United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for April 29, 2003



                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         APRIL 29, 2003

*******************************************************
                    REPORT             NEGATIVE        
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED  

HEADQUARTERS                               X                   
REGION I                                   X                   
REGION II               X                                      
REGION III                                 X                   
REGION IV                                  X 


                  
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - REGION II  APRIL 29, 2003

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Duke Power Co.                         MR Number: 2-03-0004
Oconee 3                               Date: 04/29/03
Seneca,South Carolina                                                     
Dockets: 50-287
PWR/B&W-L-LP                          

Subject: INITIATION OF SPECIAL INSPECTION AT OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION      

Discussion:

On April 21, 2003, while testing atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) in       
Unit 3 prior to shutting down for its scheduled refueling outage, the    
licensee identified a steam leak in the bonnet of the "A" main steam     
header ADV isolation valve (3MS-153).  In addition, the "B" main steam   
header ADV isolation valve (3MS-155) could not be opened when initially  
tested.  Approximately 1.5 hours later the licensee was able to open     
3MS-155; however, this was outside the 40 minute window that the ADVs are
required to be operated for certain accident mitigation sequences.       
Compensatory actions were implemented until the ADV function was no      
longer required following the Unit 3 shutdown on April 26, 2003.         
Historically, the manual valves which comprise the ADV flowpath in all   
three Oconee units have experienced problems that have impacted the      
operation of the ADVs.                                                   

Regional Action:

Region II, under the guidance of NRC management Directive 8.3, initiated 
a Special Inspection at the site on April 29, 2003, based on the         
repetitive failures and problems which have occurred with the manual     
valves that comprise the ADV flowpath.                                   

Contact:  Robert Haag                (404)562-4550


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012