United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for August 19, 2004

Headquarters Daily Report

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REGION II

STEAM GENERATOR TUBES DEGRADED - UPDATED

Licensee/Facility:

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO., INC.
Vogtle 2
WAYNESBORO, Georgia
Dockets: 05000425
[2] W-4-LP
License No:
Notification:

MR Number: 2-2004-0013
Date: 08/19/2004

Discussion:

This Morning Report provides updated information concerning suspected outer diameter (OD) circumferential cracks identified in Unit 2 steam generator (SG) tubes (Morning Reports 2-2004-0005 and 2-2004-0006). The licensee received detailed laboratory analysis of the two SG tubes that were removed from SG2 during the recent Unit 2 refueling outage. The results showed that the flaw-like signals reported at the top of the tubesheet did not represent OD circumferential cracking. The root cause of the flaw-like signals could not be determined. Uneven distribution of scale and deposits at the top of the hot leg tube sheet is suspected as the cause of the flaw-like signals.

This information is current as of 2:15 p.m. 08/19/04.

Accession Numbers:

Accession No Accession Date
ML042320667 08/19/2004

Contacts:

Name Office Abbrev Phone No E-Mail
BONSER, BRIAN R R2 (404) 562-4540 BRB1@nrc.gov


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REGION IV

UPDATE TO MR 4-2004-0004 REGARDING REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING OFFSITE POWER LINE FAULT

Licensee/Facility:

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
River Bend 1, River Bend 2
ST FRANCISVILLE, Louisiana
Dockets: 05000458, 05000459
[1] GE-6, [2]
License No:
Notification:

MR Number: 4-2004-0005
Date: 08/19/2004

Call from SRI

Discussion:

This Morning Report update provides additional information regarding the cause of the loss of the ENJAY #352 offsite power line feed to the River Bend Station switchyard discussed in Morning Report 4-2004-0004 issued on August 18, 2004. Following subsequent testing by Entergy Transmission and Distribution staff of the fault detection distance relay that caused isolation of the ENJAY #352 offsite power line, the licensee has concluded that the relay had not failed. Technicians initially thought the relay had failed as a result of performing an incorrect test. Subsequent testing determined that the relay performed as expected. At the time of the initial fault on the Port Hudson #353 offsite power line, a shield wire on an ENJAY line tower broke. As the falling shield wire passed near Phase C of the ENJAY line, a momentary fault signal was generated and detected by the fault detection distance relay in the River Bend Station switchyard. This momentary fault signal actuated the protection relay and caused the isolation of the ENJAY line, resulting in the loss of RSST 2. All offsite power lines have been restored and the switchyard breaker lineup has been returned to a normal full power lineup.

REGIONAL ACTION:

The resident inspectors will continue to monitor licensee corrective actions.

Contacts:

Name Office Abbrev Phone No E-Mail
GRAVES, DAVID N R4 (817) 860-8141 DNG@nrc.gov
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012