Information Notice No. 84-54: Deficiencies in Design Base Documentation and Calculations Supporting Nuclear Power Plant Design
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-54 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 5, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-54: DEFICIENCIES IN DESIGN BASE DOCUMENTATION AND CALCULATIONS SUPPORTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESIGN Addressees: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding a construction permit (CP) or an operating license (OL). Purpose: This information notice is provided to alert CP or OL holders to some recent experiences during Integrated Design Inspections (IDIs) in which a common finding was deficiencies in design base documents and calculations supporting design of nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components. Recipients are expected to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to 10 CFR 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," establishes overall quality assurance requirements for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. Regulatory Guide 1.64, Rev. 2, "Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the pertinent requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 with respect to design activities. Regulatory Guide 1.64 endorses American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.11-1974, "Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," which states, in part, that "Applicable design inputs, such as design bases, regulatory requirements, codes and standards shall be identified, documented and their selection reviewed and approved." The ANSI N45.2.11 standard further states that "Design activities shall be documented in sufficient detail to permit verification ...." A common finding in IDIs conducted by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement has been deficiencies in design base documentation and calculations for nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components. In some instances, the design activities were based on engineering judgments or assumptions rather than supporting calculations. The problems primarily concern the availability of 8407030089 . IN 84-5 July 5, 1984 Page 2 of 2 valid up-to-date calculations supporting the design rather than the design itself. In some instances, valid, up-to-date analyses were not available and had to be generated or are being generated to substantiate the judgments or assumptions used in developing the final design. Examples of deficiencies in design base documentation and calculations follow: 1. Designers had made judgments that openings in the shear walls of the auxiliary building were not sufficiently large so as to change the distribution of forces in these walls. However, no evidence was found as to how this judgment or other similar judgments were made. The applicant is performing additional calculations to show that redistribution of forces is not a significant effect for various cases of wall openings. 2. Certain instrumentation set points associated with the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system were not supported by a formal calculation. Specifically, the pump suction pressure set points to initiate automatic transfer of AFW system fluid source and to provide protection against pump cavitation were determined from an informal handwritten sketch, which did not consider certain factors that would affect the set points. Subsequently, a documented calculation was performed to verify that the set points were consistent with system design requirements. In addition, the applicant has indicated that it will address the subject of basis for set points, set point accuracy requirements, and basis for reset values on a generic basis for safety-related instruments. 3. Independence of the instrumentation and control systems needed for accident mitigation and safe plant shutdown had not been demonstrated. Analyses of the plant design did not sufficiently consider the effects of postulated failures of non-qualified, non-safety-related instrumentation and controls on various plant systems. The set point/volume allowance calculations for the refueling water storage tank contained many assumptions where justification was not provided. This item is under review by the applicant. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or this office. Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: H. Wang, IE (301) 492-7226 Attachment: List of Recently Issued Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021