Event Notification Report for October 28, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/27/2025 - 10/28/2025
Agreement State
Event Number: 58016
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Tier 1 Integrity LLC
Region: 4
City: Deer Park State: TX
County:
License #: L06718
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Sindiso Ncube
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton
Licensee: Tier 1 Integrity LLC
Region: 4
City: Deer Park State: TX
County:
License #: L06718
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Sindiso Ncube
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton
Notification Date: 10/30/2025
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2025
Notification Time: 10:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On October 29, 2025, the Agency received a notification from the licensee regarding a source disconnect that occurred during an industrial radiography operation at a temporary job site. The radiography camera involved is a QSA Global Delta 880 model, containing a 102 curie iridium-192 sealed source (original activity date October 16, 2025). The licensee stated that on October 28, 2025, the guide tube through which the radioactive source travels became crimped, resulting in the source becoming stuck in the exposed position and preventing normal retraction into the shielded position. The licensee stated that a technician crimped the source tube by placing it through a swivel mechanism equipped with pressure clamps, rather than using a separate rod and properly attaching the source tube to the rod. The clamping pressure deformed the guide tube, causing the drive cable to fail when excessive force was applied by the technician to retract the source. The technician contacted one of the licensee's authorized source recovery experts who responded to the site. The licensee stated that the source was safely recovered and returned to the locked, shielded position using an empty camera for transfer. The source is currently stored at the licensee's workshop. The licensee stated that dosimetry badges for all workers present at the time of the incident have been sent out for processing to the service provider. The licensee stated that there was no exposure to members of the public as a result of this event.
"Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 reporting requirements."
Texas Incident #: 10240
Texas NMED # TX250057
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On October 29, 2025, the Agency received a notification from the licensee regarding a source disconnect that occurred during an industrial radiography operation at a temporary job site. The radiography camera involved is a QSA Global Delta 880 model, containing a 102 curie iridium-192 sealed source (original activity date October 16, 2025). The licensee stated that on October 28, 2025, the guide tube through which the radioactive source travels became crimped, resulting in the source becoming stuck in the exposed position and preventing normal retraction into the shielded position. The licensee stated that a technician crimped the source tube by placing it through a swivel mechanism equipped with pressure clamps, rather than using a separate rod and properly attaching the source tube to the rod. The clamping pressure deformed the guide tube, causing the drive cable to fail when excessive force was applied by the technician to retract the source. The technician contacted one of the licensee's authorized source recovery experts who responded to the site. The licensee stated that the source was safely recovered and returned to the locked, shielded position using an empty camera for transfer. The source is currently stored at the licensee's workshop. The licensee stated that dosimetry badges for all workers present at the time of the incident have been sent out for processing to the service provider. The licensee stated that there was no exposure to members of the public as a result of this event.
"Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 reporting requirements."
Texas Incident #: 10240
Texas NMED # TX250057
Power Reactor
Event Number: 58012
Facility: Susquehanna
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Kenneth Hulbert
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Kenneth Hulbert
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 10/28/2025
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2025
Event Time: 19:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2025
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2025
Event Time: 19:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
Person (Organization):
Young, Matt (R1DO)
Grant, Jeffery (IRMOC)
McKenna, Philip (NRR EO)
Young, Matt (R1DO)
Grant, Jeffery (IRMOC)
McKenna, Philip (NRR EO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
RPS ACTUATION AND OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1904 EDT on 10/28/2025, there was a full reactor scram at Susquehanna Unit 2 from 100 percent power. All systems operated as expected, and the plant is stable in mode 3 with decay heat removal via the main condenser. The cause of the scram is under investigation. Unit 1 was not affected.
Concurrent with the Unit 2 scram, the control room received a report of a fire outside of the protected area near the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 500-kilovolt switchyard. The local fire department responded to the site with lights and sirens active which caused heightened public concern on social media. An event of potential public interest notification was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). It was determined no fire existed, no actions were taken by the offsite fire company, and no personnel were injured during the event.
Whether the reported fire and the reactor scram are related, is being investigated.
This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for the unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor is critical and for the offsite notification to PEMA.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1904 EDT on 10/28/2025, there was a full reactor scram at Susquehanna Unit 2 from 100 percent power. All systems operated as expected, and the plant is stable in mode 3 with decay heat removal via the main condenser. The cause of the scram is under investigation. Unit 1 was not affected.
Concurrent with the Unit 2 scram, the control room received a report of a fire outside of the protected area near the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 500-kilovolt switchyard. The local fire department responded to the site with lights and sirens active which caused heightened public concern on social media. An event of potential public interest notification was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). It was determined no fire existed, no actions were taken by the offsite fire company, and no personnel were injured during the event.
Whether the reported fire and the reactor scram are related, is being investigated.
This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for the unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor is critical and for the offsite notification to PEMA.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.