Event Notification Report for July 09, 2025

RADIOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:

On June 30, 2025, the licensee was performing radiography at a temporary jobsite at the HF Sinclair Refinery with a SPEC-150 camera using a 1.474 Tbq Ir-192 source. With the source extended, a crankout came into contact with a hot pipe, melting the crankout and damaging the source cable. At 1136 MDT, the radiographers determined the source could not be retracted. The radiographers extended the boundary and established a watch to prevent unauthorized entry.

A technician certified for source retrieval used a source retrieval kit and successfully retracted the source at 1203. The crank cable had to be pulled directly due to the cable damage.

The maximum dose to any of the radiographers was 9 mrem. No members of the public received any exposure due to the event.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On July 1, 2025, the Department received a notification from the licensee regarding a mechanical failure involving a level/density measurement gauge. The licensee reported that the failure was discovered on June 30, 2025. The affected gauge is a Berthold model LB 300 IRL Type I, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 sealed source. According to the licensee, the failure occurred when the cable connected to the source carrier broke, causing the source to become lodged within the thermowell inside the process vessel. The licensee stated that the vessel contains product, which is effectively shielding the source and limiting radiation levels outside the vessel. The licensee added that radiation surveys conducted on the vessel exterior indicated exposure levels of less than 2 milliroentgens per hour (mR/hr). There is no indication of elevated radiation risk to workers or members of the public. The licensee further stated that Berthold is scheduled to retrieve the source and repair the cable on July 2, 2025. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300 Reporting requirements."

Texas Incident Number: 10207
NMED Number: TX250032

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN

The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

One exit sign, containing 10 curies of tritium, was determined to be lost by the licensee.

Manufacturer: SRB Technologies
Model Number: BX-10-BK

Colorado Event Number: CO250019

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RUPTURED SEALED SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program Environmental Protection Division (the State) via email:

"On June 27, 2025, a krypton-85 sealed source capsule ruptured while unloading a Honeywell model 2201 series thickness gauge. The manufacturing engineer immediately turned on the fume hood and left the room when it was noticed the radiation monitors in the area rapidly increased in dose. It was determined the capsule had ruptured. The highest dose rate in the area of the source was 7 mR/h. The source was placed in the fume hood to allow gas to escape. The dose rate returned to normal approximately an hour after the source was placed in the fume hood. The dose rate at the source was then indistinguishable from background. The empty capsule was placed in a paint can containing cat litter and placed in their radiation source storage area.

"As a corrective action, all persons performing this activity have been retrained on loading and unloading the model 2201 source capsule, and regarding the importance of safety when unloading sealed source capsules containing [radioactive material].

"The thermoluminescent dosimeter badge of the manufacturing engineer will be sent to Landauer [the manufacturer] and the licensee will notify the State when they receive those results. Respirators are not utilized in their daily operations. The State will continue to investigate the incident and will follow up with new information."

Additional information on the sealed source:
Model: KAC.D5
Serial number: TW911
Activity: 14.8 GBq of krypton-85 as of December 2, 2011

Georgia incident number: 101

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF LICENSED MATERIAL

The following information was received from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On June 11, 2025, the Department received a telephone notification that the licensee was unable to locate two vials of carbon-14, with an aggregate activity of 1.92 mCi. The vials were identified by the licensee as missing on June 10, 2025. The licensee completed an investigation by June 26, 2025, and submitted a written report to the Department. The licensee determined the package in the original transport box was mistakenly picked up by a third-party cleaning service and disposed of as normal trash. The landfill was contacted. There are no suspected health or safety risks to any worker or member of the public. The Department will perform an investigation into this incident."

WI Event Report ID No: WI250006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE

The following report was received via email by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP):

"At approximately 1515 EDT on 7/2/2025, VRMP was notified of an incident involving a stolen portable nuclear gauge. Sometime between the hours of 1500 on 7/1/2025 and 0700 on 7/2/2025, a Troxler model 3411 portable nuclear density/moisture gauge containing 9 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241 was discovered missing from a construction site. The authorized user notified the radiation safety officer (RSO) who went to the site to search and then notified the VRMP.

"Per the RSO, at approximately 1500 on 7/1/2025, the authorized user left the gauge on the site to carry other items to his vehicle outside the fenced construction site a short distance away when it started to rain and then found the gate to the site locked when he returned to retrieve the gauge. He did not notify the RSO at that time. He returned at approximately 2030 on 7/1/2025 to find the gauge missing. He returned to the licensee's office and notified the RSO around noon on 7/2/2025. The RSO went to the site to search for the gauge. When he could not find it, he contacted the VRMP. He is also contacting the Alexandria Police Department to report the theft. The gauge was not in the transportation box when it was left on the site.

"VRMP will follow up with an investigation."

Virginia Event Report Number: VA250002

* * * UPDATE ON 07/08/2025 AT 1740 EDT FROM SHEILA NELSON TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email:

"The VRMP was notified at 1230 EDT that the missing gauge has been recovered. The gauge appears to be undamaged with no signs of tampering. The licensee will obtain a leak test and evaluate the gauge for serviceability. The agency will schedule an in-person investigation."

Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notification (email), ILTAB (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL COMPLEX PUMP ROOM DAMPER FULLY CLOSED

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 7/7/2025 at 1545 EDT, one of the division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) complex pump room dampers was noted to be full-closed instead of at the expected full-open position based on outside air temperatures. An operator walkdown confirmed that the division 2 RHR pump room temperature controller was attempting to open the damper. Per plant procedures, the affected RHR service water (RHRSW), emergency equipment service water (EESW), and emergency diesel generator service water pumps (DGSW) were declared inoperable. Division 2 EESW supports the safety function for all division 2 safety systems, including high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). Therefore, HPCI was also declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The damper will be blocked to the position required based on current and projected outside air temperature, this will return the systems to operable. The cause of the damper failure is unknown and under investigation."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Multiple technical specification limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were entered as a result of this event. Fermi Unit 2 expects to be able to exit the LCOs within the required timeframes.