Event Notification Report for December 30, 2024

MEDICAL EVENT

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:

The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) was notified on 12/20/2024, at approximately 1130 CST of a medical event that occurred at Franciscan Health Munster in Munster, IN on 10/28/2024. A patient was prescribed a Y-90 TheraSphere treatment with a prescribed dose of 23.5 Gbq. The calculated administrated dose was 18.32 Gbq. This indicates an approximate 22 percent underdose. The licensee is continuing to investigate.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/26/2024 AT 0907 EST FROM WALEED AL-NAJJAR TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone:

The event is being retracted due to the following reasons. The activity initially documented as prescribed corresponded to the quantity requested from the manufacturer. This activity is intended to decay to a specific dose by the time the procedure occurs. On the day of the procedure, the prescribed dose was 110 Gy, while the dose delivered was 89.1 Gy. The difference between these amounts is less than 20 percent, thus not subject to reporting.

Notified R3DO (Nguyen), and NMSS Events Notification (email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCES

The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

[Eight tritium exit sign were determined to be lost by the licensee.]

"Manufacturer: Safety Light Corp
"Model Number: 880-12-6 [Quantity: 2]
"Model Number: 2040 [Quantity: 6]
"Isotope and activity: H-3, 11.5 Ci each

"Notifications: Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i))"

Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO240033

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 - INTERIM REPORT FOR REGULATING TRANSFORMER

The following is a synopsis of information provided by AMETEK Solidstate Controls Inc. (AMETEK) via email:

During regulating transformer system operations, the transformer may be experiencing short circuiting between coils to ground.

Visual inspection for severe darkening or charring of coils, magnetic shunts, or core, and/or the use of thermal probes or infrared guns monitoring for excessive temperatures greater than 180 degrees Celsius or 355 degrees Fahrenheit may detect affected regulating transformer systems.

Affected systems exhibit signs of transformer insulation system deterioration, increased audible noise from the units, blackening on any areas of the transformer, or signs of electrical shorting between windings or coil to core.

The cause of the short circuiting is unknown. Component failure impact analysis and regulating transformer system electrical testing are in progress.

Recommend all units currently in service with internal components, which include but are not limited to capacitors, wire harnesses, and transformer materials, with temperatures in excess of 180 degrees Celsius or 355 degrees Fahrenheit be removed from service.

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
The AMETEK SCI model numbers listed are for regulating transformers that are intended to take in AC power at 460 VAC plus or minus 10 percent and output AC power at 120 VAC plus or minus 2 percent with low harmonic distortion.

Models: 85-IS0075-12 and 85-IS0150-14

AFFECTED PLANTS:
Southern Nuclear Company - Vogtle
Constellation Energy - Ginna

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/31/2024

EN Revision Text: MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2250 EST on November 11, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The following technical specification limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) were entered at 1939 EST on November 11, 2024:

"LCO 3.6.3, containment isolation valves, condition C, one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable; required action C.1, isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

"LCO 3.7.2, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), condition C, one or more MSIVs inoperable in mode 2 or 3; required action C.1, close MSIV within 8 hours.

"These technical specification required actions will not be completed within the completion time; therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"With one main steam isolation valve inoperable, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The failure occurred during planned surveillance testing in preparation for reactor startup.

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/2024 AT 1025 EST FROM JAMIE SMITH TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On 11/12/2024 an 8-hour notification was made describing the failure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to close during testing while the plant was in MODE 3. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Further engineering evaluation has determined that this condition was not reasonably expected to prevent the fulfillment of a safety function based on a review of the accident analyses and the redundant equipment which is known to have been capable of performing the safety functions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition under this criterion.

"At the same time, a 4-hour notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as an initiation of a shutdown required by plant technical specification due to initiating a transition to MODE 4 to exit TS applicability. The plant was in hot standby (MODE 3) at the time of the event and negative reactivity was not added in order to move to MODE 4, therefore, this event is not reportable under this criterion.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl)