Part 21 Report - 1998-022
ACCESSION #: 9801220365
RG AND E
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER,
N.Y.
14649-0001 AREA CODE 716 546-2700
ROBERT C. MECREDY
Vice President
Nuclear Operations
January 15, 1998
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Attn: Guy S. Vissing
Project Directorate I-1
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: 10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Vissing:
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), which requires "Written
notification to the NRC ... on the identification of a defect or a
failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby submitted.
Very truly yours,
Robert C. Mecredy
xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406
U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector
Page 2
10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT
I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:
NAME: Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President Nuclear Operations Group
ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC
COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS, TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The facility is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic
component is the shunt trip assembly on the "B" Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) Supply Breaker to Bus 16. This breaker
is a Westinghouse DB-75 air circuit breaker and the Ginna.
equipment identification number is EIN 52/EG1B1. The shunt
trip assembly was installed on this breaker in May, 1995, using
spare parts purchased in 1977.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR
SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS
A DEFECT:
The shunt trip assembly was supplied by:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Power Systems
Switchgear Division
700 Braddock Avenue
East Pittsburgh, PA 15112
IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY
HAZARD
WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE
TO COMPLY:
The shunt trip coil plunger is part of the shunt trip and alarm
switch assembly. The plunger of the shunt trip assembly was
binding in the shunt trip coil. When activated, the breaker's
shunt trip coil plunger pulls the breaker tripper bar to trip
the breaker. The bound plunger was not returning to its
deenergized position. The breaker tripper bar was being
maintained in the trip free position, preventing the DB-75 air
circuit breaker from closing.
Page 3
Testing of the "B" EDG Supply Breaker to Bus 16 was performed
in November, 1997, during the 1997 outage. During this
testing, the breaker failed to close. The breaker could not be
closed electrically or manually, because the shunt trip coil
plunger was maintaining the tripper bar in the trip free
position. This failure would prevent the "B" EDG from
supplying power to the safeguards loads on Bus 16. This is
considered a major degradation since, in conjunction with a
single failure on the redundant train, required safety
functions could not be performed.
V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
The information was obtained during testing performed on
November 14, 1997.
VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR
FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH
COMPONENTS
IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:
There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers permanently installed
at Ginna Station, in safeguards buses 14 and 16. One of these
breakers is manually operated and the shunt trip coil is not
used. In addition, there is one spare DB-75 breaker in stock.
With the exception of the 52/EG1B1 breaker, these breakers
still have their original shunt trip assemblies installed. The
52/EG1B1 breaker is the only DB-75 breaker that has had the
shunt trip assembly replaced. The replacement shunt trip
assembly that failed was one of ten purchased in 1977 as
spares.
VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE
TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE
TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:
Corrective action is complete. The failed shunt trip assembly
was replaced with a spare from stock. The assembly was
manually and electrically bench tested prior to being returned
to operable status.
The remaining eight assemblies in stock were inspected. Two
assemblies had coil plungers that did not fully return to the
deenergized position during manual manipulation. These were
removed from stock.
The other DB-75 breakers were visually inspected. Acceptable
plunger movement is indicated by adequate plunger to tripper
bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push
rod. No additional binding concerns were found.
Page 4
The Procurement Analysis Form (PAF) for the shunt trip assembly
was appended. Prior to reordering, the PAF now requires the
addition of plunger movement verification to the assembly
acceptance plan.
Westinghouse was contacted. There have been no other reported
events of this nature that Westinghouse is aware of. A check
of industry operational events did not identify similar breaker
failure.
VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT
THE
FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING,
OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
Receipt inspection could verify acceptable plunger movement.
During DB-75 breaker maintenance, consider verifying that the
shunt trip coil plunger moves freely in the coil by verifying
adequate plunger to tripper bar gap and full retraction of the
alarm switch attachment push rod.
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