Event Notification Report for September 15, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/15/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The following report was received by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:

"The Agency was contacted this afternoon (7/17/25) by Isomedix Operations, Inc. in Libertyville, IL to advise of a reportable equipment failure.

"According to the report, the radiation monitor used to perform required radioactivity measurements of the pool water (e.g., leak testing of the pool irradiator sources) failed at some point in the last month. It was discovered yesterday, 7/16/25, during a routine monthly check when the system failed to alarm when tested with a check source.

"Replacement monitoring equipment was installed, and the pool water was determined to be free of radioactivity. This incident had no impact to public or worker safety, nor is there any indication of leaking sources. However, the reportable criteria in 32 Illinois Administrative Code 340.122(c)(2) appear to have been met. The licensee met the 24-hour reporting requirement, and the Agency will report the matter to the NRC shortly.

"Inspectors will conduct a reactive inspection to determine root cause and corrective action."

Illinois Item Number: IL250028

* * * UPDATE ON 09/12/2025 AT 1142 FROM KIM STICE TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"On 7/17/25, the Agency conducted a reactive inspection via phone with the [Isomedix] corporate radiation safety office and confirmed that identical functioning monitoring equipment was installed immediately after the failure was identified, and that the faulty instrument was to be sent to the manufacturer for examination and to determine a possible failure cause. Additionally, the corporate radiation safety officer reviewed additional tests conducted on 7/16/25 (surveys of the deionization tanks conducted and pool water sample collected and analyzed for radioactive contamination) to confirm no leaking of sources, all with negative results.

"On 8/20/25, inspectors followed up during a routine inspection and confirmed that replacement monitoring equipment had been installed and was calibrated and functional. The licensee advised that they were still waiting on a report from the manufacturer to determine if any additional corrective measures would be instituted. The licensee stated that any information received would be shared with the Agency. Regardless, the Agency will follow up at the time of next inspection."

Notified R3DO (Santiago) (email), NMSS Events Notification (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE MISSING IN TRANSIT

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"On September 4, 2025, the Agency received a notification from GE Healthcare in Arlington Heights, IL, to advise of a radiopharmaceutical package missing in transit. The package was shipped via [common carrier] on Thursday, August 21, 2025, for delivery to Mayo Clinic of Rochester, MN. The package contained 1 vial of ln-111 Oxyquinoline product calibrated at 1.0 mCi per vial. There has been no indication that the package was damaged or that the contents were separated from its packaging.

"The last tracking information has documented receipt at the [common carrier] Memphis sort facility on Thursday evening August 21, 2025, at 2251 CDT, but after no movement, it is believed this package is lost at the Memphis sort facility. The activity at time of shipment was 4.089 mCi, making it reportable to the NRC within 30 days. Updates will be made as they become available."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/16/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTED PACKAGE EXCEEDS LIMITS

The following report was received by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via phone:

On September 8, 2025, LDEQ was notified by QSA Global in Port Allen, LA, that they received a package with readings of 1 R/hr on contact of the external surface of one side of the package. Upon opening the package, it was found to contain two nuclear gauges, both with their shutters in the locked open position. One gauge was laying on its side and was most likely the cause of the 1R/hr reading. The gauges were a Thermo Fisher gauge, model 5202, serial number B3308 (500 mCi Cs-137) and a Kay-Ray gauge, model 7063P, serial number S92L3001 (200 mCi Cs-137).

The package was received from TaTa Steel Limited in Odissa, India and was shipped via [common carrier].

* * * UPDATE ON 09/09/2025 AT 1303 EDT FROM JAMES PATE TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:

On September 3, 2025, QSA Global, Inc. received a package for disposal from India.
The sources were received from Juda Wet Processing Plant Kendujhar Keonjhar, Orissa, 758034 India.
The update included the transportation path for the shipment within the United States.

Event Report ID No.: LA20250009

Notified R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events Notification (email), and NMSS (Allen).

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/15/2025

EN Revision Text: ENCLOSURE BUILDING BOUNDARY INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax:

"Entry into shutdown technical specification action statement due to an identified breach in ventilation ductwork.

"At 2250 EDT on September 9, 2025, it was discovered that there was degraded manway sealant on the manway to fire damper HV-298A. This degraded sealant results in a direct path from the enclosure building to the atmosphere, challenging the enclosure building boundary. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The plant is currently in a 24-hour technical specification action statement (3.6.5.2) for Unit 2. Unit 3 is not impacted and continues to operate at 100 percent power."

The Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2025, AT 0908 EDT FROM JARED FARLEY TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax:

"Millstone Unit 2 is retracting NRC Event Notification (EN) 57912, made on September 10, 2025, at 0523 EDT, regarding a condition identified at Millstone Power Station Unit 2. The condition involved degraded sealant on manways to fire dampers HV-298A/B/G, which resulted in a direct path from the enclosure building to the atmosphere, challenging the integrity of the enclosure building boundary. This condition was initially reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (control of release of radioactive material).

"A subsequent review using additional information on hatch design and actual seating surface determined that there is reasonable assurance the enclosure building boundary remained operable and retained its safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Based on this assessment, Unit 2 exited Technical Specification action statement 3.6.5.2, and the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Therefore, NRC EN 57912 is being retracted."

The Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R1DO (Ford).

BOTH TRAINS OF CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING SYSTEM INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On September 11, 2025, Callaway was performing a planned maintenance window causing the 'B' train emergency diesel generator and the 'B' train essential service water system to be inoperable. At 0255 CDT the 'A' train centrifugal charging pump was declared inoperable due to an unexpected loss of control room indication for the 'A' train centrifugal charging pump miniflow valve.

"Therefore, both trains of the centrifugal charging (high head injection) system were simultaneously inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). A fuse was replaced on the 'A' train centrifugal charging pump miniflow valve breaker, restoring operability of that system at 0500.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On September 13, 2025, at 1704 EDT, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 70 percent power performing main turbine testing, the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped due to loss of both reactor recirculation pumps. Due to the power level at the time, closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems occurred, as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level, as designed. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Normal reactor level and pressure control systems are controlling as expected. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.

"The reactor protection system actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Main turbine control valve testing was in progress when the reactor recirculation pumps tripped.

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/16/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Louisiana Radiation Protection Division (LDEQ) via email:

"On September 3, 2025, at approximately 1605 CDT, the radiation safety officer (RSO) for the licensee, Raba Kistner, Inc., notified LDEQ concerning an incident in which a Troxler model 3430 soil moisture density gauge, S/N 28457, was rolled over by a bulldozer. The incident occurred at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette New Iberia Research Center at approximately 1515 CDT. The RSO reported that during a direct transmission density measurement, in which the source was submerged in approximately eight inches of soil, the gauge was run over by the bulldozer. The gauge source rod was tilted in the soil approximately 45 degrees from the normal. It could not be determined if the source rod was bent, and no attempt was made to retract the density source into the safe position. The gauge possessed two sealed sources, an 8 mCi Cs-137 source, S/N 750-2469, and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source, S/N 47-25460. Both sources are approximately 28 years old. The gauge operator is currently maintaining an exclusion area of approximately 30 feet in radius about the gauge, which had a housing that was partially broken apart during the rollover. No radiation surveys have yet been performed of the gauge or surrounding area. The gauge manufacturer was contacted at time of reporting. The RSO will notify the LDEQ of incident status changes."

Event report ID number: LA20250008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCES

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:

"As a result of an ongoing Agency investigation into unresponsive general licensees, the Agency became aware that two (2) generally licensed gas chromatography devices containing 15 millicuries of Ni-63 are missing.
"Reportedly, on or about February 2023, Morton Grove Pharmaceuticals (Morton Grove, IL) ceased operations and improperly auctioned the two generally licensed devices, along with all other assets.
"The licensee failed to properly transfer or dispose of the devices, two Agilent Technologies model G23974 (s/n U10800 and s/n U12506). Agency inspectors conducted a site investigation on August 27, 2025, and confirmed no lab equipment is on site.
"The quantity of radioactive material involved, while unlikely to be dangerous to the public, is reportable within 30 days to the Agency and the U.S. NRC. Efforts to identify the buyers of the devices through the auction company have been unproductive and, absent additional information, the investigation is closed."

Illinois item number: IL250035

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST I-125 SEED

The following information was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency) via email:

"On August 11, 2025, three radioactive iodine-125 sealed sources (seeds) were removed from a patient receiving a radioactive seed localization procedure. The licensee expected to remove four I-125 seeds, which were placed in the patient on August 8, 2025, but only located three of the seeds.
"The missing seed was not located after extensive surveys of the patient, staff, and all areas where the seed may have been misplaced. The seed has not been located at this time.
"This is a 30-day reporting requirement per [Code of Massachusetts Regulations] 105 CMR 120.281(A)(2), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 10 times quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C.
"The Agency considers this event to be open."

Manufacturer: IsoAid, LLC
Model: IAI-125A
Source: 0.181 mCi I-125

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2020 CDT [on 9/14/2025], [Comanche Peak] Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped due to a malfunction of the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system on the main turbine. All auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to steam generator `Lo-Lo' levels post trip. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an actuation of auxiliary feedwater. Unit 2 is being maintained in hot standby (mode 3) in accordance with integrated plant operating procedures. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via the steam dump valves."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Unit 1 was not affected. The cause of the malfunction of EHC is unknown and under investigation. All rods fully inserted upon the reactor being tripped.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A reportable occurrence [was] identified on September 15, 2025, for a failure to implement administrative controls. Per technical specification 6.2(b).4, the facility reactor safeguards committee (RSC) shall determine whether changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report (SAR) may be accomplished in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, without obtaining prior NRC approval via license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. On September 10, 2025, changes to the normal and emergency electrical power systems described in the SAR were made without completing a review and acquiring RSC approval for the change.

"The reactor is and will remain shutdown until review and approval by the RSC of corrective actions is completed in accordance with Technical Specifications.

"A written report will be submitted within ten days summarizing the reportable occurrence."