United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9803240135







1400 Opus Place

Downers Grove, IL 60515

                                                                    ComEd



March 16, 1998



Document Control Desk

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-001



Subject:       Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2&3;

               NRC Dockets: 50-237 and 50-249

               LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 

               NRC Dockets: 50-373 and 50-374

               Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2

               NRC Dockets: 50-254 and 50-265



               10CFRPart 21 Notification

               SBM Control Switch Binding



Reference:     GE Nuclear Energy January 23, 1998 Transfer of Information

               Pursuant to 10CFR Part 21.21(b) re: "Spring Return Binding

               in GE Type SBM Control Switches"



Applicability



This notification is submitted in accordance with the requirements of

10CFR Part 21.



Identification of Facilities and Components



Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3

LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2

Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2



GE Type SBM Control Switches with the spring return function manufactured

since March 1996.  Applicable date codes: PL, RL, SL, TL, UL, VL, WL, XL,

YL, ZL, NM, OM, PM, RM, SM, UM, VM, WM, XM, YM, ZM, NN.



Identification of Component Manufacturer/Supplier



Manufactured by:    GE Electrical Distribution and Control Power

                    Management

                    Malvern, Pennsylvania

                    as commercial grade items



g:\sbmp21.doc



A Unicom Company





Document Control Desk             - 2-                     March 16, 1998



Dedicated by:  GE-Nuclear Energy

               175 Curtner Ave,

               San Jose, California 95125



Nature of Defect



As described more fully in the referenced GE transfer of information

submittal in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(b), SBM switches identified

above are susceptible to binding which may prevent spring return to reset

(return to normal position).  The cause of binding is attributed to

failure to account for "post mold cure" shrinkage in the design tolerance

of the clearance between the phenolic rear bearing support hole and the

bearing. This design error did not become apparent until the molds

experienced wear to the extent that resulting parts were at the extremes

of dimensional tolerances.  The post mold cure is normal for the phenolic

material and has been shown to take place over a period up to two years

after molding is completed.  Consequently switches which are constructed

from components that are within specification and function fully during

acceptance testing may exhibit sluggish return or binding up to two years

after assembly.  This root cause is supported through GE examination of

failed switches which, in each instance, has found the bearing support

hole to be undersized (less than minimum inside diameter) and the bearing

at or near its maximum allowable diameter.  GE testing has also confirmed

that switches with bearings that are at their nominal diameter will

function properly, even when the support hole is undersized, consequently

the failure is not seen in every switch.



Time of Discovery



Commonwealth Edison determined that the failure was a potential defect

subject to the provisions of 10CFR Part 21 on January 27, 1998, Final

determination that the defect was reportable per 10 CFR Part 21 was made

on March 16, 1998.



Number and Location of All Defective Components



Commonwealth Edison has determined that suspect SBM switches are not

installed at its Braidwood, Byron or Zion Nuclear Generating Stations. 

Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Generating Stations which have the suspect

safety related spring return switches include Dresden, LaSalle County and

Quad Cities with two (2), two hundred forty six (246), and three (3)

switches installed respectively.  LaSalle County Station is currently

experiencing binding in 21 of these switches.





Corrective Actions



Commonwealth Edison facilities having the suspect safety related SBM

switches have established Operability Determinations which demonstrate

affected systems remain operable while prompt corrective action is

pursued.  Measures have been taken at Dresden and Quad Cities Stations,

which have only 2 and 3 switches susceptible to binding respectively, to

heighten operator awareness of the condition through placement of caution

cards on the affected switches, Additionally, these facilities have

initiated Action Requests to replace the switches with switches not

subject to the identified condition at the first available opportunity. 

Both of the LaSalle County Station units are currently in extended

maintenance outages.



g:\sbmp21.doc





Document Control Desk             - 3-                     March 16, 1998



LaSalle County Station has established operability by heightening

operator awareness through communication and is currently establishing

the scope of additional compensatory and corrective action plans to

demonstrate operability as applied to future plant operating conditions.



10CFR Part 21 Evaluation



In The course of evaluating the condition reported by GE in the

referenced transfer of information notice, Commonwealth Edison has

concluded that, in the absence of compensatory action, the reported

deviation substantially increases the likelihood of switch failure when

compared to a nominal base case switch failure rate without the reported

condition.  Since the switches control the operation of various equipment

important to plant safety, this increase in failure rate without

compensatory action has been determined to constitute a defect

representing a substantial safety hazard per the requirements of 10CFR

Part 21 and is reportable to the NRC.



Contacts



Questions pertaining to this notification should be addressed to this

office or by contacting:



Robert N. Cascarano           Jeffrey Nagel

Nuclear Engineering Services  Technical Support & Parts Engineering

Design Basis Programs         Central Testing & Materials Engineering

                              Facility

1400 Opus Place, Suite 300    555 Joliet Road

Downers Grove, Ill 60515      Bolingbrook, Ill 60446

(630) 663-7489                (630) 783-3150



Sincerely,



John B. Hosmer

Engineering Vice President

Nuclear Generation Group

Commonwealth Edison Company



cc:  A. Bill Beach, Regional Administrator - Region III

     Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden Station

     Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle County Station

     Senior Resident Inspector, Quad Cities Station

     NRR Project Manager, Dresden Station

     NRR Project Manager, LaSalle County Station

     NRR Project Manager, Quad Cities Station

     Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - IDNS

     Irene Johnson

     DCD Licensing



g:\sbmp21.doc





Commonwealth Edison Company                            EXHIBIT A

Nuclear Operations Division                            NEP-10-02

                                                       Revision 1

                                                       Page 2 of 2



                   10CFR PART 21 EVALUATION CHECKLIST



1.   Engineering Part 21 File Number 98-01



2.   Document Generated By General Electric



3.   Date of Document 1/23/98

4.   Document Identification Number(s) if any GE Notification Number

     SC98-01

5.   Deviation Identified Spring Return Binding in GE Type SBM Control

     Switches

6.   Vendor notified: N/A

     Date: N/A

     Person Contacted: N/A



7.   Has vendor assume responsibility for evaluating for Part 21

     applicability, and has the vendor reported the defect to NRC?

     YES []    NO [X]



     Completion date N/A



     If YES, the evaluation is closed.



          N/A                           N/A

     Evaluating Engineer                Date



          N/A                           N/A

     Evaluating Engineer Supervisor     Date



     If NO, then proceed by completing the remainder of the checklist.



8.   Is there a Deviation as defined in Section 4.4?



     Yes [X]   No [ ]



     Provide basis for above conclusion.

     Notification of possible failure of certain GE Type SBM Control

     Switches with spring return function was issued by GE as a transfer

     of information pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b). The possible failure was

     determined to meet the threshold for a substantial safety hazard

     based on failure analysis indicating a substantial increase in

     likelihood of switch failure where switches control the operation of

     various equipment important to plant safety.



g:\nep-p21.doc





Commonwealth Edison Company                            EXHIBIT A

Nuclear Operations Division                            NEP-10-02

                                                       Revision 1

                                                       Page 2 of 2



                   10CFR PART 21 EVALUATION CHECKLIST



9.   Does the Deviation have the potential for impacting system,

     structure, or component Operability as defined in the Technical

     Specification?      YES [X]   NO [ ]



     If NO, provide reason N/A.



     If YES, Notify the appropriate Supervisor to determine if an

     Operability Evaluation must be completed.  Operability Assessments

     have been established for all affected ComEd facilities.



10.  Is 10CFR21 notification to NRC required.  YES  [X]  NO  [ ]



     If YES, explain why, and which item of paragraph 5.1.1

     occurred/could occur.  A major deficiency involving parts which

     could adversely the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain

     it in a safe shutdown condition. (Paragraph 5.1.1.A.3.)



     If NO, provide basis for conclusion.

     N/A.



     Corrective Action which has been, is being, or will be taken.

     Dresden & Quad Cities will be, replacing switches at first available

     opportunity.  LaSalle will be replacing binding switches at first

     available opportunity and is currently evaluating scope of

     additional corrective action.



     This information is applicable to the following Station(s):



     [ ] Braidwood       [X] Dresden         [X] Quad Cities

     [ ] Byron           [X] LaSalle         [ ] Zion



     This evaluation was not performed for the following Stations:



     [X] Braidwood       [ ] Dresden         [ ] Quad Cities

     [X] Byron           [ ] LaSalle         [X] Zion



     Provide explanation for each station not evaluated.

     Braidwood, Byron & Zion evaluated the concern and determined the

     have no SBM switches of the subject population



     Evaluation conducted by                      Date

                              Evaluating Engineer



     Concur with evaluation and evaluation is closed,



                                                  Date

          Evaluating Engineer Supervisor



g:\nep-p21.doc





March 16, 1998                          NEP 10-02 Attachment I Item 98-01



                       PART 21 EVALUATION SUMMARY

                   GE Type SBM Control Switch Binding



-    On January 23, 1998, GE issued a 10CFR Part 21.21 (b) Transfer of

     information concerning the possible failure of certain GE Type SBM

     Control Switches with the spring return function to reset properly

     after operation.  GE determined it was not possible for them to

     evaluate the safety functions of the switches which are supplied to

     several nuclear power plants for unspecified safety related

     applications.  As such, GE concluded it was not possible for them to

     evaluate the safety significance of possible failures to determine

     if a defect exists in the context of 10CFR Part 21.



-    Commonwealth Edison determined the scope of applicability of the

     reported issue to affect Dresden, LaSalle County, and Quad Cities

     Stations which have two (2), two hundred forty six (246), and three

     (3) of the suspect switches installed in the plant.  None of the

     suspect switches have been installed at Braidwood, Byron or Zion

     stations.



-    Dresden and Quad Cities Stations have evaluated the condition in

     accordance with their site Operability Determination procedures,

     have placed caution cards on the subject switches and initiated

     action to replace the switches at the first available opportunity.



-    LaSalle County Station evaluated the condition in light of current

     plant status, with both units shutdown for extended maintenance

     outages, and established operability by heightening operator

     awareness through communication and is currently establishing the

     scope of additional compensatory and corrective action plans to

     demonstrate operability as applied to future plant operating

     conditions.



-    In the course of evaluating the condition reported by GE,

     Commonwealth Edison concluded, in the absence of compensatory

     action, the reported deviation may substantially increase the

     likelihood of switch failure when compared to a nominal base case

     switch failure rate without the reported condition.  Since the

     switches control the operation of various equipment important to

     plant safety, this increase in failure probability without

     compensatory action has been determined to constitute a defect

     representing a substantial safety hazard per the requirements of

     10CFR Part 21 and is reportable to the NRC.



Approval of this summary and the attached notification letter to the NRC

signifies appropriate notification to a Commonwealth Edison Officer as

require by 10CFR Part 21.





                               NEP 10-02 Attachment 1 Item 98-01 (cont'd)



R.N. Cascarano                     P.C. LeBlond

NES - Design Basis Programs        NES - Chief, Design Basis Programs



Approved                      Date:

          J.B. Hosmer

          Engineering Vice President



Attachments



1)   GE Transfer of Information Letter SC98-01 dated January 23, 1998

2)   March 16,1998 Commonwealth Edison Part 21 Notification to NRC with

     NEP 10-01, Exhibit A. "Part 21 Evaluation Checklist" dated March 16,

     1998





                                                        GE Nuclear Energy



                         General Electric Company

                         175 "illegible print", San Jose, CA 95123



January 23, 1998

98-01NRC.DOC

MFN 011-98



Document Control Desk

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555



Subject:  Spring Return Binding in GE Type SBM Control Switches



This letter provides information concerning the possible failure of

certain GE Type SBM Control Switches with the spring return function to

reset properly after operation.  While the failure mode has been

identified as an interference between the rear bearing and its support,

the root cause has not yet been determined and the total extent of the

problem is not fully known.  Until more definitive information is

available, GE Nuclear Energy (GE-NE) is conservatively assuming that SBM

Control Switches with the spring return function manufactured since March

1996 may be subject to this failure mode.  GE-NE is undertaking a test

program to determine the root cause failure mechanism and appropriate

remedial action (s), but the results of the investigation may not be

complete for several weeks.  Additional information will be provided when

it is available.



GE Type SBM Control Switches are manufactured by GE Electrical

Distribution and Control (GE-ED&C;) Power Management, Malvern, PA as

commercial grade items.  GE-NE has dedicated these switches and supplied

them to several licensees as basic components for unspecified, safety

related applications. Since the specific applications and associated

safety functions of the switches are not known to GE-NE, we have

transferred information pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21.21 (b) to those

licensees known to be affected.  However, since additional licensees may

have obtained these devices through other dedicating entities, we cannot

assure ourselves that all end-users have been notified.  We are therefore

providing this information to the NRC for appropriate action.



On January 6, 1998, GE-NE was advised by a licensee that a safety related

SRM Control Switch with the spring return function had failed to reset

(return to normal position) properly.  The switch (model

16SBMB3A02S152P1) was returned to GE-NE for evaluation with the support

of GE-ED&C; Relay Product Engineering.





The most probable failure mode was determined to be binding caused by

interference between the rear brass bearing and the phenolic rear bearing

support.  Subsequently, a second failed switch was returned, and

examination confirmed the same failure mode.  In addition, there have

been at least nine more switches identified by the licensee as failing to

reset properly after operating correctly for approximately one year.



Based on the preliminary investigation, the root cause is suspected to be

"post mold cure" shrinkage of the phenolic material used to construct

some of the switch components.  The failed devices have been examined

and, in each instance, the bearing support hole was found to be

undersized and the bearing was at, or near, its maximum allowable

diameter.  Devices with bearing that are at their nominal diameter

function properly, even when the support hole is undersized. 

Consequently, the failure is not seen in every switch.  The failure is

most likely preceded by a gradual increase in the force required to

operate the device and a sluggish return.



Although the interference can exist in any SBM Control Switch, binding is

primarily an issue in those devices that have the spring return function. 

In spring return switches, the reset spring does not generate enough

torque on the operating shaft to overcome the friction resulting from the

interference.  Thus, the operating handle, and consequently the contacts,

will not reset when the handle is released.  The switch contacts will

function when the switch is operated failed, if the switch is manually

returned to the reset (normal) position, the contacts will also return to

their normal configuration.  "Maintain position" SBM Control switches may

also have the interference, but the force required to overcome the

friction resulting from the interference is not great enough to prevent

proper function.  Nonetheless, it is considered good practice to assure

that these switches are in the proper position, as indicated by the match

pointer, before releasing the handle.



A loss of torque in the tie bolts that secure the switch components has

been observed in conjunction with the spring return binding.  The loss of

bolt torque is also postulated to be the result of the post mold cure

shrinkage and, although it has been noted in those devices that have

failed, it is not the cause of the binding and does not indicate

impending failure.



All of the failed switches identified to date were manufactured in the

period November 1996 through February 1997.  There have been no reports

of spring return binding in earlier SBM Control Switches, despite the

fact that these switches have been widely used in a variety of

application for many years.  Until more definitive information is

available concerning the root cause, GE-NE is conservatively assuming

that SBM Control Switches with the spring return function manufactured

since March 1996 may be subject to this failure mode.  The affected



                                    2





date codes are PL, RL, SL, TL, UL, VL, WL, XL, YL, ZL, NM, OM, PM, RM,

SM, UM, VM, WM, XM, YM, ZM, and NN.



There are two safety concerns with regard to spring return binding: (1)

possible damage to control circuitry caused by the circuit being

maintained in the energized state for a prolonged period; and (2) the

possibility that control circuit will be prevented from performing their

paper function by the failure of the switch contacts to return to their

reset (normal) configuration.



The consequences of the loss of torque in the tie bolts that secure the

switch components, and the resulting effect on the switch qualification,

have been evaluated.  The evaluation determined that the loss of torque

will not prevent proper operation or degrade the device qualification.



If SBM Control Switches with the spring return function, and manufactured

since March 1998, have been installed in safety related applications, it

is suggested that station personnel who operate these switches be advised

to return the operating handle to the normal position after Operation. 

This will preclude any control circuit difficulties.  It should be noted

that all of the switches identified to date as failing to reset properly

had previously operated correctly for approximately one year.



Additional information will be made available when GE-NE has completed

the test program to determine the root cause failure mechanism and

appropriate remedial [illegible print].



If you have any questions, please call me at (408) 925-1010.



Sincerely,



Michael A.  Smith, Program Manager

Safety Evaluations



cc:  S.  D.  Alexander (NRC-NRR/DISP/PSIB)

     G.  C.  Cwalina (NRC-NRR/DISP/PSIB)

     J.  F.  Quirk (GE-NE)

     H.  J.  Neems (GE-NE)

     G.  W.  Sanders (GE-NE)

     J.  A.  Steininger (GE-NE)

     J.  Teague (GE ED&C;/Malvern)

     GE-NE PRC File



                                    3





                                              10 CER Part 21 Notification



GE Nuclear Energy



SC98-01                                                  January 23, 1998



To:       BWR and PWR Utilities (per Attachment 1)



Subject:  Spring Return Binding in GE Type SBM Control Switches



[ ] Reportable Condition [21.21(d)]     [ ] 60 Day Interim Report

                                        [21.21(a)(2)] 



[x] Transfer of Information [21.21(b)]  [ ] Safety Information

                                        Communication





Summary



This Notification provides information concerning the possible failure of

certain GE Type SBM Control Switches with the spring return function to

reset properly after operation.  While the failure made has been

identified as an interference between the rear bearing and its support,

the root cause has not yet been determined and the total extent of the

problem is not fully known.  Until more definitive information is

available, GE Nuclear Energy is conservatively assuming that SBM Control

Switches with the spring return function manufactured since March 1996

may be subject to this failure mode.



GE Type SBM Control Switches are manufactured by GE Electrical

Distribution and Control (GE-ED&C;) Power Management, Malvern, PA as

commercial grade items.  GE Nuclear Energy (GE-NE) has dedicated these

switches and supplied them to several nuclear power plants for,

unspecified, safety related applications.  Since the specific application

and associated safety functions of the switches are not known, it is not

possible for GE-NE to evaluate the safety sign of possible failures to

determine if a defect exists in the context of 10CFR Part 21.  We are

therefore transferring the available information to the known affected

utilities for evaluation.



GE-NE is undertaking a test program to determine the root cause failure

mechanism and appropriate remedial action (s), but the results of the

investigation may not be complete for several weeks.  A supplement or

revision to this 10CFR Part 21 Notification will be issued when

additional information is available.



Issued by:

          M.  A.  Smith, Program Manager

          Safety Evaluations

          GE Nuclear Energy, M/C 187

          175 Curtner Avenue, San Jose, CA 95115

          (408) 925-1019



[Illegible print]





SC98-01



Background



GE Type SBM Control Switches are manufactured by GE-ED&C; Power

Management.  Malvern, PA as commercial grade items.  GE-NE dedicates

these switches  and supplies them to nuclear power plants as basic

components for safety related applications.



On January 6, 1998, GE-NE was advised by a licensee that a safety related

SBM Control Switch with the spring return function had failed to reset

(return to normal position) properly.  The switch (model

16SBMB3A02S1S2P1) was returned to GE-NE for evaluation with the support

of GE-ED&C; Relay Product Engineering.



The most probable failure mode was determined to be binding caused by

interference between the rear brass bearing and the phenolic rear bearing

support.  Subsequently, a second failed switch was returned, and

examination confirmed the same failure mode.  In addition, there have

been at least nine more switches identified by the licensee as failing to

reset properly after operating correctly for approximately one year.



Based an the preliminary investigation, the root cause is suspected to be

"past mold cure" shrinkage of the phenolic material used to construct

some of the switch components.  The failed devices have been examined

and, in each instance, the bearing support hole was found to be

undersized and the bearing was at, or near, its maximum allowable

diameter.  Devices with bearings that are at their nominal diameter

function properly, even when the support hole is undersized. 

Consequently, the failure is not seen in every switch.  The failure is

most likely preceded by a gradual increase in the force required to

operate the device and a sluggish return.



Although the interference can exist in any SBM Control Switch, binding is

primarily an issue in those devices that have the spring return function. 

In spring return switches, the reset spring does not generate enough

torque an the operating shaft to overcome the friction resulting from the

interference.  Thus, the operating handle, and consequently the contacts

will not reset when the handle is released.  The switch contacts will

function when the switch is operated and, if the switch is manually

returned to the reset (normal) position, the contacts will also return to

their normal configuration.  "Maintain position" SBM Control Switches may

also have the interference, but the force required to overcome the

friction resulting from the interference is not great enough to present

proper function.  Nonetheless, it is considered good practice to assure

that these switches are in the proper position, as indicated by the

switch pointer, before releasing the handle.



A loss of torque in the tie bolts that secure the switch components has

been observed in conjunction with the spring return binding.  The loss of

bolt torque is also postulated to be the result of the post mold cure

shrinkage and, although it has been noted in those devices that have

failed, it is not the cause of the binding and does not indicate

impending failure.



                                    2





SC98-01



All of the failed switches identified to date were manufactured in the

period November 1996 through February 1997.  There have been no reports

of spring return binding in earlier SBM Control Switches, despite the

fact that these switches have been widely used in a variety of

applications for many years.  Until more definitive information is

available concerning the root cause, GE-NE is conservatively assuming

that SBM Control Switches with the spring return function manufactured

since March 1996 may be subject to this failure mode.  The affected date

codes am PL, RL, SL, TL, UL, VL, WL XL, YL, ZL, NM, OM, PM, RM, SM, TM,

UM, VM, WM, XM, YM, ZM, and NN.



Safety Basis



There are two safety concerns with regard to spring return binding: (1)

possible damage to control circuitry caused by the circuit being

maintained in the energized state for a prolonged period; and (2) the

possibility that control circuits will be prevented from performing their

proper function by the failure of the switch contacts to return to their

reset (normal) configuration.



The consequences of the loss of torque in the tic bolts that secure the

switch components, and the resulting effect on the switch qualification,

have been evaluated.  The evaluation determined that the loss of torque

will not prevent proper operation or degrade the device qualification.



Corrective Actions and Preventive Measure



If SRM Control Switches with the spring return function, and manufactured

since March 1996, have been installed in safety related applications, it

is suggested that station personnel who operate these switches be advised

to return the operating handle to the normal position after operation. 

This will preclude any control circuit difficulties.



It should be noted that all of the switches identified to date as failing

to reset properly had previously operated correctly for approximately one

year.



Additional information will be made available when GE-NE has completed

the test program to determine the root cause failure mechanism and

appropriate remedial action(s).



                                    3





SC98-01



                     Attachment 1 - Affected Plants



          Utility                            Plan



x    Boston Edison Co                        Pilgrim

     Carolina Power & Light Co.              Brunswick 1

     Carolina Power & Light Co.              Brunswick 2

     Centerior Energy                        Perry 1

x    ComEd                                   CRIT Facility

x    ComEd                                   Dresden 2

x    ComEd                                   Dresden 3

x    ComEd                                   LaSalle 1

x    ComEd                                   LaSalle 2

x    ComEd                                   Quad Cities 1

x    ComEd                                   Quad Cities 2

     Consumers Power Co.                     Big Rock Point

     DTE Energy                              Fermi 2

     Entergy Operations, Inc.                Grand Golf

x    Entergy Operations, Inc.                River Bend

x    GPU Nuclear Corp.                       Oyster Creek

     IES Utilities, Inc.                     Duane Arnold

     Illinois Power Co.                      Clinton

x    Nebraska Public Power District          Cooper

x    New York Power Authority                FitzPatrick

     Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.              Nine Mile Point 1

     Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.              Nine Mile Point 2

x    Northern Utilities                      Millstone 1

     Northern States Power Co.               Monticello

     PECO Energy Co.                         Limerick 1

     PECO Energy Co.                         Limerick 2

     PECO Energy Co.                         Peach Bottom 2

     PECO Energy Co.                         Peach Bottom 3

     Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.          Susquehanna 1

     Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.          Susquehanna 2

     Pooled Equipment Inventory Co.          FIM

     Public Service Electric & Gas Co.       Hope Creek

x    Southern Nuclear Operating Co.          Hatch 1

x    Southern Nuclear Operating Co.          Hatch 2

x    Tennessee Valley Authority              Browns Ferry 1

x    Tennessee Valley Authority              Browns Ferry 2

x    Tennessee Valley Authority              Browns Ferry 3

x    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.      Vermont Yankee

     Washington Public Power Supply          WNP-2

     System



                                    4





SC-98-01



                     Attachment 1 - Affected Plants



          Utility                            Plan



x    Consumers Power Co.                     Palisades

x    Entergy Operations, Inc.                Arkansas Nuclear One 1

x    Entergy Operations, In.                 Arkansas Nuclear One 2

x    Florida Power & Light Co.               Turkey Point 3

x    Florida Power & Light Co.               Turkey Point 4

x    Florida Power & Light Co.               Crystal River 3

x    Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.           Maine Yankee

x    New York Power Authority                Indian Point 5

x    North Atlantic Energy Service Corp.     Seabrook

x    Omaha Public Power District             Fort Calhoun

x    Public Service Electric & Gas Co.       Salem 1

x    Public Service Electric & Gas Co.       Salem 2

x    Southern Nuclear Operating Co.          Vogtle 1

x    Southern Nuclear Operating Co.          Vogtle 2



                                    5



SC98-01 



Attachment 2 - 10 CFR Part 21 Notification for 1997/98



The following is a list of 10 CFR Part 21 Notifications that GE Nuclear

Energy has provided to affected licensees in 1997 and 1999 as Reportable

Conditions (RC), Transfers of Information (TI), Safety Information

Communications (SC) or 60 Day Interim Reports (60 Day).



                                    6





                                  ComEd



                             1400 OPUS Place

                         Downers Grove, IL 60515



                            TRANSMITTAL SHEET



DATE:



TO:



Organization Station Departments



                         FROM:

                         Department: NUCLEAR LICENSING

                         Telephone Number: (630) 663-



Transmittal Sheet Plus ___________ Page(s)

Telecopy Number:

If you have any problems receiving your telecopy, please call (630) 663-

7332



_________________________________________________________________________

                                  NOTES



Faxed by

Time:

Confirmed



k:lic faxcov.doc





GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER            EVENT NUMBER: 33917



LICENSEE: COMMONWEALTH EDISON           NOTIFICATION DATE:  03/18/98

    CITY: DOWNERS GROVE  REGION: 3      NOTIFICATION TIME:  16:37 [ET]

  COUNTY:                 STATE: IL     EVENT DATE:         03/16/98

LICENSE#:             AGREEMENT: Y      EVENT TIME:         00:00[CST]

DOCKET:                                 LAST UPDATE DATE:   03/18/98



                                                  NOTIFICATIONS



                                        MELVYN LEACH, REG 3 RDO



NRC NOTIFIED BY: GINA DISON             VERN HODGE          NRR

HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE           RICHARD BARKLEY     R1DO

                                        THOMAS JOHNSON      R2DO

EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE         LAWRENCE YANDELL    R4DO

10 CFR SECTION:

CCCC 21.21     UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH



                               EVENT TEXT



10CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING SPRING RETURN BINDING IN

GENERAL

ELECTRIC (GE) TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES AT DRESDEN, LASALLE, AND

QUAD

CITIES.



THIS NOTIFICATION REFERENCED A GE NUCLEAR ENERGY TRANSFER OF

INFORMATION

DATED JANUARY 23, 1998, AND IT INVOLVES GE TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES

WITH

THE SPRING RETURN FUNCTION MANUFACTURED SINCE MARCH 1996.  THESE

SWITCHES

ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BINDING WHICH MAY PREVENT SPRING RETURN TO RESET

(RETURN TO NORMAL POSITION).  THE CAUSE OF THE BINDING WAS

ATTRIBUTED TO

FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR 'POST-MOLD CURE' SHRINKAGE IN THE DESIGN

TOLERANCE

OF THE CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE PHENOLIC REAR BEARING SUPPORT HOLE

AND THE

BEARING.  THIS DESIGN ERROR DID NOT BECOME APPARENT UNTIL THE MOLDS

EXPERIENCED WEAR TO THE EXTENT THAT RESULTING PARTS WERE AT THE

EXTREMES

OF DIMENSIONAL TOLERANCES.  THE POST-MOLD CURE IS NORMAL FOR

PHENOLIC

MATERIAL AND HAS BEEN SHOWN TO TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF UP TO

TWO

YEARS AFTER MOLDING IS COMPLETED.  CONSEQUENTLY, SWITCHES WHICH

ARE

CONSTRUCTED FROM COMPONENTS THAT ARE WITHIN SPECIFICATION AND

FUNCTION

FULLY DURING ACCEPTANCE TESTING MAY EXHIBIT SLUGGISH RETURN OR

BINDING UP

TO TWO YEARS AFTER ASSEMBLY.  THIS ROOT CAUSE IS SUPPORTED THROUGH

GE

EXAMINATION OF FAILED SWITCHES WHICH, IN EACH INSTANCE, HAS FOUND

THE

BEARING SUPPORT HOLE TO BE UNDERSIZED (LESS THAN MINIMUM INSIDE

DIAMETER)

AND THE BEARING AT OR NEAR ITS MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE DIAMETER.  GE

TESTING

HAS ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SWITCHES WITH BEARINGS THAT ARE AT THEIR

NOMINAL

DIAMETER WILL FUNCTION PROPERLY EVEN WHEN THE SUPPORT HOLE IS

UNDERSIZED. 

CONSEQUENTLY, THE FAILURE IS NOT SEEN IN EVERY SWITCH.



COMMONWEALTH EDISON HAS DETERMINED THAT THE SUSPECT SBM SWITCHES

ARE NOT

INSTALLED AT ITS BRAIDWOOD, BYRON, OR ZION NUCLEAR GENERATING

STATIONS.



                        (Continued on next page)





LICENSEE: COMMONWEALTH EDISON             PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 33917



HOWEVER, COMMONWEALTH EDISON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONS WHICH

HAVE THE

SUSPECT SAFETY-RELATED SPRING RETURN SWITCHES INCLUDE DRESDEN,

LASALLE,

AND QUAD CITIES WITH 2, 246, AND 3 SWITCHES INSTALLED, RESPECTIVELY. 

LASALLE IS CURRENTLY EXPERIENCING BINDING IN 21 OF THESE SWITCHES.



THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES WERE ALSO REPORTED TO BE AFFECTED: PILGRIM;

RIVER BEND; OYSTER CREEK; COOPER; FITZPATRICK; MILLSTONE UNIT 1; HATCH

UNITS 1 AND 2; BROWNS FERRY UNITS 1, 2, AND 3; VERMONT YANKEE;

PALISADES;

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE UNITS 1 AND 2; TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4;

CRYSTAL

RIVER UNIT 3; MAIN YANKEE; INDIAN POINT 3; SEABROOK; FORT CALHOUN;

SALEM

UNITS 1 AND 2; AND VOGTLE UNITS 1 AND 2.


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