United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

FITZPATRICK 1                  30149
03-21-96 POW
LICENSEE: NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY           
SITE: FITZPATRICK 1                         EN NUMBER:30149
DOCKET: 05000333                         EVENT DATE: 03-21-96
RX TYPE: BWR                             EVENT TIME: 14:00
VENDORS: GE-4                           NOTIFY DATE: 03-21-96
EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A  REGION: 1 STATE: NY      TIME: 15:43
OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE            
10 CFR SECTION: AIND  50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION  
UNIT  SCRAM   RX   INIT  INITIAL MODE     CURR   CURRENT MODE
      CODE   CRIT  PWR                    PWR
 1    N       Y    100   POWER OPERATION  100   POWER OPERATION

POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT BREAKER SPRING CHARGING MOTOR LIMIT SWITCH 
FAILURES TO AFFECT 4 KV CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN BOTH SAFETY DIVISIONS
                                                                 
ON FEBRUARY 12, 1996, FAILURES OF CIRCUIT BREAKER SPRING CHARGING
MOTOR LIMIT SWITCHES CAUSED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR RESIDUAL    
HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER PUMPS 'A' AND 'C' TO FAIL TO CLOSE.   
UPON EVALUATION OF THESE FAILURES FOR POTENTIAL 10 CFR PART 21   
REPORTABILITY, THE LICENSEE CONCLUDED (AT 1400 ON MARCH 21, 1996)
THAT THE FAILURE OF THESE LIMIT SWITCHES HAD THE POTENTIAL TO    
AFFECT 4 KV CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN BOTH SAFETY DIVISIONS.           
                                                                 
THE FAILED LIMIT SWITCHES WERE DAMAGED DUE TO INTERRUPTION OF A  
DIRECT CURRENT INDUCTIVE LOAD CIRCUIT WITH APPROXIMATELY 6 AMPS  
CURRENT COMPARED TO A GENERAL ELECTRIC SALES CATALOG LISTING OF  
2.2 AMPS.  GENERAL ELECTRIC HAS REPORTED ADEQUATE LIFE TESTING   
FOR THESE SWITCHES.  HOWEVER, THE FAILED LIMIT SWITCH CONTACTS   
HAD BEEN OPERATED ONLY 2,163 AND 3,233 TIMES IN LIEU OF THE      
10,000 TIMES THAT GENERAL ELECTRIC WAS CERTIFYING.               
                                                                 
SHORTLY AFTER THESE FAILURES OCCURRED, THE LICENSEE TESTED THE   
PUMPS ON THE OPPOSITE TRAIN WITH SATISFACTORY RESULTS.  BECAUSE  
ONLY ONE TRAIN WAS INOPERABLE, THE UNIT ENTERED A 7 DAY TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION.  THE LICENSEE    
SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED THAT 4 KV CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT WERE USED
IN OTHER SAFETY RELATED APPLICATIONS WERE POTENTIALLY AFFECTED.  
AS A RESULT, THE LICENSEE REPLACED THE LIMIT SWITCH CONTACTS IN  
THE FAILED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND IN 6 OTHERS WHICH HAD MORE THAN  
1,500 CYCLES.  (THIS 1,500 CYCLE THRESHOLD WAS DETERMINED BY AN  
ENGINEERING EVALUATION.)  PREVIOUS FAILURES HAD NOT BEEN         
OBSERVED.  THERE ARE NO CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING 
CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ISSUE.             
                                                                 
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND PLANS TO    
SUBMIT A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.73.  
THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THIS WILL ALSO FULFILL THE REPORTING  
REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 21.                                  

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