in most plants; however, two plants were found to operate with the HPCI …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was recommended [1] for prioritization by DSI after a review of the AEOD engineering evaluation report (AEOD/E325) [2] on vapor binding of the AFW pumps at H.B.Robinson Unit 2. Further AEOD study of the event …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified during the staff review of the Indian Point 2 and Zion PRAs [1] ; in both of these studies, the dominant interfacing systems LOCA events were estimated to be through the RHR suction valves. The …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background During the review of LaSalle, ASB identified a potential problem which could be generic to all BWRs. [1] [2] The problem relates to ability of the CRD accumulators to retain pressure for a sufficient period of time after …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 17, 1984, a DSI memorandum [1] on the subject of RHR interlocks for W plants described staff concerns that the design basis for RHR interlocks had been misunderstood and that these concerns had not been …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Issue B-63, which was resolved and implemented as MPA B-45, required leak-testing of the check valves that isolate those low pressure systems that are connected to the RCS outside the containment. However, except for …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a DST/NRR memorandum [1] which addressed a condition in which some protective devices intended to trip active engineered safety features (ESF) components, under indication of equipment …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] in March 1985 to address the staff's concern that there were no requirements for dynamic qualification testing or dynamic surveillance testing of large bore hydraulic snubbers (> 50 kips load …
DESCRIPTION The loss of all feedwater event at Davis-Besse on June 9, 1985, resulted in the formation of an NRC project team to investigate the event. The team's findings were published in NUREG-1154 [1] and were subsequently reviewed by DL/NRR. As a …
DESCRIPTION In 1985, operating experience as well as staff and industry studies indicated that AFW systems continued to fail at a high rate. These studies also indicated that plants with similar AFW system reliabilities (as calculated in accordance with …

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