Event Notification Report for October 12, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/11/2025 - 10/12/2025
Agreement State
Event Number: 57995
Rep Org: Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm
Licensee: Applied Technical Services, LLC
Region: 1
City: Augusta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 896-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Hays
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Licensee: Applied Technical Services, LLC
Region: 1
City: Augusta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 896-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Hays
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 10/21/2025
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2025
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Matt (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Grant, Jeffery (IRMOC)
Young, Matt (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Grant, Jeffery (IRMOC)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following is a summary of information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via phone and email:
On October 13, 2025, Applied Technical Services, LLC (ATS) shipped a radiography camera containing a sealed source to QSA Global via common carrier overnight delivery. The shipment originated from Augusta, Georgia and was destined for Burlington, Massachusetts.
On October 21, 2025, ATS was notified by QSA Global that they had yet to receive the device. ATS followed up with the common carrier to attempt to locate the device and get further status. Using the package tracking number, it was determined that the package arrived at the common carrier's sorting facility in Memphis, Tennessee on October 13, 2025. After further investigation, the package was located at the common carrier facility and will be shipped to QSA Global.
Camera information:
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Model: 880 Delta
Serial Number: D11255
Source Information:
Model: A424-9
Isotope: Ir-192
Activity: 102.8 Ci (as of 10/21/2025)
GA Incident Number: 110
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following is a summary of information provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via phone and email:
On October 13, 2025, Applied Technical Services, LLC (ATS) shipped a radiography camera containing a sealed source to QSA Global via common carrier overnight delivery. The shipment originated from Augusta, Georgia and was destined for Burlington, Massachusetts.
On October 21, 2025, ATS was notified by QSA Global that they had yet to receive the device. ATS followed up with the common carrier to attempt to locate the device and get further status. Using the package tracking number, it was determined that the package arrived at the common carrier's sorting facility in Memphis, Tennessee on October 13, 2025. After further investigation, the package was located at the common carrier facility and will be shipped to QSA Global.
Camera information:
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Model: 880 Delta
Serial Number: D11255
Source Information:
Model: A424-9
Isotope: Ir-192
Activity: 102.8 Ci (as of 10/21/2025)
GA Incident Number: 110
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57983
Facility: Oconee
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: Wesley Boyd
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: Wesley Boyd
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 10/13/2025
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 13:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2025
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 13:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY (FFD) TEST
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1311 EDT on October 13, 2025, it was determined that a non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive test as specified by the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated at all Duke Energy facilities.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1311 EDT on October 13, 2025, it was determined that a non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive test as specified by the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated at all Duke Energy facilities.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57984
Facility: South Texas
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Veronica Rohan
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Veronica Rohan
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 10/13/2025
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2025
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2025
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
Person (Organization):
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
Monninger, John (R4 RA)
Williams, Kevin (NSIR)
Bowman, Greg (NRR)
Grant, Jeffery (IR MOC)
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
Monninger, John (R4 RA)
Williams, Kevin (NSIR)
Bowman, Greg (NRR)
Grant, Jeffery (IR MOC)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/21/2025
EN Revision Text: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
An Unusual Event was declared on October 13, 2025, at 1914 CDT under EAL HU1.1 due to notification of a credible security threat.
State and local agencies were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
* * * UPDATE ON 10/13/2025 AT 2315 EDT FROM VERONICA ROHAN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated on October 13, 2025, at 2148 CDT.
Notified R4RA (Monninger), NRR (Bowman), NSIR (Williams), R4DO (Miller), NRR EO (Mckenna), IR MOC (Grant), PAO (Gasperson).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
EN Revision Text: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
An Unusual Event was declared on October 13, 2025, at 1914 CDT under EAL HU1.1 due to notification of a credible security threat.
State and local agencies were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
* * * UPDATE ON 10/13/2025 AT 2315 EDT FROM VERONICA ROHAN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated on October 13, 2025, at 2148 CDT.
Notified R4RA (Monninger), NRR (Bowman), NSIR (Williams), R4DO (Miller), NRR EO (Mckenna), IR MOC (Grant), PAO (Gasperson).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57982
Facility: Columbia Generating Station
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Justin Gerg
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Justin Gerg
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 10/13/2025
Notification Time: 00:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2025
Event Time: 17:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2025
Notification Time: 00:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2025
Event Time: 17:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
Person (Organization):
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
Miller, Geoffrey (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/6/2025
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On October 12, 2025, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) was performing a reactor building emergency cooling test. At 1428 [PDT], an air damper associated with the division 1 motor control center (MCC) room cooling failed to perform its intended function to close. This MCC supports the operation of one subsystem of the standby gas treatment system (SGT).
"At 1440, a second air damper, associated with the division 2 MCC room cooling, also failed. This MCC supports the operation of the other SGT subsystem. Field operators were dispatched to investigate the potential cause.
"At 1627, the first air damper that had failed was observed to have closed on its own without further operator action. Operators subsequently determined that failure of the air damper to close rendered the associated emergency room coolers inoperable.
"At 1705, [the division 2 MCC] was declared inoperable and technical specification action statement 3.8.7.A was entered. From 1440 to 1627, CGS was in a condition that required both SGT subsystems to be declared inoperable due to the loss of emergency room cooling to their associated MCCs. This condition constitutes a loss of safety function of SGT and secondary containment. It could have challenged the station's ability to control a radioactive release had one occurred during that time.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) due to the loss of safety function of both trains of SGT and secondary containment for approximately 2 hours."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
At the time of notification, the licensee had exited all technical specification action statements.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/5/2025 AT 1925 EST FROM JERRY AINSWORTH TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"On October 12, 2025, at 2152 PDT, Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) due to the loss of safety function of both trains of standby gas treatment (SGT) and secondary containment for approximately 2 hours under Event Notification 57982.
"The notification was made due to the failure of two dampers to close during testing of the Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System. The dampers that failed to close were cross-divisional and affected rooms with equipment necessary for both trains of the SGT system which supports the safety function of secondary containment.
"Following the event, engineering conducted an evaluation to determine if both air dampers remaining open during a loss of cooling accident would have put any safety-related equipment at risk due to potential changes in radiological and environmental conditions within the associated motor control center (MCC) rooms.
"The engineering evaluation determined temperatures and humidities would not have exceeded limits in the MCC rooms due to the dampers being left open. Additionally, any increase in radiation would be considered negligible and would not affect the ability of the equipment to perform their design functions. Therefore, the safety-related equipment within the MCC rooms would have been available and operable to perform their design function were an accident to occur. Consequently, the failure of two dampers to close during testing is not considered to be an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of SGT and secondary containment and did not impact the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident or control the release of radioactive material, therefore, event notification 57982 is retracted.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Vossmar)
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On October 12, 2025, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) was performing a reactor building emergency cooling test. At 1428 [PDT], an air damper associated with the division 1 motor control center (MCC) room cooling failed to perform its intended function to close. This MCC supports the operation of one subsystem of the standby gas treatment system (SGT).
"At 1440, a second air damper, associated with the division 2 MCC room cooling, also failed. This MCC supports the operation of the other SGT subsystem. Field operators were dispatched to investigate the potential cause.
"At 1627, the first air damper that had failed was observed to have closed on its own without further operator action. Operators subsequently determined that failure of the air damper to close rendered the associated emergency room coolers inoperable.
"At 1705, [the division 2 MCC] was declared inoperable and technical specification action statement 3.8.7.A was entered. From 1440 to 1627, CGS was in a condition that required both SGT subsystems to be declared inoperable due to the loss of emergency room cooling to their associated MCCs. This condition constitutes a loss of safety function of SGT and secondary containment. It could have challenged the station's ability to control a radioactive release had one occurred during that time.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) due to the loss of safety function of both trains of SGT and secondary containment for approximately 2 hours."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
At the time of notification, the licensee had exited all technical specification action statements.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/5/2025 AT 1925 EST FROM JERRY AINSWORTH TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"On October 12, 2025, at 2152 PDT, Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) due to the loss of safety function of both trains of standby gas treatment (SGT) and secondary containment for approximately 2 hours under Event Notification 57982.
"The notification was made due to the failure of two dampers to close during testing of the Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System. The dampers that failed to close were cross-divisional and affected rooms with equipment necessary for both trains of the SGT system which supports the safety function of secondary containment.
"Following the event, engineering conducted an evaluation to determine if both air dampers remaining open during a loss of cooling accident would have put any safety-related equipment at risk due to potential changes in radiological and environmental conditions within the associated motor control center (MCC) rooms.
"The engineering evaluation determined temperatures and humidities would not have exceeded limits in the MCC rooms due to the dampers being left open. Additionally, any increase in radiation would be considered negligible and would not affect the ability of the equipment to perform their design functions. Therefore, the safety-related equipment within the MCC rooms would have been available and operable to perform their design function were an accident to occur. Consequently, the failure of two dampers to close during testing is not considered to be an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of SGT and secondary containment and did not impact the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident or control the release of radioactive material, therefore, event notification 57982 is retracted.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Vossmar)