Event Notification Report for September 05, 2024

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/5/2024

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLAINT INSULATED CONDUCTOR

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:

A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to nine plants.

Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse.

Reporting company point of contact:
RSSC Wire and Cable LLC
dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager
Phone: 860-653-8376
Fax: 860-653-8301
Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com


* * * UPDATE ON 08/23/24 AT 1315 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The vendor provided the final report for this event listing corrective actions and the estimated completion dates.

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 group (Email).

* * * UPDATE ON 09/04/24 AT 1044 EDT FROM PHILLIP SARGENSKI TO NESTOR MAKRIS * * *

The vendor notified the NRC that they plan to send additional finding data regarding this notification via fax and/or email within the next day or two.

Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R3DO (Hills), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 group (Email).

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK OPEN SHUTTERS

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:

"On August 28, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that during a record review, it was discovered that on November 22, 2023, during routine testing, two gauge shutters had failed in the open position and were not reported to the Department. The gauges were both Vega [model] SHLG-1 gauges. One gauge contained a 1 millicurie Cs-137 source and the other a 500 millicurie Cs-137 source. Open is the normal operating position for the gauges. The licensee reported that there is no additional risk of radiation exposure to members of the general public or the licensee's workers. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300"

Texas Incident Number: 10124
Texas NMED Number: TX240025

UNABLE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE

The following summary was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

While performing industrial radiography at a refinery, equipment did not function properly and personnel were unable to return the source to the shielded position. Personnel contacted the radiation safety officer (RSO) and upon instruction were able to retrieve the source into the shielded position. Personnel red tagged the equipment and took it out of service. There was no overexposures to personnel.
Source is a Ir-192 (90 Ci) source.
NRC Region 3 and the National Response Center were notified.

National Response Center Incident report #: 1409302

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL ACTIVATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) invalid specified system actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a) invalid actuation of residual heat removal (RHR).

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(a) under the provision of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) as an invalid actuation of the RHR. On July 10, 2024, while at 100 percent power, a partial train actuation of RHR was initiated by an invalid actuation signal while performing RHR valve logic testing.

"The cause for the RHR system logic actuation was due to improper configuration of an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) logic tester. The RHR system started and functioned as designed for the actuation signals it received from the ECCS logic tester.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC resident inspector was notified."

PART 21 - STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN CONTROL ROD BLADES

The following information was provided by Westinghouse Electric Company via phone and email:

This issue concerns the Westinghouse designed and manufactured CR99 and Trident X boiling water reactor (BWR) control rod blades (CRBs). The CR99 CRBs were designed with dimensional and material choices for mechanical stability such that the mechanical function is maintained throughout the life of the control rod. However, observed cracking at United States licensees, resulting from irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), occurred before the nuclear end of life. Therefore, the current depletion limits that define nuclear end of life are not sufficient to prevent cracking, and the continued use of uninspected CRBs can lead to further cracking. With severe cracking of the CRBs, boron loss can occur and negatively impact the shutdown margin.

Westinghouse is aware that plants which experienced CRB cracking have been able to scram their cracked CRBs, safely shut down the reactor, and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. Trident X CRBs are susceptible to IASCC and within the scope of this notification. However, the first Trident X CRBs were installed in a US operating plant earlier in 2024 and have operated for less than one cycle.

Westinghouse continues to communicate with impacted licensees and will issue plant-specific operating recommendations.

Operating Plants with Generation 2 and 3 CR99 CRBs
Brunswick Units 1 and 2, Dresden Unit 3, Hatch Units 1 and 2, Hope Creek, La Salle Unit 1, Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Quad Cities Unit 1, Susquehanna Units 1 and 2

Permanently Shutdown/Decommissioned Plants with Generation 2 and 3 CR99 CRBs
Duane Arnold

Operating Plants with Trident x CRBs
Brunswick Unit 1

Point of Contract:
Camille Zozula
Manager, Global Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
Westinghouse Electric Company LLC
412-374-2577
zozulact@westinghouse.com