Part 21 Report - 1998-022

 
 

ACCESSION #: 9801220365



RG AND E



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER,

N.Y.

14649-0001     AREA CODE 716 546-2700



ROBERT C.  MECREDY

Vice President

Nuclear Operations

                                        January 15, 1998



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk

Attn: Guy S.  Vissing

          Project Directorate I-1

Washington, D.C.  20555



Subject:  10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report

          R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

          Docket No. 50-244



Dear Mr.  Vissing:



In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and

Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), which requires "Written

notification to the NRC ... on the identification of a defect or a

failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby submitted.



                                        Very truly yours,



                                        Robert C. Mecredy



xc:  Mr. Guy S.  Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)

     Project Directorate I-1

     Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

     Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     Washington, D.C.  20555



     Regional Administrator, Region I

     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     475 Allendale Road

     King of Prussia, PA 19406



     U.S.  NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector



                                                                   Page 2



          10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT



I.        NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:



          NAME:     Robert C.  Mecredy

                    Vice President Nuclear Operations Group



          ADDRESS:  Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation

                    89 East Avenue

                    Rochester, New York 14649



II.       IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC

          COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS, TO COMPLY OR

          CONTAINS A DEFECT:



          The facility is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.  The basic

          component is the shunt trip assembly on the "B" Emergency

          Diesel Generator (EDG) Supply Breaker to Bus 16.  This breaker

          is a Westinghouse DB-75 air circuit breaker and the Ginna.

          equipment identification number is EIN 52/EG1B1.  The shunt

          trip assembly was installed on this breaker in May, 1995, using

          spare parts purchased in 1977.



III.      IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR

          SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR

CONTAINS

          A DEFECT:



          The shunt trip assembly was supplied by:



               Westinghouse Electric Corporation

               Power Systems

               Switchgear Division

               700 Braddock Avenue

               East Pittsburgh, PA 15112



IV.       NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY

HAZARD

          WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE

          TO COMPLY:



          The shunt trip coil plunger is part of the shunt trip and alarm

          switch assembly.  The plunger of the shunt trip assembly was

          binding in the shunt trip coil.  When activated, the breaker's

          shunt trip coil plunger pulls the breaker tripper bar to trip

          the breaker.  The bound plunger was not returning to its

          deenergized position.  The breaker tripper bar was being

          maintained in the trip free position, preventing the DB-75 air

          circuit breaker from closing.



                                                                   Page 3



          Testing of the "B" EDG Supply Breaker to Bus 16 was performed

          in November, 1997, during the 1997 outage.  During this

          testing, the breaker failed to close.  The breaker could not be

          closed electrically or manually, because the shunt trip coil

          plunger was maintaining the tripper bar in the trip free

          position.  This failure would prevent the "B" EDG from

          supplying power to the safeguards loads on Bus 16.  This is

          considered a major degradation since, in conjunction with a

          single failure on the redundant train, required safety

          functions could not be performed.



V.        THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO

          COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:



          The information was obtained during testing performed on

          November 14, 1997.



VI.       IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR

          FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH

COMPONENTS

          IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:



          There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers permanently installed

          at Ginna Station, in safeguards buses 14 and 16.  One of these

          breakers is manually operated and the shunt trip coil is not

          used.  In addition, there is one spare DB-75 breaker in stock.

          With the exception of the 52/EG1B1 breaker, these breakers

          still have their original shunt trip assemblies installed.  The

          52/EG1B1 breaker is the only DB-75 breaker that has had the

          shunt trip assembly replaced.  The replacement shunt trip

          assembly that failed was one of ten purchased in 1977 as

          spares.



VII.      THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE

          TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE

          FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE

          TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:



          Corrective action is complete.  The failed shunt trip assembly

          was replaced with a spare from stock.  The assembly was

          manually and electrically bench tested prior to being returned

          to operable status.



          The remaining eight assemblies in stock were inspected.  Two

          assemblies had coil plungers that did not fully return to the

          deenergized position during manual manipulation.  These were

          removed from stock.



          The other DB-75 breakers were visually inspected.  Acceptable

          plunger movement is indicated by adequate plunger to tripper

          bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push

          rod.  No additional binding concerns were found.



                                                                   Page 4



          The Procurement Analysis Form (PAF) for the shunt trip assembly

          was appended.  Prior to reordering, the PAF now requires the

          addition of plunger movement verification to the assembly

          acceptance plan.



          Westinghouse was contacted.  There have been no other reported

          events of this nature that Westinghouse is aware of.  A check

          of industry operational events did not identify similar breaker

          failure.



VIII.     ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT

THE

          FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING,

          OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:



          Receipt inspection could verify acceptable plunger movement.

          During DB-75 breaker maintenance, consider verifying that the

          shunt trip coil plunger moves freely in the coil by verifying

          adequate plunger to tripper bar gap and full retraction of the

          alarm switch attachment push rod.



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