Event Notification Report for July 26, 2024

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/26/2024

EN Revision Text: LOST RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following is a summary of information obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers report guidance:

At 0415 CDT, on 6/10/2024, the Radiation Safety Officer's (RSO) truck, which contained a Troxler 3440 nuclear gauge (serial number 66812), was stolen (loss of control). The RSO left the truck running with the keys in the ignition and the nuclear gauge secured inside when an individual decided to get in the drivers seat and drive away. When the RSO realized the truck was stolen, they immediately contacted Missouri local law enforcement. The nuclear gauge contains 44 mCi of Am241:Be.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/10/2024 AT 1032 EDT FROM LARRY BRADSHAW TO IAN HOWARD * * *

The following is a summary of information obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers report guidance:

At 0902 CDT, on 6/10/2024, the truck was located and returned to the RSO with the Troxler gauge secure in its locked case. There was no indication of tampering with the case or the locks used to secure the Troxler gauge.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/25/2024 AT 1838 EDT FROM LARRY BRADSHAW TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a summary of information obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers report guidance:

After reviewing security footage, it was determined that the truck was not left running, but the keys were left in the ignition which allowed the truck to be started.

Notified R3DO (Feliz-Adorno)


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/26/2024

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"In accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.7.2.1, a report is required to be made within 24 hours by telephone, confirmed by digital submission or fax to the NRC Operations Center if requested, and followed by a report in writing to the NRC, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. within 14 days that describes the circumstances associated with eight different specifications, one of which, (h), is abnormal and significant degradation in reactor fuel, cladding, or coolant boundary.

"At approximately 0900 MDT this morning, abnormal and significant degradation in reactor cladding was observed on fuel element 681E, an aluminum-clad element being inspected for removal from service. The degradation was in the form of an L-shaped hole, approximately 0.25 inches long in the upper section of the fuel element body approximately one inch from the top edge, where the upper aluminum pin and upper graphite section meet internally. It is unknown how long this damage has existed, as there is no visual record of any of this fuel since first inspected in 2003 at the VA Omaha TRIGA reactor before USGS took possession. At that point, it did not have this damage. According to the records, it was dropped during handling in 2003 when it was being unloaded from the shipping cask here at the GSTR [Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor], but no record of further inspection appears to exist. Therefore, this element may have been in the operating core for as long as 18 years in this condition, as USGS was first licensed to use it in 2006."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

No fission products were detected in the primary, pool, or on an air particulate detector. The damaged element remains in its storage location in the pool with no other mitigating measures planned in the near term.

* * * UPDATE ON 07/03/2024 AT 0927 EDT FROM JONATHAN WALLICK TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:

After continued fuel inspections, four additional damaged fuel elements were identified (Fuel Element 3007, Fuel Element 5952, Fuel Follower Control Rod 5767, and Fuel Follower Control Rod 5768). The damaged elements will be moved to dry storage and will not be considered for further use.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Inspections are approximately one third complete.

Notified NRR PM (Boyle), NPR Event Coordinator (Waugh), and USGS PM (Sutherland).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/15/2024 AT 1005 EDT FROM JONATHAN WALLICK TO ERNEST WEST * * *

"[The licensee has] additional elements to report, under license technical specification 6.7.2.1 (h):

"Fuel element 3361, stainless-steel clad: Substantial cladding damage, but not an apparent breach. It has a severe scratch approximately one eighth of an inch wide along most of the element, and two other substantial scratches. The top of the main scratch terminates in what appears to be a cracking pattern, though likely not fully through the cladding, as no fission product release was detected. The element also exhibits apparent rust on the triangular spacer, covering approximately 10 percent of the serial number face surface. It will not be used in the future. None of our inspection records show a history of any damage. It was in service prior to this inspection. This element was transferred to our facility after previous use at Michigan State University in 1989, also having been previously used at General Atomics in San Diego. Estimated manufacture [date] in 1964.

"Fuel element 7932, stainless-steel clad: Substantial cladding damage, but not an apparent breach. It has multiple deep scratches, disconnected at the ends, though running in parallel for lengths down a side of the element for nearly the entire length. [The element] gives the appearance of potential separation, but no fission product release was detected. It will not be used in the future unless thorough non-destructive evaluation concludes sufficient cladding integrity remains. None of our inspection records show a history of any damage. It was in service prior to this inspection. This element was purchased directly from General Atomics new in 1974.

"Fuel element 9473, stainless-steel clad: Multiple deep scratches on several sides with little to no light reflection. Scratches are typical on elements, however, the appear to threaten the integrity of the cladding and further use may result in release, though none has been detected yet. It will not be used in the future unless thorough non-destructive evaluation concludes sufficient cladding integrity remains. None of our inspection records show a history of any damage. It was in service prior to this inspection. This element was purchased directly from General Atomics new in 1980.

"Fuel element 5888, stainless-steel clad: Several concerning scratches and a large, repeatedly damaged scratch, indicating improper handling and threatening cladding integrity. No fission product release detected, but further handling may result in even minor damage sufficient enough to enable a release. It will not be used in the future unless thorough non-destructive evaluation concludes sufficient cladding integrity remains. Inspection records show small amounts of damage; however, [the records were] not fully indicative of the degree [of damage] observed during this inspection. The element has not been in service at this facility. It was obtained from the fuel repository at Idaho National Lab in 2016, which transferred the element from General Atomics, originally used starting in 1970.

"Fuel element 5671, stainless-steel clad: Appears to have oddly spaced and shaped bands of rust around the fuel section of the element. Coloration and lack of light reflection strongly suggest an abnormal corrosion, prominent on all sides of the element in varying degrees. Gently rubbing with a soft cloth resulted in minimal transfer of material, only some coloration but no discernable particulate, indicating the defects are integrated into the cladding and not freely releasable. No obvious mechanism exists to explain the features, though other elements on site have a similar pattern, none exhibit the degree of discoloration or loss of luster. The element was in storage at the facility but had been previously used. It will not be used in the future. It was originally purchased new from General Atomics in 1968.

"[The licensee is] still working through fuel inspections. There will likely be future updates."

Notified NRR PM (Boyle), NPR Event Coordinator (Waugh), and USGS PM (Sutherland).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/25/2024 AT 0903 EDT FROM JONATHAN WALLICK TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

"[The licensee has] an additional element to report, under license technical specification 6.7.2.1 (h):

"Fuel element 6551 (stainless-steel clad): Corrosion of top fitting and upper canister weld, but not an apparent breach as no fission product release was detected. It will not be used in the future. This is the first close inspection that the element has undergone at our facility other than briefly viewing upon its arrival. It was in storage prior to this inspection. This element was transferred to our facility after previous use at the VTT FiR-1 reactor in Finland in 1/2021. Estimated manufactured in 9/1970, and delivered to the Finland reactor in 11/1970.

"[The licensee is] still working through fuel inspections. There will likely be future updates."

Notified NRR PM (Boyle), NPR Event Coordinator (Waugh), and USGS PM (Sutherland).

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/26/2024

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SUSPECTED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND

The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program (MDE/RHP) via email:

"On July 15, 2024, at about 0859 [EDT], the MDE/RHP was contacted by the Maryland Emergency Response Division (ERD) that a bolted container [marked with] Russian [text] and red paint [located on] the middle part of the container with a trefoil symbol that was suspected of containing [radioactive material] was found dropped off at [a salvage] site in Joppatowne, MD. The scrap yard does not know the source(s) of these items and who [deposited] them. [Personnel at the scrap yard] did not detect radiation with available instruments.

"MDE/RHP will follow up and investigate the case today."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Two MDE/RHP inspectors were enroute to the scrap yard to investigate at the time the notification of this event to the NRC was made.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/25/2024 AT 1036 EDT FROM ATNATIWOS MESHESHA TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

The following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program (MDE/RHP) via email:

"RHP inspectors responded to the site on the same day (7/15/2024) and investigated the case. RHP inspectors surveyed the area and took wipe samples of the outside of the containers. The survey results and wipe analysis report indicated no elevated radiation other than natural background. On July 17, 2024, the containers were rejected by Joppa Salvage as suspect of containing hazardous material (RAM), and returned back to Aberdeen Proving Ground, a federal site, by the hauler that dropped them. There are no health or safety concerns related to this event.

"MDE/RHP closed this event."

Maryland Event ID Number: 56594.

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), NMSS Events (email), ILTAB (email), NMSS Day (Brenneman)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Department Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"On July 18, 2024, the Department was notified of a stolen nuclear density gauge. This event is reportable within 24-hours per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i).

"On July 17, 2024, an employee of the licensee reported to police that a nuclear density gauge was stolen from their vehicle between 1830-2250 EDT. Local police are aware of the incident. The Department has been in contact with the licensee and will update this event as soon as more information is provided.

"Manufacturer & Model Number: Troxler Electronic Laboratories
"Model Number: 3440
"Serial Number: 87955
"Isotope & Activity: Cs-137, 9 millicuries; Am-241:Be, 44 millicuries"

Pennsylvania Incident Number: 240016

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/25/2024

EN Revision Text: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

A Notification of Unusual Event was declared by South Texas Project Unit 1 at 0718 CDT for emergency action level (EAL) SU.1, loss of all offsite power for greater than 15 minutes, following a fire in the switchyard. Unit 1 tripped following the loss of power and is stable in Mode 3. Unit 2 reduced power to 90 percent but was otherwise unaffected by this event. Offsite services responded to the switchyard fire. The fire was extinguished at 0925 CDT.

There is no radioactive release and no threat to public safety.

The licensee notified state and local authorities and the NRC senior resident inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1154 EDT FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0702 CDT on 7/24/2024, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to loss of offsite power. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the scram.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator power operated relief valves (PORV). Unit 2 was reduced in power to approximately 90 percent power due to conditions in the switchyard.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Azua)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1259 EDT FROM CHRIS MCRARY TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone:

At 1146 CDT, South Texas Project Unit 1 terminated the previously declared Notification of Unusual Event due to restoration of an offsite source of electrical power.

Notified R4DO (Azua), NRR EO (McKenna), IR MOC (Crouch), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/24/2024 AT 1555 EDT FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

For the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) reporting requirements:

"At 0702 CDT on 7/24/2024, with both Unit 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) north and south switchyard electrical buses were de-energized.

"In Unit 1, all emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 11, 12, and 13 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on train `A', `B', and `C' engineered safety feature (ESF) buses.

"Also in Unit 1, trains `A', `B', and `C' of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system automatically started.

"In Unit 2, EDG 22 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on the train `B' ESF bus.

"Also in Unit 2, train `B' of the AFW system automatically started.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of a pressurized water reactor auxiliary feedwater system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6)) and emergency alternating current (AC) electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

For the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) reporting requirement:

"A news release was completed at 1140 CDT on 7/24/2024, by South Texas Project on the declaration of the Unusual Event. This media release is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi): Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made."

Notified R4DO (Azua)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1046 EDT on 7/24/2024, fourteen Ashtabula County emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated during system maintenance. Ashtabula County Emergency Management Agency was contacted and made aware of the situation. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified of the issue."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Minimum staffing [was] not met under Missouri University of Science and Technology Reactor (MSTR) Technical Specification (TS) 6.1.3.1(a) [for approximately one hour].

"At 1400 CDT, on July 24, 2024, the MSTR conducted a planned shutdown from 40 kW in support of a thermal power calibration. At approximately 1410, the control room operator left the control room for the reactor bay to perform additional power calibration data collection. At approximately 1510, the radiation safety officer (RSO) passed by the control room and observed that the magnet key remained in the console. The operator was promptly notified and secured the key. The operator notified the reactor manager and senior reactor operator on duty (shift supervisor) by approximately 1530, who discussed the issue with the facility director.

"During the time period of 1410 to 1510, the MSTR did not meet the TS definition for reactor secured, as the magnet key remained in the console. As such, without an operator in the control room, the minimum staffing requirements of TS 6.1.3.1(a) were not met, as this specification states: `1. The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be: a) A certified reactor operator in the control room.' It is noted that the reactor was shut down and the control rods remained inserted for the duration of the event.

"The event has been entered into the facility corrective action program as CAP-2024-001, and the NRC project manager will be notified."

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On July 24, 2024, a licensed operator violated the station's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The employee's unescorted access to South Texas Project has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii).

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

PART 21 REPORT - NON-COMPLIANT INSULATED CONDUCTOR

The following is a synopsis of information received via fax:

A reel of insulated conductor was found non-compliant due to failure of insulation tensile and elongation at break test following air oven aging. Wire from the non-compliant reel was delivered to 9 plants.

Affected plants: Wolf Creek, Dresden, LaSalle, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Arkansas Nuclear One, Waterford, Susquehanna, and Davis Besse

Reporting company point of contact:
RSSC Wire and Cable LLC
dba Marmon Industrial Energy and Infrastructure
20 Bradley Park Road
East Granby, CT 06026

Phillip Sargenski - Quality Assurance Manager
Phone: 860-653-8376
Fax: 860-653-8301
Phillip.sargenski@marmoniei.com

PART 21 - HPCI RUPTURE DISC NOT WITHIN TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) completed an engineering evaluation for a Fike Metal Products 16-inch rupture disc, part number 16-CPV-C, which had failed in March 2024 during an event previously reported to the NRC as Event Notification 57036 and Licensee Event Report 260/2024-002-00.

"The evaluation determined that the failure of the rupture disc constituted a failure to comply by a basic component which resulted in a substantial safety hazard.

"The rupture disc was procured as a non-safety related item from Fike Corporation and commercially dedicated by Paragon Energy Solutions. The disc was supplied to TVA in a satisfactory condition meeting all acceptance criteria. During a routine flowrate surveillance test, the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) inner rupture disc developed a hole which caused the Unit 2 HPCI turbine to trip. This resulted in [Browns Ferry Unit 2] entering Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition `C', which is a 14-day shutdown LCO. Per HPCI system design criteria, turbine casing protection disc rupture pressure shall be at 175 psig plus 1 or minus 10 psig and the rupture discs shall be sized for a flow capacity of 600,000 pounds per hour at 200 psig, minimum. The failed HPCI inner rupture disc did not experience pressures above 45 psig since being installed; therefore, the HPCI turbine inner rupture disc did not meet its technical requirements.

"On July 23, 2024, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days."


The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Both Fike Corporation and Paragon Energy Solutions have been informed of the HPCI inner rupture disc not meeting technical requirements. Known potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3.