Event Notification Report for February 20, 2025

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:

"On February 11, 2025, the radiation safety officer reported a misadministration which occurred on February 10, 2025 at Northside Hospital Gwinnett in Lawrenceville, Georgia. A patient was prescribed a reduced dose of 160 mCi of lutetium-77 under the brand name Pluvicto, used for the treatment of metastatic prostate cancer, but the regular dose of 200 mCi was accidentally administered rather than the lower dose. The referring physician was notified, and the patient will be seen before the end of the week to ensure that no adverse effects have been caused by the higher dosage."

NMED Incident number: 91

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/20/2025

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At approximately 2320 EST on 02/17/2025, it was discovered that external network access was unavailable, to include access to DEENS (Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System) rendering the system non-functional. Subsequently, the backup method for activating the station ERO (Emergency Response Organization) was attempted and was unable to be verified. Therefore, neither the primary nor backup methods for activating the site ERO were available. Corporate IT has been notified and is investigating. [Control room staff] contacted the North Anna Power Station and verified similar issues with DEENS availability and backup ERO activation.

"On 02/18/2025, at 0403, an additional backup ERO activation phone number was provided [and documented in a standing order] in the event that the backup number listed in attachment 7 of EP-AA-CSD-201 (Notifications and Communications) is not available.

"This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability.

"The external network access and DEENS were restored on 02/18/2025 at 0725.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 2/19/2025 AT 1107 EST FROM FORREST COPELAND TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

"It has since been determined that the phone number provided at 0400 on 2/18/2025, would not have worked to activate the ERO. However, the network issues were resolved at approximately 0700 on 2/18/2025 when DEENS capability was restored."

Notified R2DO (Penmetsa).

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/20/2025

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0005 EST on February 18, 2025, the operations staff identified network issues. At 0014, Surry operations staff contacted the North Anna Power Station (NAPS) Shift Technical Advisor (STA) to inform NAPS that they had lost Dominion Energy
Emergency Notification System (DEENS) capability and could not utilize the backup Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation phone number. NAPS operations staff then confirmed that they had also lost DEENS and the ability to activate the ERO with the backup phone number. At 0400, NAPS was provided an additional phone number that can be utilized to have an Everbridge operator activate the ERO remotely. Corporate IT has been notified and is investigating.

"The loss of ERO activation capability is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability.

"The external network access and DEENS were restored at 0720 on February 18, 2025.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 02/19/2025 AT 1107 EST FROM BOB PAGE TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"It has since been determined that the [backup] phone number provided at 0400 would not have worked to activate the ERO. However, the network issues were resolved at approximately 0700 when DEENS capability was restored.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Penmetsa)

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0234 EST on February 18, 2025, VC Summer (VCS) was notified by Dominion Energy IT that VCS had lost Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System (DEENS) capability. VCS confirmed that they had lost DEENS and the ability to activate the ERO (Emergency Response Organization) with the backup phone number. At approximately 0705, DEENS communication functionality was restored and is currently available for use.

"The loss of ERO activation capability is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 2/20/2025

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At approximately 0230 EST on 2/18/2025, it was determined that the primary and backup methods of activating the site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not available. External network access was unavailable, to include access to the Dominion Energy Emergency Notification System (DEENS) rendering the system non-functional. Subsequently, the backup method for activating the station ERO was attempted and was unable to be verified.

"On 2/18/2025, at approximately 0400, an additional backup ERO activation phone number was provided and verified to be functional. At approximately 0740 on 2/18/2025, external network access was restored and DEENS was restored to functional.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 2/19/25 AT 1030 EST FROM JOSHUA LINDSEY TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"It has since been determined that the [backup] phone number provided at 0400 would not have worked to activate the ERO.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Deboer)

PART 21 - EDG ROOM VENTILATION FAN CONTROLLER FAILURE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email:

"Catawba Nuclear Station has determined that a defect associated with Love Controllers identified with Limpet supplier part number 54-834-838-8187-8160-8134-8174 is reportable under 10 CFR Part 21.

"The subject parts were procured as commercial grade items and dedicated by Duke Energy, Inc., solely for use at Catawba Nuclear Station. Manufacturer circuit board workmanship issues associated with the Love controller resulted in a failed controller installed in Catawba's 2A1 emergency diesel generator room ventilation train and resulted in Catawba submitting licensee event report 2024-001-00. The loss of one emergency diesel room ventilation fan, under certain conditions, could cause a loss of safety function at elevated outside air temperatures and could result in a substantial safety hazard. All other Love controllers installed and in Duke Energy's warehouse were subsequently inspected for similar workmanship issues [with no issues found].

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No other nuclear plants were affected as the part has not been sold or transferred to another facility."

Notified by:

Scott Milton
Nuclear Support Services Manager
Catawba Nuclear Station
Desk: 803-701-3488

TWO OF THREE ECCS TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 02/18/2025, at 0400 CST, train `C' essential cooling water was declared inoperable for scheduled maintenance. This cascades down to train `C' emergency core cooling system (ECCS), rendering it inoperable. Train `C' essential cooling water was declared operable on 02/18/2025, at 1207; however, train `C' essential chiller remained inoperable due to ongoing maintenance, which renders train `C' ECCS inoperable.

"On 02/19/2025, at 0324, train `B' ECCS was declared inoperable due to challenging control room habitability. The mitigating strategy of placing high head safety injection pump `1B' in pull to lock was completed at 0749 on 2/19/2025.

"On 02/19/2025, at 0324, Technical Specification 3.5.2 action `b' was entered due to two trains of ECCS being inoperable. This action requires that at least two trains of ECCS are restored to operability within 1 hour or apply the requirements of the CRMP (Configuration Risk Management Program).

"On 02/19/2025, at 0424, the CRMP was entered based on two ECCS trains remaining inoperable for longer than 1 hour.

"This condition resulted in the inoperability of two of the three safety trains required for the accident mitigating function including: high head safety injection, low head safety injection, and containment spray. This is an 8-hour reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because it could affect the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Unit 1 remains in mode 1 at 100 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

With two ECCS trains inoperable, the licensee will enter a shutdown technical specification action statement on 3/13/2025.