Event Notification Report for July 23, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/23/2025

EN Revision Text: RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL COMPLEX PUMP ROOM DAMPER FULLY CLOSED

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 7/7/2025 at 1545 EDT, one of the division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) complex pump room dampers was noted to be full-closed instead of at the expected full-open position based on outside air temperatures. An operator walkdown confirmed that the division 2 RHR pump room temperature controller was attempting to open the damper. Per plant procedures, the affected RHR service water (RHRSW), emergency equipment service water (EESW), and emergency diesel generator service water pumps (DGSW) were declared inoperable. Division 2 EESW supports the safety function for all division 2 safety systems, including high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). Therefore, HPCI was also declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The damper will be blocked to the position required based on current and projected outside air temperature, this will return the systems to operable. The cause of the damper failure is unknown and under investigation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Multiple technical specification limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were entered as a result of this event. Fermi Unit 2 expects to be able to exit the LCOs within the required timeframes.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOSH MORSE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1616 EDT ON JULY 22, 2025 * * *

The following retraction was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Following the initial event notification, further analysis of the condition identified that since the residual heat removal complex room temperature (85 degrees F) was less than the limit bounded by a calculation (<104 degrees F), and the dampers were blocked in a position in accordance with plant procedures within 24 hours of the event, there is reasonable assurance that the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system would be able to perform its safety function. Therefore, HPCI is considered operable for the condition.

"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC event report 57804 can be retracted and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."

Notified R3DO (Zurawski)

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/23/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email:

"On July 15, 2025, the Agency became aware that a generally licensed gauge containing 100 millicuries of Am-241 could not be located. The gauge, a Peco Controls Corporation Gamma 101P, (SN G011619735), was one of (8) listed in use at Teasdale Foods in Hoopeston, IL. According to the (relatively new) registrant's management, records of the device could not be found and search efforts have been unproductive. An investigation is still underway to determine the root cause and the effectiveness of corrective actions."

Sealed source information:
Serial number: 5445LA

Illinois item number: IL250027

* * * UPDATE FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1639 EDT ON JULY 22, 2025 * * *

The following update was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"Agency staff conducted a reactive inspection on 7/21/25 and discovered two additional 'Gamma 101P' gauges were missing and could not be accounted for. There does not appear to be any intentional theft or diversion, rather loss of accountability and oversight during routine maintenance. The Agency investigation is ongoing."

Notified R3DO (Zurawski), NMSS_Events and ILTAB (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:

"The BRC received notification from Cardinal Health that a courier, employed by a courier company, was involved in a traffic stop resulting in an arrest. The courier was transporting a radioactive materials package containing one 5 mCi I-131 source at the time of the arrest. The transporting vehicle was then held at a towing company storage, with the towing company stating an intent to retain all impounded material until proper permissions could be received from the vehicle owner. The towing company was informed that they must release the material to Cardinal Health and have agreed to comply."

Florida Incident Number: FL25-069

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information received from the Alabama Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email:

"On July 16, 2025, at 0914 CDT the Agency received a call from the radiation safety officer (RSO) for INEOS Styrolution American, LLC. stating that during regular shutter checks, the shutter for the Ronan Model SA1-F37 Serial No. 8171GK, with 5000 millicuries cesium-137 would not close. The facility contacted RSO Services to schedule repair of the device. The facility has a maintenance outage scheduled in September of this year.

"The Agency will provide more information as the investigation continues."

Alabama Incident Number: 2025 25-02

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR UNSECURED

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On July 21, 2025, at 1548 CDT, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating at 100 percent reactor power when the central alarm station received a door alarm indicating that PW123-01 was not fully secured. A security officer was dispatched and found the door closed with the dogs (latches) not engaged. The security officer fully engaged the dogs at 1551 CDT.

"PW123-01 is a secondary containment door. With the dogs not being engaged, secondary containment was inoperable for 3 minutes.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function due to the inoperability of secondary containment.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee entered technical specification LCO 3.6.4.1 while the door was unsecured.

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1510 [EDT] with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 96 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to loss of main transformer cooling. The scram was not complex, all systems responded normally post-scram. Main turbine bypass valves opened automatically to maintain reactor pressure.

"Operations responded to stabilize the plant. High pressure coolant injection momentarily injected into the reactor vessel and was subsequently placed in standby. Reactor water level has stabilized and is being maintained with the '1B' reactor feed pump. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 was not impacted. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical and the emergency core coolant system discharge to the reactor coolant system, this event is being reported as a four-hour and eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10 CFR 50.72{b){2)(iv)(A), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The Unit 1 reactor is currently stable in mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the loss of main transformer cooling. There was no impact to the health or safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The state of Pennsylvania has been informed."