Event Notification Report for February 02, 2026

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"The licensee informed the Department via telephone on January 23, 2026, that a fixed gauging device was disabled or failed to function as designed. The licensee reported that a sealed source was stuck (exposed) in a dip tube assembly that was attached to a process vessel. The licensee reported that a representative from a licensed service provider was on-site and was able to remove the sealed source from the dip tube assembly, and placed the sealed source into a transport shield. The sealed source is a 9 millicurie cobalt-60 Berthold model P2608-100 sealed source. The licensee did not report any overexposures or ongoing health/safety concerns. This event is still under investigation by the Department."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOOSE CONTAMINATION EXCEEDED ANNUAL LIMIT ON INTAKE

The following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) via phone and email:

"On December 22, 2025, the licensee informed the Department that a pathology assistant (PA) accidentally bisected an I-125 seed, used for radioactive seed localization in breast tissue, during pathology processing in the laboratory. The seed was a Best Medical International model 2300 series (S/N 61498-8) containing 169 microcuries of I-125. The PA removed the two sections from the tissue with forceps, placed them in a vial within a shielded lead pig, and contacted the nuclear medicine (NM) department. The NM employee surveyed the area, equipment used, and the PA. The specimen container, absorbent liner where the tissue was sectioned, and 6 of the 11 specimen slides showed contamination. These items were packed into another container and taken back to NM. Area surveys of the room and personnel showed no evidence of contamination. The radiation safety officer (RSO) and associate RSO were notified of the event.

"The facility attempted to measure the remaining activity of the 2 pieces of seed. The dose calibrator detected an activity greater than the decayed activity. The decayed activity of the seed was [calculated to be] 169 microcuries. The dose calibrator detected 188 microcuries (dose calibrator background of I-125 detected 2 microcuries). The RSO stated the greater read may be due to the very low activity and the I-125 only having an energy of 35 KeV. Wipes were performed on the broken seed sections with no removable activity noted. The wipes detected only 12 cpm after correcting for background (212 cpm). These results lead the RSO to believe that pathology encapsulated the released I-125. This loose contamination is greater than one annual limit on intake of I-125 (40 microcuries).

"The Department performed a reactive inspection on January 9, 2026.

"New information received on January 26, 2026, shows that this event is reportable per 10 CFR 20.2202(b)."

Pennsylvania event report ID number: PA250020

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email:

"On January 26, 2026, VRMP was contacted by Elekta, Inc (Georgia license number 1153-1, working under reciprocity in Virgina) to report a missing Ir-192 high dose rate source. The source serial number is D36R4778 and the activity [as of January 26, 2026, is calculated to be] 878 mCi. The source is reported to have been picked up by the [common carrier] on November 27, 2025, from Virgina licensee Sentara Health. Sentara Health initiated a [common carrier] case on December 2, 2025. Elekta notified the State of Georgia on December 14, 2025. VRMP contacted the radiation safety officer (RSO) at Sentara regarding the failure to report the missing source and the RSO indicated they had not been notified by their oncology department that the source was missing. VRMP confirmed with the [common carrier] that the source has not been located as of January 26, 2026.

"VRMP will continue the investigation."

Virginia event report ID number: VA260001

* * * UPDATE ON 01/30/2026 AT 1322 EST FROM SHEILA NELSON TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by VRMP via email:

The source has been located at a common carrier processing center in Emporia, VA. The source remained at the Emporia facility because the common carrier was restructuring their express and ground shipping process. It was also discovered that the source was actually picked up by the common carrier from the licensee on October 27, 2025, earlier than initially reported, and taken from there to the common carrier processing center in Emporia.

The package will be delivered to the original consignee.

Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email), ILTAB (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 - EMD DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDER HEAD CRACKING

The following is a summary of information provided by Engine Systems, Inc. via fax:

Commercial, high duty cycle applications have experienced cracks between the core plugs and injector well on EMD cylinder heads cast from May 2023 to August 2025. The effect is a minor jacket water leak at the top of cylinder head. If the leakage goes undetected, there is the long-term possibility of lube oil dilution that could prevent the engine from fulfilling its safety-related function.

Data obtained from commercial applications indicates these top deck head cracks developed in only the heaviest loaded engines and at an average of 3000 hours. Considering a typical EMD nuclear engine operating time of 50 hours per year, a cylinder head is expected to last 60 years in an emergency standby application before a crack may develop. For the few commercial applications impacted by this issue (less than 0.5 percent), cracks were detected during top deck inspections, but the leakage did not negatively affect engine operation. Crack propagation has not been a concern, and the issue is localized to the top deck area adjacent to the core plugs. The effect of the crack was nuisance leakage. If left undetected, one symptom of the leak is oil dilution. It is recommended to perform periodic top deck visual inspections of the head and continue performing lube oil analysis.

Corrective actions have been implemented by the casting manufacturer effective August 2025. For future shipments, ESI will ensure all cylinder heads have a cast date after August 2025.

Responsible corporate officials:

Dan Roberts, Quality Manager
John Kriesel, Engineering Manager
Engine Systems, Inc.
175 Freight Rd
Rocky Mount, NC

Affected plants:
Region I - Fitzpatrick, Nine Mile Point
Region II - Brunswick, Sequoyah, Turkey Point, Watts Bar
Region III - Davis Besse, Dresden, Perry, Quad Cities
Region IV - Grand Gulf

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A STEAM LEAK

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2155 EST, on January 30, 2026, with unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a steam leak in the feedwater heater system. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) resulting from a valid actuation of the reactor protection and emergency feedwater systems.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

HIGH-PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2009 CST on February 1, 2026, Grand Gulf Nuclear Sation (GGNS) was conducting surveillance testing on the high-pressure core spray (HPCS) division III diesel generator. Following the start of the HPCS division III diesel generator, the HPCS standby service water (SSW) pump immediately tripped. As a result, HPCS SSW and HPCS were declared inoperable. The cause of the HPCS SSW pump trip is being investigated.

"The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. HPCS, a single-train safety system, will remain inoperable until the condition is corrected.

"All sources of offsite power are available. No other safety systems are inoperable. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was verified to be operable per GGNS technical specification 3.5.1.B.1.

"The NRC Resident has been notified."