United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

LICENSEE: ENTERGY OPERATIONS INC.
SITE: WATERFORD 3 EVENT NOTIFICATION NUMBER: 37698
DOCKET: EVENT DATE: 01/28/2001
RX TYPE: PWR EVENT TIME:  22:45
VENDORS:   CE NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/2001
EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A REGION:4 STATE:LA TIME: 05:36
HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD
10 CFR SECTION: *INC POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
*DEG DEGRAD COND DURING OP
UNIT  SCRAM  RX  INIT  INITIAL MODE  CURR  CURRENT MODE
CODE  CRIT PWR                    PWR
3  N     Y     100     Power Operation  100  Power Operation

PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES FAILED TO CLOSE

At 2245 on 1/28/01 it was discovered that PSL-303 and PSL-304, Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Inside and Outside Containment Isolation Valves would not close when their respective control switches at OP-8 in the Control Room were taken to the "Close" position. The valves had been open since 1455 that same day to perform degas of the Pressurizer. The Nuclear Plant Operator first took the switch for PSL-304 to the "Close" position and observed that the valve continued to indicate "Open". He then took the Switch for PSL-303 to the "Close" position, and observed that valve continue to indicate "Open". Technical Specification 3.6.3 was entered and a Nuclear Auxiliary Operator was dispatched to verify the position of PSL-304 locally. PSL-304 was found to be in the open position and the on-shift chemistry technician confirmed that there were still indications of flow through the sample line. Another attempt to close PSL-304 was made using the switch on CP-8 in the control room. The Nuclear Auxiliary Operator observed that the valve moved approximately one quarter-inch in the closed direction. At 2257 PSL-304 was closed using the manual gagging device. At 2310 PSL-304 was de-energized to comply with the action requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3.b. At 0007 on 1/29/01, another attempt was made to close PSL-303 using the control switch at OP-8. This attempt was successful. The affected containment penetration is a one-half-inch line and is currently isolated. They are investigating the cause.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * UPDATE AT 1717 ON 3/21/01, BY PIPKINS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *

"This is an update to Event Number 37698, which was reported on 1/29/2001 at 05:36 [EST]. After further evaluation by Entergy, the valve vendor (Flowserve Engineering) was notified (March 16, 2001) concerning an apparent defect in design related to inadequate internal valve clearances that resulted in galling and subsequent binding of the subject valves (PSL-303 and PSL-304). The vendor was asked to review the condition as a potential 10 CFR Part 21 [report]. The vendor contacted Entergy today (3/21/01) and indicated that, after review, they agree that the valve failure is a Part 21 issue and agreed to issue the Part 21. The subject valves are 1/2 inch, 2500 Ib, WKM model 70-18-9 DRTS cage-guided globe valves. In addition to the original reporting criteria given in the call on 1/29/2001, the condition is also reportable under 10 CFR50.72.(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a condition involving principal safety barriers being seriously degraded. Entergy has reviewed all of the safety-related applications of the subject valves at Waterford 3 for other potential cases of common mode failure."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center notified the R4DO (Pellet).

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012