United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for February 16, 2005

Headquarters Daily Report

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N/A

ESI Service Advisory: EMD Fuel Injectors

Licensee/Facility:

GM ELECTROMOTIVE
ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC. (ESI)
Rocky Mount, North Carolina
Dockets:

License No:
Notification:

MR Number: H-2005-0007
Date: 02/11/2005

Letter

Discussion:

The morning report is based on a "service alert" letter received from the Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI).

Electro Motive Division (EMD), a division of General Motor, has found that storing an injector for more than one year could significantly increase the failure of the fuel injector upon installation. These fuel injectors are used in emergency diesel generators (EDGs) in nuclear power plants.

The injectors are initially shipped full of EMD-approved calibrating fluid but over the period of one year this calibrating fluid leaks out of the injector and/or evaporates. The evaporation may leave some internal injector components with a heavy oil residue that will increase the incidence of sluggish or tight racks or leave some internal components dry with no lubrication oil at all. This condition leads to the sticking and seizing of the needle in the spray tip upon installation.

The vendor recommends that the injectors stored for more than one year be filled with clean fuel/calibrating fluid and slowly pop tested a few times in order to re-lubricate all of the internal components prior to installation. Filling with clean fuel should be done without the return fuel cooling lines connected to avoid trapping air inside the injector prior to popping.

ESI has notified all of its customers of this condition via letter. ESI has the in-house capability to perform injector pop testing. For more information contact Mr. Jack Murray or Mr. Darryl Hartley, ESI Service Managers, at 800-759-2720.

Contacts:

Name Office Abbrev Phone No E-Mail
TABATABAI, OMID NRR (304) 415-6616 OTY@nrc.gov


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REGION I

Part 21: Abnormal Allen-Bradley 700RTC Relay Contact Response

Licensee/Facility:

ALLEN-BRADLEY
DOMINION
GLEN ALLEN, Virginia
Dockets:

License No:
Notification:

MR Number: H-2005-0005
Date: 02/10/2005


Source Document: Fax from Licensee

Reviewer: TABATABAI, OMID

Discussion:

This morning report concerns an abnormal relay contact response which was observed during pre-installation testing of Allen-Bradley 700RTC relays at North Anna. The 700RTC relays are solid state timing relays, used as replacements for Agastat relays, in several safety related applications at North Anna.

The 700RTC relay provides a wide time adjustment with two timed contact positions and two instantaneous contact positions. The relays are ordered to a part number that specifies a certain contact arrangement, but the contacts are fully interchangeable and may be configured by the end user in any combination of Normally Open/Normally Closed (NO/NC). At North Anna, Allen-Bradley part number 700RTC11110U1 is used, which is a contact configuration of NO, NC, NO, NC.

The relays were setup and tested in a NO, NO, NC, NC configuration when it was discovered that the instantaneous contact (C5-C6 position), with a NC contact cartridge installed, behaved like a timed contact. The C5-C6 position changed state according to the setting of the timer. All other contact positions worked properly. With a NO contact installed in the C5-C6 position, the contact position behaved as expected (as an instantaneous contact). Different NC contact cartridges were installed in the C5-C6 position of the relay and the anomaly still occurred. Forty five (45) relays were tested for this anomaly. Twelve of 45 relays failed testing (C5-C6 with NC contact). The relays were returned to Allen-Bradley for failure analysis.

The root cause is unknown at this time, although Allen-Bradley has indicated that the sensitivity of the contact cartridges may be a factor in causing this response. North Anna is working with Allen-Bradley to determine a cause.

Accession Numbers:

Accession No Accession Date
ML050450388 02/10/2005

Contacts:

Name Office Abbrev Phone No E-Mail
TABATABAI, OMID NRR (301) 415-6616 OTY@nrc.gov

REGION I

Part 21: Defective Switchboard Installation System (SIS) Control Wire

Licensee/Facility:

EATON ELECTRICAL
FRAMATOME ANP
LYNCHBURG, Virginia
Dockets:

License No:
Notification:

MR Number: H-2005-0006
Date: 02/10/2005


Source Document: Fax

Reviewer: TABATABAI, OMID

Discussion:

The following information was provided by Framatome ANP:

Part 21: Defective Switchboard Installation System (SIS) Control Wire

This issue concerns defective crimps associated with AMP Faston Flag Receptacles (with Tab-Lok features) utilized on SIS Control Wire which was supplied to South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Operating Company. A failure of the crimp connection could cause an unwanted action or prevent a desired action that could affect the operation of a safety related system. A variety of safety related systems could be impacted depending on where the wires are used. This commercial grade product was manufactured/supplied by Eaton Electrical and dedicated/supplied by Framatome ANP for a safety-related application on DS Type Circuit Breakers. The defective wires were identified prior to installation in the plant.

Framatome ANP supplied 50 SIS Control Wires to STP Nuclear Operating Company. Framatome ANP contacted STP Nuclear Operating Company and requested that all 50 SIS Control Wires supplied by Framatome ANP be returned. To prevent further occurrence of this problem Framatome ANP has taken a number of corrective actions in conjunction with the company supplying the commercial grade product, including additional inspection requirements in the dedication process to ensure crimps meet the manufacturers requirements.

Accession Numbers:

Accession No Accession Date
ML050450391 02/10/2005

Contacts:

Name Office Abbrev Phone No E-Mail
TABATABAI, OMID NRR (301) 415-6616 OTY@nrc.gov
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