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Home NRC Library Document Collections Events, Reports Associated with Morning Reports 2001

Morning Report for March 21, 2001

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         MARCH 21, 2001

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV                              X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MARCH 21, 2001

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-01-0018
Pilgrim                                Date: 03/21/01
Plymouth,Massachusetts

Subject: Part 21  - Incorrectly Configured Relays in Bus Transfer Scheme

Discussion:

VENDOR: Pilgrim                         PT21 FILE NO: m1-12-0
DATE OF DOCUMENT:  02/28/01             ACCESSION NUMBER: ML010650221
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LER 50-293/2001-01     REVIEWER: REXB, E. Benner

The Pilgrim licensee reported two incorrectly configured relays installed
in the seismically- upgraded bus transfer scheme (Licensee Event Report
50-293/2001-01). These relays would have prevented swing bus B6 from
transferring to the alternate supply under certain design basis
conditions. The inability of B6 to transfer would have prevented the low
pressure coolant injection isolation valves from opening to perform their
safety function.

The licensee stated that the cause was failure to detect the mismatch
between the relay label and contact configuration by the manufacturer,
Joslyn Clark, and by a commercial dedication organization, Trentec,
during the qualification process. The licensee restored the design basis
requirements for the B6 transfer scheme.

The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/PART21/2001.

Contact:    E. Benner, NRR
            301-415-1171
            E-mail: ejb1@nrc.gov
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