United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9903120178


Coltec Industries Fairbanks Morse
Engine Division
701 White Avenue
Beloit, WI 53511-5492
www.fairbanksmorse.com

608/364-4411
Fax: 6081364-0382

March 8, 1999

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
File No. 99-002

Subject: ALCO Air and Exhaust Valve Cam Rollers

On February 9, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division (FMED), became aware of a potential safety hazard associated with the air and exhaust valve cam rollers Catalog number 2241342 for FM-ALCO 251 engines. FMED had supplied the suspect rollers in six fuel pump support kits Catalog number 2500605 to Consolidated Edison - Indian Point 2 nuclear power station on November 14, 1997. Based on a review of FMED records, Consolidated Edison is the only nuclear utility that is impacted.

Engineering and Quality Assurance determined the cause to be improper heat treatment of the cam rollers, which results in premature wear of the roller and possible damage to the camshaft lobe, roller pin, and push rod. FM-ALCO specifications require the rollers to be carburized, to ensure adequate case depth hardness and surface hardness. However, the suspect rollers were induction hardened, which resulted in inadequate case depth hardness and surface hardness. FMED Receiving Supervisor failed to note the improper heat treatment process upon review of the certifications from the supplier of the cam rollers. In addition, the commercial grade dedication process for the cam rollers used non- conservative tolerances for the surface hardness of the rollers.

FMED has taken corrective action to prevent recurrence by retraining the Receiving Supervisor and the engineering personnel who develop the dedication processes. In addition, the tolerance used during the dedication process for the cam rollers has been changed. Other tolerances will be reviewed as parts are dedicated.

It should be noted that FMED has not be notified, nor is aware of any air and exhaust valve cam roller failures that have occurred at any nuclear facilities. The failures that have occurred have been in commercial applications after approximately 200 hours of operation.

Sincerely,

James C. Golding
Senior Quality Assurance Engineer

Cc:

Terry Gill
Mary Armfield
Ted Stevenson
Greg Gutoski
Mario Lavin

A division of Coltec Industries Inc.


03/08/1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 1
 
General Information or Other (PAR) Event# 35448
 
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION
Supplier: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE DIVISION
Notification Date / Time: 03/0811999 15:29 (EST)
Event Date / Time: 03/08/1999 14:20 (CST)
Last Modification: 03/08/1999
 
Region: 3 Docket #:
City: BELOIT Agreement State: No
County: License #:
State: WI
 
NRC Notified by: Notifications: RONALD GARDNER R3
 
HQ Ops Officer: FANGIE JONES VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR
 
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
 
10 CFR Section: 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT REGARDING IMPROPER HEAT TREATMENT TO CAM ROLLERS

On February 9, 1999, Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division (FMED), became aware of a potential safety hazard associated with the air and exhaust valve cam rollers for FM-ALCO 251 engines. Final analysis was completed on March 8, 1999 by Engineering and Quality Assurance. They determined the cause to be improper heat treatment of the cam rollers, which results in premature wear of the roller and possible damage to the camshaft lobe, roller pin, and push rod. The suspect rollers were induction hardened, which resulted in inadequate case depth hardness and surface hardness.

FMED had supplied the suspect rollers to Consolidated Edison Indian Point 2 nuclear power station on November 14, 1997. Based on a review of FMED records, Consolidated Edison is the only nuclear utility that is impacted.

FMED has taken corrective action-to prevent reoccurrence. In addition, the tolerance used during the dedication process for the cam rollers has been changed. Other tolerances will be reviewed as parts are dedicated.

It should be noted that FMED has not been notified, nor is it aware of any air and exhaust valve cam roller failures that have occurred at any nuclear facilities. The failures that have occurred have been in commercial applications after approximately 200 hours of operation.


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April 14, 1999

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