Morning Report for November 14, 2001
Headquarters Daily Report NOVEMBER 14, 2001 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS NOV. 14, 2001 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-01-0065 Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01 Subject: Part 21 - Incompletely Threaded Screw on Terminal Block Discussion: VENDOR: Systems Control PT21 FILE NO: m1-25-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/08/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012260207 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, Y. Diaz The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 licensee reported finding a loose screw belonging to a terminal block being installed in an emergency diesel generator panel. The screw had not been fully threaded during manufacture and could have fallen into safety-related equipment. The defective terminal block was one of 400 supplied to the licensee in the 1980s by Systems Control of Iron Mountain MI. All but 169 had been installed in both Units 1 and 2 in various applications. The licensee concluded from its inspection of the terminal blocks still in spare storage and review of operational experience that the defective terminal block was an isolated occurrence. Contact: Y. Diaz, NRR 301-415-1175 E-mail: yks@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 NOVEMBER 14, 2001 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-01-0066 Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01 Subject: Part 21 - Excessive Disc Angular Movement in Swing Check Valves Discussion: VENDOR: Flowserve PT21 FILE NO: m1-27-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/23/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012410030 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, E. Goodwin The valve vendor Flowserve reported being notified by Arizona Public Service of improper operation of a 4-inch, 1500 pounds per square inch pressure class swing check valve. The potential problem, excessive disc angular movement, is similar to the problem reported by the vendor's predecessor, BW/IP International (Borg-Warner) in 1993. In 1993, some disc assemblies were shipped with an excessive stud-to-disc weld that could keep the disc washer too far from the back of the disc, consequently permitting excessive angular movement of the disc. In the present case, the vendor notified the customers who purchased 3-inch or 4-inch swing check valves or disc assemblies in 1977 or earlier, recommending inspection of such valves at the earliest convenient time and replacement of the disc assembly if evidence of interference is found. The vendor notified the nuclear power utilities Southern California Edison, Arizona Public Service, Texas Utilities Electric, Duke Energy, Entergy, Rochester Gas and Electric, and Tennessee Valley Authority. Contact: E. Goodwin, NRR 301-415-1154 E-mail: efg@nrc.gov _ HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 NOVEMBER 14, 2001 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-01-0067 Part 21 Database Date: 11/14/01 Subject: Part 21 - Potential Loss of Backup Safety Function of Charging Pump Air Lock Tank Discussion: VENDOR: David Brown Union Pumps PT21 FILE NO: m1-29-0 DATE OF DOCUMENT: 08/31/01 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML012490467 SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: REXB, C. Petrone The Turkey Point licensee received an incorrectly configured replacement actuator from the vendor, David Brown Union Pumps. This type of actuator was intended for use in controlling fluid drive speed for charging pumps. The actuator was incorrectly configured in that a regulator included with the actuator contained "hard seats" rather than the resilient seats contained in the original actuator. This hard seat regulator was not designed for use with a safety backup air lock tank like the one originally supplied by the vendor with the charging pumps. Although this hard seat regulator would work satisfactorily during normal operation, during fail safe operation (following a loss of air supply pressure) it would allow air from the air lock tank to bleed off in one to two hours. This would result in the loss of the backup safety function of the tank and the actuator would lose its ability to control the charging pump fluid drive speed. Contact: C. Petrone, NRR 301-415-1027 E-mail: cdp@nrc.gov _
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021