Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Task III.A: Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Effects ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–35 )
TASK III.A.1: IMPROVE LICENSEE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - SHORT-TERM
The objectives of this task were to improve and upgrade licensee emergency preparedness by requiring improvements in facilities, plans, procedures, offsite support, technical assistance, equipment, and supplies required to adequately respond to and manage an accident.
ITEM III.A.1.1: UPGRADE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The two parts of this item are evaluately separately below.
ITEM III.A.1.1(1): IMPLEMENT ACTION PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMPTLY IMPROVING LICENSEE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
DESCRIPTION
This TMI Action Plan48 item called for licensees to promptly upgrade their overall state of emergency preparedness for accidents, including the integration of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness. The plan for staff review of licensee actions was documented in SECY-79-450.
In the short-term, the staff was directed to make an integrated assessment of licensee, local, and state capabilities and interfaces based on: (1) a review of existing plans and a meeting in each site area to communicate upgraded criteria and to identify to licensees the areas requiring improvements; and (2) a review of upgraded licensee, local, and state plans submitted by each licensee, after the site visit was summarized in an SER. A status report on this item was issued in December 1981.248
CONCLUSION
This item was clarified in NUREG-073798 and requirements were issued.
ITEM III.A.1.1(2): PERFORM AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
DESCRIPTION
This TMI Action Plan48 item called for the staff to perform a long-term integrated assessment of the implementation of the actions required by Item III.A.1.1(1). This assessment consisted of: (1) a review of implementation procedures, including onsite and offsite personnel and equipment; (2) observation and critique of exercise involving licensee, local, and state capabilities; and (3) observation and critique of exercises involving licensee, local, state, and federal capabilities.
CONCLUSION
Procedures for routine, periodic inspection of licensees' emergency preparedness programs were developed by the staff and used for subsequent routine inspections; observation of exercises is an ongoing function of the regions. Thus, this item was RESOLVED and no new requirements were established.
ITEM III.A.1.2: UPGRADE LICENSEE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FACILITIES
The three parts of this item are evaluated separately below.
ITEM III.A.1.2(1): TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
DESCRIPTION
This TMI Action Plan48 item called for a dedicated Technical Support Center (TSC) to provide a place for management and technical personnel to support reactor control functions, to evaluate and diagnose plant conditions, and for a more orderly conduct of emergency operations. The TSC was required to be separate from but near the control room and was expected to have the capability to dis-play and transmit plant status to those individuals knowledgable of and responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations, in the event of an accident.
CONCLUSION
This item was clarified in both NUREG-073798 and Generic Letter No. 82-33376 and requirements were issued.
ITEM III.A.1.2(2): ON-SITE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER
DESCRIPTION
This TMI Action Plan48 item called for the establishment of an Operational Support Center (OSC) separate from the control room as a place in which operations support personnel could assemble in an emergency situation to receive instructions from the operating staff. The OSC was to be provided with communication capability with the plant control room, TSC, and the near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
CONCLUSION
This item was clarified in both NUREG-073798 and Generic Letter No. 82-33376 and requirements were issued.
ITEM III.A.1.2(3): NEAR-SITE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY
DESCRIPTION
This TMI Action Plan48 item called for a near-site EOF to provide a planned, organized, central focal point for coordination of onsite and offsite activities for reactor emergency situations. The EOF was required to be operated by licensees and sized and equipped to function as a center for: (1) licensee command and control functions of onsite operations and evaluation and coordination of all onsite and offsite licensee activities related to an emergency having actual or potential environmental consequences; and (2) analysis of plant efflu-ent monitors, meteorological conditions, and offsite radiation measurements, and for offsite dose projections.
CONCLUSION
This item was clarified in both NUREG-073798 and Generic Letter No. 82-33376 and requirements were issued.
ITEM III.A.1.3: MAINTAIN SUPPLIES OF THYROID BLOCKING AGENT
Both parts of this item were combined and evaluated together.
DESCRIPTION
Historical Background
This TMI Action Plan item48 addressed the issue of providing potassium iodide (KI) as a thyroid blocking agent for nuclear power plant onsite personnel, off-site emergency response personnel, and the general population near nuclear power plants. NUREG-0654224 required licensees to have adequate supplies of KI available for onsite personnel and for offsite emergency response support personnel, including offsite agencies. The item also called for an evaluation by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding use of KI by the general public.
In accordance with SECY-82-396A,369 RES was expected to complete a technical paper which evaluated the cost/benefit of the use of KI by the general public. These results were to be sent to the other federal agencies involved with the final decision.
Safety Significance
It is possible that a nuclear power reactor accident could release radionuclides, including isotopes of radioiodine, into the environment. The radioactive iodine, if taken up by the thyroid gland, could induce nodules of cancer in the thyroid.64
Possible Solution
If stockpiles of KI are made available for public use, the KI could help prevent radiation injury to the thyroid gland by saturating the gland with non-radioactive iodine.64 This would block the thyroid from taking up the radioactive iodine.
CONCLUSION
The licensees are already required to maintain supplies of the thyroid blocking agent (KI) as a protective measure for emergency workers and other individuals onsite during an emergency.48,224 Therefore, Item III.A.1.3(1) was resolved.
Work completed by the staff on the subject of stockpiling KI for public use resulted in a cost/benefit study which was published in NUREG/CR-1433.831 HHS completed its recommendations on the methods for administration of KI to the general public (130 milligrams/day at projected thyroid doses of 25 rem or greater) and published them in the Federal Register in 1982 (47 FR 28158). NUREG/CR-1433831 showed that the use of KI by the general public has a very low cost/benefit ratio. FEMA, through a special subcommittee of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC), developed a draft federal policy statement in July 1982 on the use of KI for thyroid blocking by the gen-eral public. This draft policy statement left the decision on distribution and use of KI for thyroid blocking by the general public to the state and local authorities on a site-specific basis. The HHS guidance on KI use was addressed in the statement as well as many of the problems and difficulties in distribu-tion and administration of the drug (e.g., timeliness, interference with other protective actions, and limited protection). The NRC staff did not agree with the draft federal policy statement because it believed that the statement should recommend that KI not be distributed for use by the general public. A new cost/benefit study was prepared using an uncertainty analysis of the information in NUREG/CR-1433831 and showed that KI offered an extremely small benefit in relation to its cost over the uncertainty range.
The new cost/benefit study and prepared changes to the draft federal policy statement were reviewed by the ACRS and forwarded to the Commission for consideration in SECY-83-362.832 While the Commission was considering the staff posi-tion, FEMA decided to revise the draft federal policy statement because of the lack of concurrence by NRC and several other member agencies of the FRPCC. The Commission decided to review this new policy statement before responding to FEMA.
The new draft federal policy statement was completed by the FRPCC on March 26, 1985 and was sent to the Commission for review on May 13, 1985 (SECY-85-167).833
This new policy statement recommended against a nationwide requirement for the distribution or stockpiling of KI for use by the general public and left the final decision for its use to state and local authorities on a site-specific basis. On June 11, 1985, the Commission concurred with the new policy statement. FEMA published the policy statement in the Federal Register on July 24, 1985 (50 FR 30258). With the publication of the federal policy statement on the distribution and stockpiling of KI for use in the event of a nuclear power reactor accident, this item was RESOLVED and no new requirements were established.818
ITEM III.A.1.3(1): WORKERS
This item was evaluated in Item III.A.1.3 above and was determined to be RESOLVED. No new requirements were established.818
ITEM III.A.1.3(2): PUBLIC
This item was evaluated in Item III.A.1.3 above and was determined to be RESOLVED. No new requirements were established.818
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