Event Notification Report for March 14, 2025

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2025

EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT WITH CIRCUIT BOARD

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email:

The licensee received two alarms due to direct current (DC) output voltage fluctuating between 127.4 to 131.3 volts. After troubleshooting, the DC output voltage fluctuations were caused by the battery charger printed circuit board. The part has been sent to the vendor, AMETEK, for evaluation. Catawba is the only plant known to have this issue at this time.

The evaluation is expected to be completed on January 31, 2025.

Catawba condition report number: 02526388

AMETEK Part Number: 80-921-4031-90
AMETEK failure analysis number: 24-006

* * * UPDATE ON 01/31/25 AT 1548 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO KAREN COTTON * * *

AMETEK is continuing its evaluation of the circuit boards. The original evaluation completion date was January 31, 2025. AMETEK is extending the evaluation completion date to February 28, 2025. Remaining steps include completing the cause analysis, identifying all affected equipment, finalizing any corrective action measures, and determining actions required.

Notified R2DO (Suggs), Part 21 Group (email)

* * * UPDATE ON 02/28/25 AT 1509 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the information provided from AMETEK:

AMETEK has submitted their final report for the evaluation of the circuit boards in question. AMETEK identified two failed capacitors on a charger control printed circuit board with part number: 80-9214031-90. The two failed capacitors are C35 (part number: 03-010003-00) and C36 (part number: 03-011006-00). These capacitors have been identified to fail prematurely prior to the 10-year replacement schedule in a few identified cases. AMETEK will be conducting further design evaluations on printed circuit board (PCB) 80-9214031-90 and considering design and/or component changes that will further enhance the reliability of the charger control board.

AMETEK reviewed the last 10 years of jobs and identified the following potentially affected U.S. nuclear power plants:

Farley
Braidwood
Byron
Dresden
Fitzpatrick
Ginna
Nine Mile Point
Quad Cities
Millstone
North Anna
Surry
Catawba
Robinson
Harris
McGuire
Oconee
Beaver Valley
Davis Besse 3
Columbia Generating Station
Arkansas Nuclear One
Grand Gulf
River Bend
Waterford
Hatch
Vogtle Unit 1 and Unit 2
DC Cook
Seabrook
Turkey Point
Point Beach
Diablo Canyon
Sequoyah
Watts Bar
Comanche Peak
Prairie Island
Palisades (ISFSI)
Three Mile Island (ISFSI)

Notified R1DO (Defrancisco), R2DO (Penmetsa), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Roldan-Otero), Part 21 Group (email)

* * * UPDATE ON 03/13/25 AT 1301 EDT FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO KERBY SCALES * * *

AMETEK provided an update to their final report to include additional variations of the charger control board. There is no change to the affected users, findings, or resolution.

Notified R1DO (Schussler), R2DO (Pearson), R3DO (Edwards), R4DO (Warnick), Part 21 Group (email)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email.

"On March 6, 2025, the Agency made the determination that Days & Crawford Scrap Metal (GL 9223735), lost an X-Ray fluorescence analyzer device (Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC, XLp-828q, s/n 11540). The Agency reached out to the registrant on February 11, 2025, to inquire about delinquent payments for the device's registration. The registrant responded to the Agency on March 5, 2025, that they were unable to locate the device. The device contains three sealed sources: 14 mCi of americium-241; 40 mCi of cadmium-109; and 0.005 mCi of americium-241. At this time, this is considered an accidental loss due to poor oversight and is not related to any criminal theft or diversion. This event is currently under Agency investigation. Further details will be entered as they are received."

Item Number: IL250010

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2025

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On March 6, 2025, the Department received a call from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO). He reported that at around 1600 hours a radiography crew reported losing a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 95.4 curie iridium-192 source. The RSO stated that the source was in the fully shielded position. The RSO stated that the radiographers had completed an exposure on a pipeline and the radiographer trainer told the trainee to store the exposure device. [The radiographer trainer] then went to the cab of the truck to do some paperwork. The trainee set the exposure device on the back of the truck with the guide tube removed but the 35-foot crank outs still attached. The trainee failed to secure the device in the truck. The radiographers drove [toward] the next site. The RSO stated that they traveled about a mile and realized the exposure device was no longer on the back of the truck. The radiographers turned around and retraced the path they had traveled. They did not find the device. The RSO stated that while looking for the device [the radiographers] passed two trucks, which they stopped and asked if anyone had seen the device. Both said they had not seen it. The RSO stated that they have 4 radiography crews searching in the area for the device. The operations manager is also in the area searching for the device. The RSO stated that he has tried to contact the sheriff for the area and has not been able to do so. He stated he will continue to call them until he reaches someone. The radiographers were working approximately 10 miles east of Mentone, Texas, north of state highway 302. The RSO said he would provide GPS coordinates as soon as he received them.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: 10179
NMED Number: TX250016

Notified: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), CNSNS (Mexico) email.

* * * UPDATE ON 03/13/2025 AT 1843 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO ROBERT THOMPSON * * *

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On March 13, 2025, the licensee contacted the Department and stated they had received a phone call from an individual who stated they had found its exposure device. The individual stated they found it on March 13, 2025, where the licensee believed it had been lost. The individual stated they had taken it to their home in Pecos, Texas. They stated this was their first day back at work since they found the device and saw the posting about the device. They agreed to meet at the individual's home at 1700 CDT. The licensee's radiation safety officer, corporate safety officer, the local sheriff, and two deputies arrived at the individual's home at 1715 CDT. The individual took them to a small shed behind their house. The shed was locked. The individual stated the gauge remained in the locked shed from the time they brought it to their home until then. The exposure device was found on the floor in the shed. The crank outs were still attached, and the dust cover was still on the front of the device. Both the exposure device and the crank outs appeared to be undamaged. The individual stated they had not attempted to operate the device. The licensee took the device to their vehicle to transport it back to its normal storage location. The licensee stated that dose rates off the device were normal and no individual would have received any significant exposure due to this event."

Internal notifications: R4DO (Warnick), NMSS (Silberfeld), ILTAB (Brown), IR MOC (Crouch), NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (email), ILTAB, (email), INES National Officer (Smith), NMSS INES Coordinator (Allen).

External notifications: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS CISA Central, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), CNSNS (Mexico) email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 2' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION

The following is a synopsis of information provided by Curtiss-Wright via email:

On January 7, 2025, Rosemount notified Curtiss-Wright Middleburg Heights regarding Generation 3 quick disconnect connectors (QDCs) with no connection on at least one wire, with the bad connection not favoring one specific wire. Rosemount identified five Generation 3 QDCs out of 122 tested, where the issue is specifically in the continuity of the wires. All Generation 3 QDCs from the order are currently on hold at Rosemount and have not been shipped to any customer.

On January 9, 2025, Rosemount sent Curtiss-Wright two of the five questionable Generation 3 QDCs. Curtiss-Wright performed an initial evaluation to confirm the issue. The results were initially confirmed, but with minor manipulation the Generation 3 QDCs no longer showed negative results. Curtiss-Wright and Rosemount have agreed to send all the questionable Generation 3 QDCs to an outside testing entity to help perform a failure analysis to assist in determining the root cause.

Curtiss-Wright anticipates completing the evaluation by Tuesday, May 6, 2025.

There are no known plants affected.

Contact Information:
Tim Franchuk
Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division
Director of Quality Assurance
(513) 201-2176
tfranchuk@curtisswright.com

FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

A non-licensed employee brought an illegal substance into the protected area. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

EN Revision Imported Date: 3/17/2025

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1902 EDT on 3/13/2025 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Unit 4 declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power [to the '4B' 4KV bus]. The '4B' 4KV bus was re-energized from the '4B' emergency diesel generator (EDG). The '4A' 4KV bus is de-energized as part of the pre-planned outage scope. The cause of the loss of Unit 4 startup transformer is not known at this time. All plant parameters are stable."

State and local agencies were notified. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee is evaluating the startup transformer before transferring the '4B' 4KV bus back to offsite power. Spent fuel pool cooling remained in-service as it was powered from Unit 3. Unit 3 was unaffected and remains at 100 percent power.

* * * UPDATE ON 03/13/2025 AT 2318 EDT FROM DANIEL BITTNER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

"At 2056 EDT on 3/13/2025, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Unit 4 terminated the Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The event was terminated due to more than one emergency power source being available; `4B' emergency diesel generator and `4D' bus station blackout tie."

Notified R2DO (Pearson), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, FEMA NWC, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).

* * * RETRACTION ON 03/14/2025 AT 0518 EDT FROM DANIEL BITTNER TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

"Turkey Point Nuclear Station Unit 4 is retracting this notification based on additional information not immediately identified at the time of notification. Following the loss of the '4B' 4kV bus event on 3/13/25, the emergency action level (EAL) technical bases document for CU2.1 was reviewed and identified that more than one emergency power source was still available at the time of the event and could have been credited. Specifically, the '4B' EDG and the '4D' bus station blackout cross tie (powered by Unit 3) emergency power sources were still available. The initial report was based on the available information at the time pursuant to emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements.

"The NRC Resident has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Pearson), Region 2 RA (Miller), NRR (Bowman). IR MOC (Crouch), Region 2 PAO (Gasperson), NRR EO (Felts), and NSIR (Erlanger)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:

"On March 7, 2025, at approximately 1700 CST, the Department was notified by the licensee that a Troxler 3440 moisture density gauge containing an 8 mCi Cesium-137 source (original strength) and a 40 mCi (original strength) Am-241/Be source were damaged by being run over by construction equipment at a job site in Melissa, Texas. The radiation safety officer (RSO) was onsite, the sources were intact, but the gauge was damaged to an extent that the cesium source could not be retracted into a safe position. The RSO, in coordination with the Department, removed the gauge from the accident site, and made the device safe by placing it in a container filled with sand. The damaged gauge was then secured to the container, the container was secured to the licensee's vehicle, and the damaged gauge was transported to their vault which was less than 1 mile away. The manufacturer, who has a local repair facility, was already closed for the weekend so the damaged device was placed in the vault at the licensee's facility for transport to the manufacturer on Monday. The RSO performed several surveys at the accident site, with the gauge in the truck, and at the licensee's vault. All readings were well within normal limits. No overexposure occurred as the only time the source was exposed was when the RSO transferred it from the ground to the sand filled container. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-10181
Texas NMED Number: TX250018

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF '4B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1847 EDT on 3/13/25, with Unit 4 in mode 6 and defueled, an actuation of the 4B emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred when the Unit 4 startup transformer '4B' 4kV Bus Supply Breaker '4AB05' tripped open. The '4B' EDG automatically started and energized the '4B' 4kV Bus as designed when the undervoltage condition caused the '4B' sequencer loss of offsite power signal to be received.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

All systems responded as expected for the loss of voltage. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The cause of the breaker opening is under investigation. Power remains available to the '4B' 4kV Bus via both the '4B' EDG and the station blackout tie bus.

FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

A licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a test specified by the FFD testing program. The employee's access to the site has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

FITNESS FOR DUTY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

A licensed employee violated the FFD policy. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

AUTOMATIC START OF THE DIVISION III EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On March 15, 2025, at 1248 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was operating in mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power when a grid disturbance (degraded voltage) resulted in a valid specified system actuation (automatic start) of the division Ill emergency diesel generator (EDG). The division Ill EDG started and repowered the '17' AC safety-related electrical bus as designed.

"GGNS is currently in mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event and no other safety system actuations occurred.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that results in a valid specified system actuation due to the automatic start of the division Ill EDG on bus undervoltage due to a grid disturbance.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."