Event Notification Report for January 02, 2026
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/01/2026 - 01/02/2026
EVENT NUMBERS
58104
58104
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58104
Facility: Hatch
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Hugh Garrett Crosby
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Hugh Garrett Crosby
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 12/31/2025
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2025
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/31/2025
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2025
Event Time: 09:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/31/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Nielsen, Adam (R2DO)
Nielsen, Adam (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 2, 2025, at 0915 EST, and on November 3, 2025 at 0203 EST, while [Hatch] Unit 1 was at 100-percent power, the normal supply breaker from the `1D' 600V switchgear to the 120/208V essential transformer `1C' tripped on overcurrent due to a ground resulting in the loss of the `1B' essential bus and the `1B' instrument bus. The loss of power impacted the logic of the primary and secondary containment isolation systems resulting in the invalid actuation of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems. The ground within the `1D' 600V switchgear was cleared by racking [out] the associated breaker and by replacing a degraded wire. A future action includes performing a detailed cubical and bus bar inspection of the `1D' 600V switchgear.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it was not part of a pre-planned sequence and resulted in the invalid, partial actuation of CIVs in both the primary containment and secondary containment systems, with all systems responding normally.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On November 2, 2025, at 0915 EST, and on November 3, 2025 at 0203 EST, while [Hatch] Unit 1 was at 100-percent power, the normal supply breaker from the `1D' 600V switchgear to the 120/208V essential transformer `1C' tripped on overcurrent due to a ground resulting in the loss of the `1B' essential bus and the `1B' instrument bus. The loss of power impacted the logic of the primary and secondary containment isolation systems resulting in the invalid actuation of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems. The ground within the `1D' 600V switchgear was cleared by racking [out] the associated breaker and by replacing a degraded wire. A future action includes performing a detailed cubical and bus bar inspection of the `1D' 600V switchgear.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it was not part of a pre-planned sequence and resulted in the invalid, partial actuation of CIVs in both the primary containment and secondary containment systems, with all systems responding normally.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."