The staff's assessment of the implications of the Chernobyl accident on the safety regulation of U.S. commercial
nuclear power plants, as reported in NUREG-1251, [1]led to the conclusion that no immediate changes in NRC's regulations regarding the design or operation of U.S. commercial reactors were needed. However, further consideration of certain issues was recommended, most of which were found to be already under consideration as a part of ongoing NRC work.
This section includes all the work recommended in NUREG-1251 [2]and outlined in the staff's follow-up
program, SECY-89-081. [3]As noted in NUREG-1251, [4]the Chernobyl experience will continue to be taken into account in various areas of reactor safety. The follow-up program was limited to work on those issues whose relationship to the events at Chernobyl was direct, clear, and substantial, but with reasonable extrapolation
to account for the large differences in specific design and operational features. Other work that was generally related to severe accidents was to be pursued (or considered for pursuit), in accordance with established
procedures, outside the Chernobyl follow-up program. [5]
The tasks contained in this section follow the numbering sequence of the various chapters in NUREG-1251. [6]
The issues identified for further pursuit under each task follow the labeling of the follow-up program. [7]
[1] NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vols. I and II) April 1989.
[2] NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vols. I and II) April 1989.
[3] SECY-89-081, "Final Report on Chernobyl Implications," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 7, 1989. [8903200205]
[4] NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vols. I and II) April 1989.
[5] SECY-89-081, "Final Report on Chernobyl Implications," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 7, 1989. [8903200205]
[6] NUREG-1251, "Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vols. I and II) April 1989.
[7] SECY-89-081, "Final Report on Chernobyl Implications," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 7, 1989. [8903200205]
- Task CH1: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES: Administrative Controls to Ensure That Procedures Are Followed and That Procedures Are Adequate: Symptom-Based EOPs
- Task CH2: DESIGN: Reactivity Accidents: Reactivity Transients
- Task CH3: CONTAINMENT: Containment Performance During Severe Accidents: Containment Performance
- Task CH4: EMERGENCY PLANNING: Size of the Emergency Planning Zones
- Task CH5: SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA: Source Term: Mechanical Dispersal in Fission Product Release
- Task CH6: GRAPHITE-MODERATED REACTORS: Graphite-Moderated Reactors: The Fort St. Vrain Reactor and the Modular HTGR