IE Circular 77-16, Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock-out Features
CR77016 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 9, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: B. H. Grier, Director, Region I J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III E. M. Howard, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V FROM: H. D. Thornburg, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, IE SUBJECT: IE CIRCULAR 77-16, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL TRIP LOCK-OUT FEATURES The subject document is transmitted for issuance on December 13, 1977. The Circular should be issued to all holders of Reactor Operating Licenses and Construction Permits. Also enclosed is a draft copy of the transmittal letter. Harold D. Thornburg, Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclosures: 1. Circular 77-16 2. Draft Transmittal Letter CONTACT: V. D. Thomas, IE 49-28180 . Transmittal letter for Circular 77-16, to each holder of an NRC Operating License and Construction Permit. Addressee: The enclosed Circular 77-16, is forwarded to you for information. If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office. Signature (Regional Director) Enclosure: IE Circular 77-16 . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 9, 1977 IE Circular 77-16 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL TRIP LOCK-OUT FEATURES Description of Circumstances: On June 15, 1977, Duquesne Light Company (Beaver Valley 1) reported that during the performance of a test of the diesel-generator (D/G) trip lock-out features in the emergency mode of operation, the D/G output circuit breaker opened when the field voltage trip interlock was tested. This is contrary to a requirement for this facility that, in the emergency mode, all D/G output breaker trips except generator differential and overcurrent be automatically disabled. The engine overspeed trip, which shuts down the diesel engine (but does not affect breaker operation) is also expected to be operable during the emergency mode of operation. An investigation conducted by the licensee disclosed that the unexpected opening of the output breaker was due to deenergizing a field voltage sensing relay which was supplied by the vendor but had not been disconnected during the on-site acceptance testing of the D/G nor disabled by the protection circuitry logic. A redundant field voltage relay which was supplied by the licensee is correctly by-passed during fast start conditions and emergency operation. 1 of 3 . IE Circular 77-16 December 9, 1977 A design change was initiated by the licensee which removed the field voltage trip feature. This was accomplished by disconnecting the set of relay contacts to the trip circuitry of the D/G output breaker. Subsequent testing of the D/G was performed by the licensee which demonstrated satisfactory operation. This is an example of an event which resulted from inadequate test procedure performance. The procedures as performed had not previously identified the type of deficiency described in this circular. The safety significance of this situation is that the premodified protection circuitry would have opened the circuit breaker if a loss of field voltage occurred while running in the emergency mode of operation. The D/G Units for the above facility were supplied by the Electro Motive Division (EMD) of General Motors. The model numbers for the D/G Units are: Engine Model No. 20-645-E4 Generator Model No. A-20-C2 Control Panel Model No. 999-20 2 of 3 . IE Circular 77-16 December 9, 1977 All holders of operating licenses or construction permits should assure that the appropriate D/G protection trip circuits are provided with automatic by-pass features that prevent them from negating automatic starting or tripping of D/Gs during fast start or emergency operations. It is recommended that the following be considered in your reviews of this matter: 1. Facility procedures should specifically determine whether the protection circuitry that trips the D/G set or the associated output breaker is in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications. 2. Test procedures for your D/G sets (e.g. acceptance preoperational and surveillance tests) should be reviewed to assure that D/G system performance is demonstrated by these tests to be in accordance with related operational requirements specified in the facility Technical Specifications. 3. Strengthening of management controls should be reviewed as necessary to assure adherence to D/G test procedures by plant personnel. No written response to this circular is required. If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office. 3 of 3
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021