Event Notification Report for October 02, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/01/2025 - 10/02/2025
Agreement State
Event Number: 57964
Rep Org: Minnesota Department of Health
Licensee: Braun Intertec Corporation
Region: 3
City: Stillwater State: MN
County:
License #: 1091
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brandon Juran
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Braun Intertec Corporation
Region: 3
City: Stillwater State: MN
County:
License #: 1091
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brandon Juran
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 10/03/2025
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2025
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 14:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Minnesota Department of Health via email:
"The licensee had an InstroTek portable gauge containing 10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sealed sources at a temporary jobsite. The gauge was run over by a compaction roller. The work site was cordoned off and the roller shut off. The roller [pushed] the rod with the Cs-137 source out of the shielded position and into the ground. The local radiation safety officer responded to the site. They maintained the cordoned off area until they were able to secure the gauge. The gauge was packaged and labeled according to the manufacturer's instructions and returned to the licensee's storage location. The accident area was surveyed after the gauge was secure and the readings were at background. The licensee leak tested the sources and sent them in to be analyzed."
State event report ID: MN250006
The following information was provided by the Minnesota Department of Health via email:
"The licensee had an InstroTek portable gauge containing 10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sealed sources at a temporary jobsite. The gauge was run over by a compaction roller. The work site was cordoned off and the roller shut off. The roller [pushed] the rod with the Cs-137 source out of the shielded position and into the ground. The local radiation safety officer responded to the site. They maintained the cordoned off area until they were able to secure the gauge. The gauge was packaged and labeled according to the manufacturer's instructions and returned to the licensee's storage location. The accident area was surveyed after the gauge was secure and the readings were at background. The licensee leak tested the sources and sent them in to be analyzed."
State event report ID: MN250006
Agreement State
Event Number: 57965
Rep Org: Arkansas Department of Health
Licensee: Domtar AW LLC
Region: 4
City: Ashdown State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0354-03120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Hunter Broadaway
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Domtar AW LLC
Region: 4
City: Ashdown State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0354-03120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Hunter Broadaway
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 10/03/2025
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2025
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/22/2025
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER
The following information is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
During routine gauge shutter checks conducted by the licensee on October 2, 2025, the licensee found the shutters of three Berthold Technologies model LB300L fixed gauges stuck in the open position. The licensee has flagged the gauges, placed barriers around the gauges, and suspended any work in the area. The licensee is arranging for a Berthold field representative to perform maintenance on the gauges to attempt to close the gauges.
Gauge 1: 0.2 mCi Co-60
Gauge 2: 0.5 mCi Co-60
Gauge 3: 1.8 mCi Co-60
Arkansas event: AR-2025-013
* * * UPDATE ON 10/20/2025 AT 1617 EDT FROM HUNTER BROADAWAY TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
On October 20, 2025, a response from DOMTAR A.W. LLC, Arkansas Licensee ARK-0354-03120, reports that under the direction of a Berthold Technologies representative, the three shutters were able to be cycled and are once again functional. Maintenance and leak testing were performed on the three gauges.
Arkansas event AR-2025-013 is considered closed by the Department.
Notified R4DO (Vossmar) and NMSS Events Notification (email).
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN GAUGE SHUTTER
The following information is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
During routine gauge shutter checks conducted by the licensee on October 2, 2025, the licensee found the shutters of three Berthold Technologies model LB300L fixed gauges stuck in the open position. The licensee has flagged the gauges, placed barriers around the gauges, and suspended any work in the area. The licensee is arranging for a Berthold field representative to perform maintenance on the gauges to attempt to close the gauges.
Gauge 1: 0.2 mCi Co-60
Gauge 2: 0.5 mCi Co-60
Gauge 3: 1.8 mCi Co-60
Arkansas event: AR-2025-013
* * * UPDATE ON 10/20/2025 AT 1617 EDT FROM HUNTER BROADAWAY TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information is a summary of information provided by the Arkansas Department of Health (the Department) via email:
On October 20, 2025, a response from DOMTAR A.W. LLC, Arkansas Licensee ARK-0354-03120, reports that under the direction of a Berthold Technologies representative, the three shutters were able to be cycled and are once again functional. Maintenance and leak testing were performed on the three gauges.
Arkansas event AR-2025-013 is considered closed by the Department.
Notified R4DO (Vossmar) and NMSS Events Notification (email).
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 58017
Rep Org: Michigan State University
Licensee: Michigan State University
Region: 3
City: Hickory Corners State: MI
County: Kalamazoo
License #: 21-00021-29
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Travis Smith
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Licensee: Michigan State University
Region: 3
City: Hickory Corners State: MI
County: Kalamazoo
License #: 21-00021-29
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Travis Smith
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 10/31/2025
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2025
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen LNM>10x
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - Lost/Stolen LNM>10x
Person (Organization):
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSC (Canada), - (EMAIL)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Ziolkowski, Michael (R3DO)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSC (Canada), - (EMAIL)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
STOLEN SOURCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee reported that a trailer containing an electron capture device with a 5 mCi Ni-63 source was discovered stolen from a university agricultural research station on October 2, 2025. Local law enforcement (Kalamazoo County Sheriff) and Michigan State University police were notified. The trailer has not been located.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:
The licensee reported that a trailer containing an electron capture device with a 5 mCi Ni-63 source was discovered stolen from a university agricultural research station on October 2, 2025. Local law enforcement (Kalamazoo County Sheriff) and Michigan State University police were notified. The trailer has not been located.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57963
Facility: South Texas
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Long Han
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Long Han
HQ OPS Officer: Jordan Wingate
Notification Date: 10/02/2025
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 16:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2025
Notification Time: 20:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2025
Event Time: 16:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/21/2025
EN Revision Text: TWO TRAINS OF ECCS INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On October 2, 2025, at 1651 CDT, essential cooling water pump '1C' tripped. Essential chiller '1C' and cascading equipment, including emergency core cooling system (ECCS) train '1C,' was declared inoperable.
"Essential chiller '12A' and cascading equipment, including ECCS train '1A,' was concurrently inoperable for ongoing maintenance.
"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on 2 out of 3 safety trains for the accident mitigating functions, including the train 'A' and train 'C' high head safety injection (SI), low head SI, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), and essential chilled water. All 'B' train safety related equipment remains operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The repair timeline is unknown. We have already entered the configuration risk management program to mitigate additional maintenance induced risk with a risk informed completion time of October 19, 2025, at 1140 CDT. We are limited by TS 3.7.7.C to restore 1 train of control room HVAC by October 5, 2025, at 1651 CDT.
"This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The 'C' emergency diesel generator is unavailable due to the loss of cooling water. Maintenance on the ECCS train '1A' is partially complete and operators are working to restore the train to an operable status prior to the technical specification deadline. The essential cooling water pump trip was due to a hot spot causing the pump to overheat. The cause of the hot spot is still under investigation.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/20/2025 AT 1636 EDT FROM MARC HILL TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 57963, which was made on October 2, 2025, at 2055 EDT. [The] notification was initially made due to two of three trains of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) being declared inoperable. After the notification was made, South Texas Project determined, using an engineering evaluation, that one of the two inoperable ECCS trains was operable because the elevated chilled water outlet temperature of the associated essential chiller (Train A) did not impact the technical specification specified function.
"Therefore, this event was not a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Vossmar)
EN Revision Text: TWO TRAINS OF ECCS INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On October 2, 2025, at 1651 CDT, essential cooling water pump '1C' tripped. Essential chiller '1C' and cascading equipment, including emergency core cooling system (ECCS) train '1C,' was declared inoperable.
"Essential chiller '12A' and cascading equipment, including ECCS train '1A,' was concurrently inoperable for ongoing maintenance.
"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on 2 out of 3 safety trains for the accident mitigating functions, including the train 'A' and train 'C' high head safety injection (SI), low head SI, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), and essential chilled water. All 'B' train safety related equipment remains operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The repair timeline is unknown. We have already entered the configuration risk management program to mitigate additional maintenance induced risk with a risk informed completion time of October 19, 2025, at 1140 CDT. We are limited by TS 3.7.7.C to restore 1 train of control room HVAC by October 5, 2025, at 1651 CDT.
"This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The 'C' emergency diesel generator is unavailable due to the loss of cooling water. Maintenance on the ECCS train '1A' is partially complete and operators are working to restore the train to an operable status prior to the technical specification deadline. The essential cooling water pump trip was due to a hot spot causing the pump to overheat. The cause of the hot spot is still under investigation.
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/20/2025 AT 1636 EDT FROM MARC HILL TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 57963, which was made on October 2, 2025, at 2055 EDT. [The] notification was initially made due to two of three trains of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) being declared inoperable. After the notification was made, South Texas Project determined, using an engineering evaluation, that one of the two inoperable ECCS trains was operable because the elevated chilled water outlet temperature of the associated essential chiller (Train A) did not impact the technical specification specified function.
"Therefore, this event was not a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Vossmar)