Event Notification Report for October 10, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/09/2025 - 10/10/2025
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57977
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Michael Grembecki
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Michael Grembecki
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 04:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 01:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 04:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 01:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
Mckown, Louis J (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 5 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0100 EDT, on 10/10/2025, with McGuire Unit 2 in mode 1 at 5 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to an approximate 4 gpm leak associated with the chemical and volume control system. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were manually started due to anticipation of automatic actuation. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and manual start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour system actuation per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"At 0211 on 10/10/25, it was determined the required train of the refueling water storage tank was inoperable due to insufficient borated water volume; therefore, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The safety function was restored at 0249 on 10/10/2025 and the required train has been declared operable. There was no impact to the other unit.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Decay heat is being removed via steam dump valves to the main condenser, and the auxiliary feedwater system. The cause of the leak is being investigated.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0100 EDT, on 10/10/2025, with McGuire Unit 2 in mode 1 at 5 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to an approximate 4 gpm leak associated with the chemical and volume control system. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were manually started due to anticipation of automatic actuation. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and manual start of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour system actuation per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"At 0211 on 10/10/25, it was determined the required train of the refueling water storage tank was inoperable due to insufficient borated water volume; therefore, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The safety function was restored at 0249 on 10/10/2025 and the required train has been declared operable. There was no impact to the other unit.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Decay heat is being removed via steam dump valves to the main condenser, and the auxiliary feedwater system. The cause of the leak is being investigated.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57978
Facility: Braidwood
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Sam Keller
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Sam Keller
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 02:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 09:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 02:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Degraded Condition
Person (Organization):
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
DEGRADED CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM PENETRATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0230 CDT, on October 10, 2025, it was determined that the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration '69' was degraded because liquid penetrant testing performed on the embedded flaw repair weld identified an unacceptable indication in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section Ill acceptance standards and NRC approved licensee relief request for a previously performed embedded flaw repair. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.? The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0230 CDT, on October 10, 2025, it was determined that the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration '69' was degraded because liquid penetrant testing performed on the embedded flaw repair weld identified an unacceptable indication in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section Ill acceptance standards and NRC approved licensee relief request for a previously performed embedded flaw repair. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.? The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 57980
Rep Org: Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm
Licensee: Tanner Health System
Region: 1
City: Carrollton State: GA
County:
License #: GA 120-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Shatavia Walker
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: Tanner Health System
Region: 1
City: Carrollton State: GA
County:
License #: GA 120-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Shatavia Walker
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Notification Time: 15:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Matt (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Young, Matt (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CALIBRATION SOURCE
The following information is a summary provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
On October 10, 2025, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) noticed a missing calibration source from April 1, 2024, while reviewing sealed source inventory documents. The source had been marked absent, and the former RSO had initiated an investigation but did not leave any documents to address the whereabouts of the source. The RSO reported that they did have a disposal company to exchange and dispose of several sources during that time, however, there is no evidence the source in question was disposed of. Although the RSO is confident the source was disposed, they do not have the documents and do not believe they will be able to find them. The licensee was advised to reach out to the disposal company and inquire if they could account for the source. More information will be provided as it becomes available.
Missing source: 12 mCi, Cs-137, serial number 1104-30
Georgia Incident Number: 108
NMED Number: 2025-10-10
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information is a summary provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
On October 10, 2025, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) noticed a missing calibration source from April 1, 2024, while reviewing sealed source inventory documents. The source had been marked absent, and the former RSO had initiated an investigation but did not leave any documents to address the whereabouts of the source. The RSO reported that they did have a disposal company to exchange and dispose of several sources during that time, however, there is no evidence the source in question was disposed of. Although the RSO is confident the source was disposed, they do not have the documents and do not believe they will be able to find them. The licensee was advised to reach out to the disposal company and inquire if they could account for the source. More information will be provided as it becomes available.
Missing source: 12 mCi, Cs-137, serial number 1104-30
Georgia Incident Number: 108
NMED Number: 2025-10-10
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf