Event Notification Report for June 23, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/23/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - FAILURE OF SIZE 1 AND 2 FREEDOM SERIES FULL VOLTAGE REVERSING STARTERS

The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions:

On 3/29/2021, Dominion - North Anna Station has identified instances where size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics LLC (NLI). The mechanical interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor from closing when energized. The identified failed starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves (MOV). This is an intermittent duty application.

The issue was identified on Eaton Starter Model AN56DN*, AN56GN*, CN55DN*, CN55GN* style starters and contactors with supplied date codes T4514 (week 45 of year 2014) and T4215 (week 42 of year 2015). Paragon is in the process of identifying the date codes to provide the specific information to the identified plants.

The following plants were supplied starters from September 2014 through October 2018: Beaver Valley, Columbia, Ergytech, Harris, Millstone, NEK KRSKO, North Anna, Prairie Island.

The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (Eaton) in October 2018. There have been no reported failures of the interlock mechanism in vintages manufactured before September 2014 or after October 2018.

These recommendations are based on the specific application: The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed.

The motor control centers that contain the mechanical interlock should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation.

The evaluation being performed by Paragon is expected to be completed by May 29, 2021.

Tracy Bolt
Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO
817-284-0077
Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

* * * UPDATE ON 5/3/2021 AT 1559 FROM TRACY BOLT TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following revision was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email and corrects the identified date code and includes the size and serial number of the starter that failed:

The issue was identified on supplied Size 1, 73262-025-00028 (Date Code: T4515 - 45th week of 2015) and Size 2, 73262-028-00001 (Date Code: T4215 - 42nd week of 2015).

Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/28/2021 AT 1558 FROM TRACY BOLT TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update (Interim Report) was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

"Paragon is submitting this Interim Report since this condition is currently under evaluation but will not be completed within 60 days.

"Paragon is in communication with EATON, the OEM for the starters/contactors to determine the extent of condition. The evaluation is expected to be completed by June 30, 2021.

"It was determined that Dominion - Millstone should not be included in the list of affected plants. Millstone will be removed from the list in the final revision of P21-03302021."

Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Gepford), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/29/2021 AT 1658 EDT FROM TRACY BOLT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is a synopsis of an update (completion of the evaluation) received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

"Paragon has identified the date codes of the supplied starters and contactors to provide the specific information to the identified plants. This information has been provided directly to the specific plant." [Millstone was removed from the list of plants.]

"The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (EATON) in September of 2014. The failed units were from Date Codes T4215 and T4515 which are in the 42nd and 45th weeks of 2015. In September 2018 the drawing was revised again. In discussions with the OEM the revision of the drawing was due to a change in material type and was not a result of binding issues.

"This condition has not been identified on assemblies manufactured after September 2018.

"Due to the number of starters that have been installed and in service without issue, it is highly unlikely that there is a defect within all the supplied starters in the date range of September 2014 through September 2018. To date, Paragon has been unable to obtain any conclusive information from EATON regarding the potential cause of the binding issue. One of the failed starters along with samples of binding and non-binding interlocks have been provided to EATON for them to perform their own analysis on the potential causes of the binding issue.

"Until more information is gathered from the OEM (EATON) Paragon recommends the following:

"The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed at the plant's discretion.

"Replacement mechanical interlocks may be ordered to replace the existing interlocks from the affected date code range if the plant application will not allow for removal.

"The motor control center cubicles or starter assemblies with date codes within the September 2014 through September 2018 range should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation. It is possible that if the starter is found to bind during operation, the bound condition could be released by cycling the power to the starter. This action may release the bound condition and will allow the starter to operate."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Werner), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/20/2025 AT 0557 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The following is a summary of an update received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

Paragon Energy Solutions has expanded the affected date range of starters supplied. This was done based on the evaluation of a recent failure identified by Callaway nuclear plant. The affected range is now from September 2014 through March 2022.
Additional affected plants based on the expanded date range scope of supply include Callaway, Turkey Point, and Watts Bar.

Richard Knott, Vice President, Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

Notified R1DO (Warnek), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Zurawski), R4DO (Drake), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE

The following information was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) via email:

"On June 3, 2025, at approximately 1450 MDT, Western Metals Recycling, a non-licensee, reported a radiation alarm to the CDPHE. The alarm occurred on a truck loaded with scrap steel. Western Metals facility staff performed surveys using a handheld instrument and observed a net radiation reading of approximately 15 microrem/hour in the area of the load behind the cab of the truck. CDPHE issued a DOT special permit to allow return of the shipment to the non-licensee Denver Scrap Metal Recycle Center. Denver Scrap Metal does not have a vehicle radiation monitoring system.

"CDPHE on-call staff responded to the Denver Scrap Metal facility at approximately 1645 on June 3, 2025. CDPHE staff performed radiation surveys of the truck driver, and no readings above background were noted. CDPHE staff performed radiation surveys of the accessible areas of the load, which had been unloaded onto the ground, focusing on the front of the truck. Radiation surveys eventually located and identified two radium-226 radio luminescent military personnel markers (each approximately 1.5 inches in diameter) as confirmed using a Flir Identifier survey instrument. Dose rate measurements of approximately 1.7 to 2.5 mrem/hour on contact with the Ra-226 markers were observed. Wipe surveys of the markers did not indicate the presence of gross contamination using the handheld instrument for analysis. The sources (markers) were placed in a small bag and then placed inside a metal container. The metal container was surrounded by lead found on site to provide interim shielding and reduce radiation. Facility staff were requested to label, secure, and isolate the Ra-226 sources in an area away from staff, pending final disposition. The facility has contacted a licensed waste broker/service provider to prepare and dispose of the sources.

"Based on Oak Ridge Associated Universities historical information (https://www.orau.org/health-physics-museum/), each marker may contain up to 7 microcuries of Ra-226.

"These items are considered to be generally licensed in accordance with Colorado Part 3, Section 3.6.8.1(4) / 10 CFR 31.12(a)(4). This event is reported, consistent with Section 8.3 (found source) of NRC Handbook SA-300 and Colorado Part 4, Section 4.51.1/10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii)."

CO Event Number: CO250016

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the North Dakota Department of Environmental Quality (the Department) via email:

"On June 12, 2025, at 1647 MDT, the Department received a notification from Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative reporting an equipment issue identified on June 11, 2025. The issue involved a fixed nuclear gauge (Thermo MeasureTech model 7063, S/N: 1519A), containing a 500 millicurie (original activity) Cs-137 sealed source. The Department is waiting for specific sealed source information.

"The facility is transitioning into a scheduled plant maintenance and cleaning downtime period. As part of this downtime, the radiation safety officer (RSO) planned to replace the referenced fixed gauge. During this process, it was discovered that the fixed tab used to secure the shutter arm in the locked-out position had broken off. Although the shutter mechanism remains operational, the gauge can no longer be properly locked out due to the missing tab.

"There is no visible damage to the source holder's structure or housing. The gauge continues to function securely in its installed position and does not present an operational safety concern.

"The last shutter check was in March 2025, and there was no indication of damage to the fixed gauge [at that time].

"No overexposures occurred during this event.

"Currently, the RSO is in contact with the vendor for plans to remove and dispose of the gauge and replace it with a new gauge.

"This is reported per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)."

ND Event Number: ND250002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was provided by the Washington State Department of Health (the Department) via email:

"In early March 2025, a mixed-waste operator at Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW) sustained a finger sliver while processing waste. Although the wound frisked clean, split 24-hour urinalysis later that month revealed 0.07 and 0.06 pCi Pu per L, projecting a maximum committed effective dose (CEDE) of up to 6 rem. PFNW did not alert the Department until June 10, 2025, about sixty days after receiving the positive result, and still has not submitted the 30-day written report that was due on April 28, 2025. These delays violate the 24-hour telephone-notification and 30-day written-report provisions of WAC 246-221-250, both incorporated into PFNW's licenses via license condition 11. Bioassay follow-up, dose modelling, and record updates have also lagged, contravening license condition 21, while no timely radiological unusual event file was routed to the Department as required by license condition 23.

"No chelation therapy (Ca- or Zn-DTPA) was administered, and the contract certified health physicist (CHP) did not document why none was indicated. Immediate corrective actions included and include retro-logging the 24-hour call, submitting an overdue SA-300 written report within five working days, and certifying the committed dose by June 20, 2025. They are also to provide supporting records for the Department to review during the June 24, 2025 on-site inspection. Should the final dose exceed 5 rem CEDE, PFNW will breach the annual dose limit in WAC 246-221-010(1), and the dose must then be subtracted from the worker's planned-special-exposure allowance under subsection (2). In summary, PFNW's failures in notification, reporting, and bioassay execution constitute serious compliance deficiencies that require immediate, documented remediation to protect the worker and restore conformity with state and license requirements.

"As the maximum calculated CED exceeds 5 rem, this event is being reported as a possible overexposure.

"The Department is conducting a responsive investigation."

Washington Incident File: WNS-INC-25-04

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 19, 2025, at 2027 CDT, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to an `A' steam generator (SG) water level low signal. The low level in the SG was caused by a feedwater control system malfunction. All safety related systems responded normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant.
"Decay heat is being removed by steam dumps to the main condenser. Farley Unit 1 is not affected.
"An automatic actuation of auxiliary feedwater system also occurred, which is an expected response from the reactor trip.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PART 21 REPORT - DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET WATER PUMP FAILURE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On April 8, 2025, while in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, during performance of a scheduled monthly surveillance test, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) identified Diesel Generator (DG) 1 jacket water (DGJW) pump may not be providing sufficient cooling water to the DG. The DGJW pump impeller was found to have slipped on the shaft as a result of a failure to achieve the required interference fit during preventive maintenance replacing the pump seal. On May 22, 2025, subsequent investigation identified a deviation in that the originally supplied Cooper-Bessemer DGJW impeller bore was not provided in accordance with the design drawing. Due to the bore dimensional deviation, the required interference fit was not achieved, resulting in shaft rotational and torsional forces challenging the compromised fit until the impeller was able to spin freely on the shaft.

"On June 19, 2025, NPPD completed an evaluation and determined that the deviation represents a defect that could create a substantial safety hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21, as this pump was approved for use in a safety application. NPPD is not aware of any other plants being impacted by this issue.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A written notification will be provided within 30 days."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Maintenance performed on the DGJW pump was completed on April 9, 2025.

FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1353 CDT on 6/20/2025, it was determined that a supervisor tested positive in accordance with the fitness-for-duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified."

UNUSUAL EVENT - UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FAILURE DUE TO BUS LOCKOUT

The following information is a summary of the information provided by the licensee via phone and email:

On 6/21/2025, at 1438 EDT, Turkey Point experienced an unplanned reactor trip and a spurious safety injection signal when the '4A' 4 kV bus locked out. An Unusual Event, SU8.1, was declared at 1453 EDT due to two open, motor-operated steam generator sample containment isolation valves not closing on the phase 'A' containment isolation signal due to the loss of power. There were no abnormal parameters that would require a safety injection signal.

Turkey Point unit 3 was unaffected and remains at 100 percent power. Turkey Point unit 4 is stable in mode 3.

The state and one county were notified, and the other county will be notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee manually closed the valves due to loss of power to the bus, and they are investigating the cause of the reactor trip.

* * * UPDATE ON 06/21/2025 AT 1639 EDT FROM CHAD HELLMAN TO KAREN COTTON * * *

Turkey Point unit 4 exited the Unusual Event at 1609 EDT.

Notified R2RA (Lara), NRR (Bowman), NSIR (Erlanger), R2DO (Blamey), NRR EO (Felts), IR MOC (Whited), R2 PAO (Gasperson).

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 06/21/2025 AT 1835 EDT FROM ADAM ABRAMS TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On June 21, 2025, at 1438 EDT, while Turkey Point Unit 4 was in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to lockout of the '4A' 4 kV bus. The cause of the bus lockout is unknown. The trip was complicated with all systems responding normally post-trip, except for containment isolation valves powered from the '4A' 4 kV bus. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is removed by discharging steam from the steam generators to atmosphere. Unit 3 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system occurred during the reactor trip and safety injection signal. The AFW pumps automatically started as designed when the low steam generator, safety injection, and '4A' 4 kV bus undervoltage signals were received. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Blamey).