Event Notification Report for August 06, 2025

DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:

On July 7, 2025, at 1550 EDT, a density technician was taking a measurement when they were struck by construction equipment. The individual was transported to the hospital for medical attention and the gauge was damaged by the construction equipment. The radiation safety officer responded to the site, pulled the gauge out of the ground, and verified that the source was still intact at the tip of the rod. The gauge was placed in a drum filled with sand and transported to a radioactive material storage facility owned by the licensee. The next morning, InstroTek was contacted to plan disposal of the gauge. There was no additional exposure to the technician or the public during the event and all radiation and contamination surveys of the site were below background levels. The damaged gauge is an InstroTek Explorer 3500 (S/N 3257) and contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCES

The following information was provided by the California Radiation Control Program via email:

"The licensee's contract physicist reported that two Cs-137 attenuation correction sources with approximate activities of 13 mCi each were missing when the licensee went to conduct an inventory in March 2025. The licensee has searched their facility but could not locate the sources."

California Report ID Number: 072825

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST / MISSING SOURCES

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"As a result of an Agency investigation into an unresponsive general licensee, three (3) x-ray florescence analyzers containing 30 millicuries each of Am-241, are being reported as lost or missing. The quantity of radioactive material involved, while unlikely to be dangerous to the public, is immediately reportable to the Agency and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission when lost or missing. Agency staff will conduct a reactive inspection to determine if the portable analyzers are still on site or any additional information is available.

"The company, Bar Source International, LLC (d/b/a Pro Metals LLC) was operating in Rochelle, IL as recently as March 2020. At that time, the company was in possession of a Thermo Niton XLp-818 (s/n 10597), XL3p-800 (s/n 33072) and XL258006651 (s/n 96513). The company has been unresponsive to Agency requests and, according to a former employee, closed sometime on or after March 2020."

Illinois Item Number: IL2500030

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS

The following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environmental (the Department) via email.

The Department received a notification from AMC Westminster Promanade 24 that two exit signs with 10 Ci of H-3 were lost in Westminster, CO.

Manufacture: Isolite Corporation
Model Number: 880-12-6.

Colorado Event Report ID Number: CO250023

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On June 10, 2025, Unit 2 operations personnel received an `A' channel half scram and entered 2-AOI-99-1. Motor generator set 2A was shut down and reactor protection system `A' was swapped to alternate. This resulted in primary containment isolation system (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and initiation of standby gas treatment (SGT) trains `A', `B', and `C' and control room emergency ventilation system (CREV) train `A'. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS groups 2 and 8 actuations are reactor vessel low water level and high drywell pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 3 actuations, are reactor vessel low water level and reactor water cleanup area high temperature.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 6, CREV and SGT actuations, are reactor vessel low water level, high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation (reactor zone or refuel zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; the actuation was due to a loss of power and not due to a low reactor water level or drywell pressure. Therefore, the actuation of the PCIS, CREV, and SGT was invalid.

"Upon investigation, the 2A2 circuit protector was found to have charred wire on the top right lug. The terminal block was replaced.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

"This event was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2019406."