Morning Report for August 3, 1999

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         AUGUST 03, 1999

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV           X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS AUGUST  3, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-99-0066
Whiting                                Date: 08/03/99


Subject: Part 21 - Potential overstressed condition in hoisting Crane

Discussion:

VENDOR: Whiting                     PT21 FILE NO: 99-28-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 04/27/99          ACCESSION NUMBER: 9905120290

SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER             REVIEWER: REXB, C. Petrone


NEW ISSUE. The crane vendor Whiting Corporation reports that analysis of
the main hoist on a crane similar to those in nuclear service has
identified some over stressed conditions. This crane with the over
stressed condition is a Whiting "Tiger Design" line crane with main hoist
capacities from 75 tons to 240 tons. Some of these cranes were purchased
in the 1960's and 1970's by nuclear utilities for use as reactor building
cranes. Whiting stated that potentially affected cranes had been
identified by serial number and that the owners of these cranes had been
notified by letter. Whiting also stated that they are continuing to
review records of other cranes to identify other potential candidates for
notification.

Whiting recommended that owners of suspect cranes should derate their
main hoist capacity by 50 percent until an analysis of the crane can be
completed. Completion of analysis for the first two cranes indicated that
no modifications were needed. However, the adequacy of the remaining
cranes can not be assured until an individual analysis is completed on
each crane. The auxiliary hoist is not affected by this condition and can
continue to be used without restriction.
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HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          AUGUST  3, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-99-0067
Westinghouse                           Date: 08/03/99


Subject: Part 21 - Safety-related W2 control switch would not
         work after installation


Discussion:

VENDOR: Westinghouse                PT21 FILE NO: 99-29-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 05/27/99          ACCESSION NUMBER:

SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER             REVIEWER: REXB, D. Skeen

NEW ISSUE. The Ginna licensee reports that a safety-related W2 control
switch drawn from warehouse stock did not operate satisfactorily after
being installed in the main control board as the control switch for a
safety injection pump. The switch, which operated properly before being
installed in the control board, would bind and fail to spring return to
either the "after close" or "after trip" position after installation. The
licensee returned it to the vendor, Westinghouse, for a failure mode
assessment and 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to determine if the switch was
deficient at the time of manufacture. The evaluation is expected to be
completed by October 1, 1999.
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REGION IV  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          AUGUST  3, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Agreement State Licensee               MR Number: 4-99-0022
Trutec                                 Date: 08/03/99
Baton Rouge,Louisiana

Subject: CONTAMINATION EVENT AT LICENSEE'S FACILITY

Discussion:

The State of Louisiana notified Region IV by e-mail of a contamination
event at a State of Louisiana licensee's site. The licensee inadvertently
cut into a 925 megabecquerels (25 mCi) Cs-137 source at the facility in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The State responded to the event and conducted
radiation surveys. The contamination was contained within the lower level
of the facility. The site has been decontaminated, which included the
removal of the lower level carpet. The State is continuing its
investigation into the event.

Regional Action:

Region IV will continue to coordinate with the State of Louisiana on
their followup activities.

Contact:  M. Linda McLean            (817)860-8116
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