Morning Report for September 10, 2002
Headquarters Daily Report SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS SEP. 10, 2002 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0064 Engine Systems Date: 09/10/02 Subject: Part 21 - EMD emergency diesel generator air start system pressure regulating valve may stick open Discussion: VENDOR: Engine Systems PT21 FILE NO: m2-18-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 07/30/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022190534 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, R. Caldwell Engine Systems, a vendor of EMD emergency diesel generators, concluded its investigation of a condition with EMD air start systems using Norgren R18 relieving style air pressure regulating valves. During an engine start, the sudden high air flow followed by its immediate termination, causes the internal components of the pressure regulating valve to be excessively deflected. As a result, the valve sticks open until the air receiver pressure drops, via its relieving tube, to a value low enough to allow the valve to close. The vendor learned of this problem from the Sequoyah and Davis-Besse nuclear power plants. Contact: R. Caldwell, NRR 301-415-1243 E-mail: rkc1@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0065 Engine Systems Date: 09/10/02 Subject: Part 21 - Potential bearing cooling oil blockage from loose flashing material used in manufacture of EMD 645 engine pistons Discussion: VENDOR: Engine Systems PT21 FILE NO: m2-19-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/01/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022200286 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, J. Dozier Engine Systems, a vendor of EMD emergency diesel generators, concluded its investigation of a condition with EMD 645 engine pistons. Loose casting flash material applied during the manufacturing process could block the insert bearing oil passage and cause bearing damage. However, the manufacturer, EMD, has reported no actual failures because of this condition in nuclear or commercial applications. Contact: J. Dozier, NRR 301-415-1014 E-mail: jxd@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0066 Rockbestos Date: 09/10/02 Subject: Part 21 - Incorrect lacquer applied to electrical cable could contribute to flame propagation Discussion: VENDOR: Rockbestos PT21 FILE NO: m2-20-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/09/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml022260608 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, V. Hodge Rockbestos-Surprenant, a vendor of electrical cables, reported that its 2/C 14 AWG 600V Firewall SR (Silicone Rubber) cable with overall Rockhide braid failed the vertical tray flame test when subjected to the requirements described in the standard IEEE-383-1974, Section 2.5.4. The lacquer applied to the braid was incorrect and could contribute to the propagation of flame. The vendor states that its initial investigation indicates that the affected cables are limited to 8 part numbers or shipments of this cable manufactured from 1999 through July 2002. The vendor stated that it notified affected purchasers. Contact: V. Hodge, NRR 301-415-1861 E-mail: cvh@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Part 21 Database MR Number: H-02-0067 General Electric Date: 09/10/02 Subject: Part 21-Inadequate vibratory loads on main steam isolation valves with one main steam isolation valve out of service Discussion: VENDOR: General Electric PT21 FILE NO: m2-21-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/23/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 39148 REVIEWER: RORP, I. Jung General Electric, boiling water reactor nuclear steam supply system vendor, reported that its 1988 analysis for Brunswick Units 1 and 2 full power operation with one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) out of service did not adequately address the increased flow-induced vibratory loads on the MSIVs in service. That evaluation used 100 percent flow in the three active steamlines when it should be 133 percent flow. Absent test data, the vendor recommends that power be limited to 75 percent while one MSIV is out of service. The vendor notified the Brunswick licensee and will notify other affected licensees. Contact: I. Jung, NRR 301-415-1837 E-mail: ixj@nrc.gov _
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021