Event Notification Report for July 28, 2024

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/29/2024

EN Revision Text: INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT WITH CIRCUIT BREAKER

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (a)(2), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this interim notification of ongoing analysis for Part 21 reportability of a potential defect with a Schneider Electric Medium Voltage VR Type Circuit Breaker Part Number V5D4133Y000.

"On February 15, 2024, Paragon completed initial documentation of a potential defect with the subject circuit breaker in which Duke-Oconee had identified failure to close on demand or delayed operation to close with extended application of the remote closing signal. Since the primary safety function of the circuit breaker is to close and maintain continuity of power to downstream loads, failure to close could potentially contribute to a substantial safety hazard.

"This is the first reported instance of this failure mode, and Paragon suspects the issue to be related to aging of the circuit breaker's lubrication. Paragon requires more time to complete testing and analysis to confirm the failure mode and determine reportability.

"Date when evaluation is expected to be complete: 5/03/2024."

Affected licensee: Oconee. Paragon is currently evaluating the extent of condition as it pertains to other plants and equipment that may utilize the same or similar circuit breakers.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/02/24 FROM R. KNOTT TO T. HERRITY VIA EMAIL AND PHONE CALL * * *

Due to inconclusive results, the completion date of the testing is revised to 05/31/2024.

Notified R2DO (Miller) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/2024 AT 1534 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:

The only known affected licensee is Oconee. Paragon is evaluating if the issue pertains to other equipment or plants.

Paragon has conducted additional testing with the original equipment manufacturer, Schneider Electric, but will require more time to complete their evaluation. Evaluation is expected to be complete by 6/30/2024.

Other circuit breaker types that may be affected are:
5GSB2-250-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB2-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-1200 (uses KVR type element)
5GSB3-350-2000 (uses KVR type element)

Paragon recommends licensees with the breaker types listed above monitor for failure to close on demand or delayed. If any improper operation is found, report it to Paragon for evaluation.

Contact Information:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com

Notified R2DO (Franke) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 6/29/2024 AT 1137 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:

Paragon Energy Solutions has provided a new expected date for completion of their evaluation: 7/28/2024.
The only known affected licensee remains Oconee.

Notified R2DO (Suggs) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

* * * RETRACTION ON 7/27/2024 AT 0836 EDT FROM RICHARD KNOTT TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following is an excerpt from a Part 21 final update received via email:

"Paragon has been working closely with OEM (Schneider Electric) to conduct the failure analysis. After extensive inspection and testing by Schneider Electric, the condition has not been able to be recreated following cleaning and relubrication activities, nor has any non-conformances with breaker parts and materials been identified that would cause delayed closing of the breaker mechanism. Paragon has reviewed the final OEM analysis report and concludes the issue exhibited with this breaker is related to lubrication maintenance and not the result of any defect in design or manufacturing. Paragon will be updating instruction manuals associated with this breaker element for all clients recommending more frequent cleaning, relubricating, and cycling frequencies.

"Based on the evaluation conducted, Paragon has concluded the deviation discussed above is not reportable per 10CFR Part 21."

Notified R2DO (Coovert) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (email).

PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLIANT INSULATED CONDUCTOR

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:

A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to 9 plants.

Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse

Reporting company point of contact:
RSSC Wire and Cable LLC
dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager
Phone: 860-653-8376
Fax: 860-653-8301
Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com

PART 21 - HPCI RUPTURE DISC NOT WITHIN TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) completed an engineering evaluation for a Fike Metal Products 16-inch rupture disc, part number 16-CPV-C, which had failed in March 2024 during an event previously reported to the NRC as Event Notification 57036 and Licensee Event Report 260/2024-002-00.

"The evaluation determined that the failure of the rupture disc constituted a failure to comply by a basic component which resulted in a substantial safety hazard.

"The rupture disc was procured as a non-safety related item from Fike Corporation and commercially dedicated by Paragon Energy Solutions. The disc was supplied to TVA in a satisfactory condition meeting all acceptance criteria. During a routine flowrate surveillance test, the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) inner rupture disc developed a hole which caused the Unit 2 HPCI turbine to trip. This resulted in [Browns Ferry Unit 2] entering Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition `C', which is a 14-day shutdown LCO. Per HPCI system design criteria, turbine casing protection disc rupture pressure shall be at 175 psig plus 1 or minus 10 psig and the rupture discs shall be sized for a flow capacity of 600,000 pounds per hour at 200 psig, minimum. The failed HPCI inner rupture disc did not experience pressures above 45 psig since being installed; therefore, the HPCI turbine inner rupture disc did not meet its technical requirements.

"On July 23, 2024, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days."


The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Both Fike Corporation and Paragon Energy Solutions have been informed of the HPCI inner rupture disc not meeting technical requirements. Known potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3.

ALERT DECLARATION DUE TO SEISMIC ACTIVITY FELT ON SITE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and phone call:

"On July 26, 2024, at 0844 MDT, Urenco (Louisiana Energy Services) declared an Alert following a magnitude 5.0 earthquake in Snyder, Texas, which was felt onsite. No release on site was detected."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The earthquake was felt from within the Urenco control room. Three centrifuges were taken out of service due to the seismic event, however, there were no leaks found on the equipment. No public protective actions are recommended at this time.

The licensee notified State and local authorities.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FERC (email)

* * * UPDATE ON 07/26/2024 AT 1430 MDT FROM TYLER ROBINSON TO IAN HOWARD * * *

On 7/26/2024, at 1430 MDT, Urenco USA terminated the Alert. Urenco USA met conditions for event termination. No damage was found upon completion of site walkdowns and seismic aftershock magnitude continues to decrease. The licensee will notify State and local authorities.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FERC (email), R2DO (Coovert), IR MOC (Crouch), NMSS (Helton)

NON-POWER REACTOR - UNPLANNED HIGH POWER TRIP

The following information was summarized from the licensee via phone and email:

At the time of the trip, the reactor was being operated by an authorized operator trainee under direct supervision of a reactor operator with a senior reactor operator present. The reactor was at a steady state power of 5 watts as planned by the supervisor. The reactor tripped unplanned as a result of high power trip signal. The trip was uncomplicated, the event was not an emergency, and involved no damage to the facility. The reactor is shut down and secured at this time.

The safety channels of the AGN-201M are set to operate near 120 percent of the licensed power limit of 6 watts. The high-power trip observed today was unplanned but does not appear to have occurred because of an actual exceedance of the trip setpoints on the redundant safety channels, or the licensed power limit. Both trip setpoints and safety channels were measured during monthly surveillances on 7/23/24, and were within the normal and expected range.

In the past, there have been protection system trips caused by static electrical discharge from the operator to the console however the cause of the trip is still under investigation.

Monthly surveillances relating to the safety channels are planned to be repeated to verify that they are operating in the normal range before resuming reactor operations.

The University of New Mexico is making this notification to the NRC in accordance with technical specification '6.9.2.a.7', which requires notification for unplanned events causing a reactor shutdown (i.e. high-power trip).