Morning Report for February 3, 1999
Headquarters Daily Report FEBRUARY 03, 1999 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS FEB. 03, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-99-0010 Proposed Generic Communication Date: 02/03/99 Subject: Millstone 2 - Discharge of Carbon Dioxide System in Millstone 2 Cable Spreading Room Affects Control Room Discussion: On January 15, 1999 a CO2 discharge inadvertently occurred in the Unit 3 cable spreading room. Approximately 4 hours after this discharge, control room operators donned self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) when the scent of wintergreen [CO2 is spiked with the scent to aid detection] was noted inside the control room envelope. An NRC inspection team reviewed this event and will document their findings in an inspection report. In addition, the NRC plans to issue an Information Notice to provide details of this event to other utilities. Technical contacts: Jim Trapp, Region I 610-337-5186 EMail: jmt1@nrc.gov Chuck Petrone, NRR 301-415-1027 Email: cpd@nrc.gov _ REGION III MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 FEBRUARY 3, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: United States Enrichment Corporation MR Number: 3-99-0005 United States Enrichment Corporatin Date: 02/03/99 Ptsmouth Gaseous Diffusi Plant VIA Resident Report Dockets: 07007002 Subject: ORGANIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT AT PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT Discussion: The following management changes at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant were recently made: Pat Musser assumed the position of Enrichment Plant Manager, responsible for directing and coordinating plant operations. Mr. Musser was previously the Training and Procedures Organization Manager. Bob Helme was named Engineering Organization Manager, responsible for engineering activities in support of plant operations, including nuclear safety (which includes nuclear criticality safety and safety analysis). Mr. Helme was previously employed at Carolina Power and Light. David Couser assumed the position of Training and Procedure Organization Manager, responsible for the technical and qualification training program and development and implementation of the procedures management program. Mr. Couser was previously the Training Manager. Regional Action: None Contact: Patric Hiland (630)829-9603 _ REGION IV MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 FEBRUARY 3, 1999 Licensee/Facility: Notification: Entergy Operations, Inc. MR Number: 4-99-0004 Arkansas Nuclear 2 Date: 02/03/99 Russelville,Arkansas Senior Resident Inspector Dockets: 50-368 PWR/CE Subject: INADVERTENT ENTRY INTO REDUCED INVENTORY OPERATIONS Discussion: On February 2, 1999, with the unit in the 25th day of the refueling outage, licensed operators were draining the Unit 2 refueling canal to the refueling water tank, using two low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps, in preparation for reactor head reassembly. When water level reached 105 inches, the reactor operator noted that level started to lower rapidly. Operators stopped one of the LPSI pumps and instructed a local operator to close the isolation valve to the refueling water tank. This manually operated valve required 55 turns of the handwheel to fully close the valve. Within approximately 1.5 minutes, reactor vessel level dropped to 56 inches. This was below the 65-inch entry point for reduced inventory operations. (Reference zero on these level instruments is the bottom of the hot leg, with midloop being defined at approximately 24 inches.) At the lowest water level, 93 inches of water remained above the top of active fuel. At 90 inches (15 inches below the flange) time to boil was approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes. Operators started a high head safety injection pump and refilled the vessel to approximately 90 inches. The reactor coolant system was in reduced inventory for 7 minutes. Level remained well above the point where pump cavitation would be expected. The licensee has stopped all reactor vessel drain activities while an event investigation is being performed. Regional Action: The region is developing a special inspection plan. Focused inspection activities are scheduled to start on February 4, 1999. Contact: Charles S. Marschall (817)860-8185 David P. Loveless (817)860-8161 _
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021