The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of rescinding or revising guidance and policies posted on this webpage in accordance with Executive Order 14151 Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing, and Executive Order 14168 Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government. In the interim, any previously issued diversity, equity, inclusion, or gender-related guidance on this webpage should be considered rescinded that is inconsistent with these Executive Orders.

Part 21 Report - 1997-100

LICENSEE: NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. SITE: NINE MILE POINT 2 EN NUMBER:31822 DOCKET: 05000410 EVENT DATE: 02-18-97 RX TYPE: BWR EVENT TIME: 14:30 VENDORS: GE-5 NOTIFY DATE: 02-20-97 EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A REGION: 1 STATE: NY TIME: 15:13 OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE 10 CFR SECTION: CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH UNIT SCRAM RX INIT INITIAL MODE CURR CURRENT MODE CODE CRIT PWR PWR 2 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE EXCESSIVE FAILURE RATE OF BORG-WARNER (BWIP) PRESSURE SWITCHES USED IN THE GAS TREATMENT, SERVICE WATER, AND HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS SEVERAL BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES FAILED DURING OPERATION AND INITIAL CALIBRATION, AND AN EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT THE SWITCHES ARE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THE CORRECT RESET POINT WHEN THE SETPOINT IS ADJUSTED. ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER, THE SUBJECT SWITCHES DO NOT HAVE AN ACCURATELY ADJUSTABLE RESET VALUE. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SETPOINT OF THE SWITCHES AND THEIR RESET POINT IS NOT LINEAR NOR CONSISTENT BETWEEN DIFFERENT SWITCHES OF THE SAME MODEL. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO OPERATE WITH A MAXIMUM SETPOINT AND MINIMUM RESET WINDOW ONLY. AS A RESULT, THE SWITCHES ARE NOT CONSISTENTLY ABLE TO BE INITIALLY CALIBRATED TO THE DESIRED SETPOINT; AND ONCE INSTALLED AND CALIBRATED, MINOR SETPOINT DRIFT MAY PLACE THE SWITCHES OUTSIDE THEIR ACCEPTABLE TOLERANCES. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 40 QUESTIONABLE BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES INSTALLED IN THE PLANT (22 IN THE GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM, 6 IN THE SERVICE WATER SUPPLY TO COOLERS AND CHILLERS, AND 12 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM). EACH OF THE ASSOCIATED VALVES HAS TWO OR THREE OF THE SWITCHES WITHIN ITS HYDRAULIC CONTROLS. THE TYPE OF FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SWITCH DEPENDS ON WHICH SWITCH HAS FAILED. THE EFFECTS OF A FAILED SWITCH CAN BE A VALVE FAILING TO OPEN AND BEING UNABLE TO CLOSE OR A VALVE FAILING CLOSED AND BEING UNABLE TO OPEN. THE LICENSEE PERFORMED AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION AND CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE SWITCHES WILL OPERATE AS REQUIRED. THIS DETERMINATION WAS BASED ON SUCCESSFUL INITIAL CALIBRATION TESTING, POSITIVE TEST DATA OF INSTALLED CALIBRATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO SHORTEN THE CALIBRATION FREQUENCY. THE LICENSEE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ENERTECH (THE VENDOR) IN CALIFORNIA AND WITH BORG-WARNER (THE MANUFACTURER). THE LICENSEE ALSO BELIEVES THAT ENERTECH HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE NRC. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR SITE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBERS.)

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