Information Notice No. 81-14: Potential Overstress of Shafts on Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly Valves with Expandable T Rings
SSINS No.: 6835 Accession No.: 8011040292 IN 81-14 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 7, 1981 Information Notice No. NO- 81-14: POTENTIAL OVERSTRESS OF SHAFTS ON FISHER SERIES 9200 BUTTERFLY VALVES WITH EXPANDABLE T RINGS Description of Circumstances: Northern States Power Company recently informed NRC that the design of certain butterfly valves at Monticello Nuclear Generating Station contained a design error that shows the calculated maximum shaft stress to be underestimated. The valves affected are Fisher Controls Company Series 9200 butterfly valves (6 to 48 inches) with expandable T rings (inflatable seals) manufactured from 1968 to 1972. In the calculation of the shaft stress, the length between the shaft bushing and the attachment of the shaft to the valve disc used in the stress calculations was shorter than the actual length. From discussions with the valve manufacturer, the cause of the difference in the design calculation dimension and the actual dimension was that the shaft bushings were recessed into the valve body to accommodate the pneumatic passages for the inflatable seals. Evaluation of the design error for the valves at Monticello indicate that the maximum shaft stress in the closed position remains less than the minimum yield strength of the shaft material. The licensee intends to keep the affected valves closed while operating and plans to replace the shafts with ones of higher strength material. The potential consequences of the design error is that, under accident loading conditions, there is a possibility for excessive deformation of the shaft. Therefore, these valves when closed under the dynamic conditions of a LOCA or, if already closed, may not seal essentially leaktight. Since these valves are used primarily in the containment purge and vent lines, a substantial safety hazard would exist if these valves could not be closed or if there was excessively leakage past these valves. Containment integrity therefore could not be assured. The operability of containment purge and vent valves is item II.E.4.2 in the TMI Action Plan. The facilities identified that may have the Fisher valves include Duane Arnold, Monticello, Palisades, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2. Discussions with the valve vendor indicate that the reviews of the valve calculations affected should be completed by mid-April. This information is provided as an early notification of a significant safety matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that licensees will review the information for possible applicability to their plants. If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested. . IN 81-14 April 17, 1981 Page 2 of 2 No written response to this information notice is required. If you need additional information with regard to this matter contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office. Attachment: Recently issued Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021