United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for February 3, 1999

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         FEBRUARY 03, 1999

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III          X
REGION IV           X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 03, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

                                       MR Number: H-99-0010
Proposed Generic Communication         Date: 02/03/99


Subject: Millstone 2 - Discharge of Carbon Dioxide System in Millstone 2
         Cable Spreading Room Affects Control Room


Discussion:

On January 15, 1999 a CO2 discharge inadvertently occurred in the Unit 3
cable spreading room.  Approximately 4 hours after this discharge,
control room operators donned self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs)
when the scent of wintergreen [CO2 is spiked with the scent to aid
detection] was noted inside the control room envelope.

An NRC inspection team reviewed this event and will document their
findings in an inspection report.  In addition, the NRC plans to issue an
Information Notice to provide details of this event to other utilities.

Technical contacts: Jim Trapp, Region I
                    610-337-5186
                    EMail: jmt1@nrc.gov

                    Chuck Petrone, NRR
                    301-415-1027
                    Email: cpd@nrc.gov
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REGION III  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          FEBRUARY  3, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

United States Enrichment Corporation   MR Number: 3-99-0005
United States Enrichment Corporatin    Date: 02/03/99
Ptsmouth Gaseous Diffusi Plant         VIA Resident Report
Dockets: 07007002

Subject: ORGANIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT AT PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT

Discussion:

The following management changes at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion
Plant were recently made:

Pat Musser assumed the position of Enrichment Plant Manager, responsible
for directing and coordinating plant operations. Mr. Musser was
previously the Training and Procedures Organization Manager.

Bob Helme was named Engineering Organization Manager, responsible for
engineering activities in support of plant operations, including nuclear
safety (which includes nuclear criticality safety and safety analysis).
Mr. Helme was previously employed at Carolina Power and Light.

David Couser assumed the position of Training and Procedure Organization
Manager, responsible for the technical and qualification training program
and development and implementation of the procedures management program.
Mr. Couser was previously the Training Manager.

Regional Action:

None

Contact:  Patric Hiland              (630)829-9603
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REGION IV  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          FEBRUARY  3, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Entergy Operations, Inc.               MR Number: 4-99-0004
Arkansas Nuclear 2                     Date: 02/03/99
Russelville,Arkansas                   Senior Resident Inspector
Dockets: 50-368
PWR/CE

Subject: INADVERTENT ENTRY INTO REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATIONS

Discussion:

On February 2, 1999, with the unit in the 25th day of the refueling
outage, licensed operators were draining the Unit 2 refueling canal to
the refueling water tank, using two low pressure safety injection (LPSI)
pumps, in preparation for reactor head reassembly. When water level
reached 105 inches, the reactor operator noted that level started to
lower rapidly. Operators stopped one of the LPSI pumps and instructed a
local operator to close the isolation valve to the refueling water tank.
This manually operated valve required 55 turns of the handwheel to fully
close the valve. Within approximately 1.5 minutes, reactor vessel level
dropped to 56 inches.  This was below the 65-inch entry point for reduced
inventory operations. (Reference zero on these level instruments is the
bottom of the hot leg, with midloop being defined at approximately 24
inches.)  At the lowest water level, 93 inches of water remained above
the top of active fuel.  At 90 inches (15 inches below the flange) time
to boil was approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes. Operators started a high
head safety injection pump and refilled the vessel to approximately 90
inches. The reactor coolant system was in reduced inventory for 7
minutes. Level remained well above the point where pump cavitation would
be expected.

The licensee has stopped all reactor vessel drain activities while an
event investigation is being performed.

Regional Action:

The region is developing a special inspection plan. Focused inspection
activities are scheduled to start on February 4, 1999.

Contact:  Charles S. Marschall       (817)860-8185
          David P. Loveless          (817)860-8161
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