Event Notification Report for April 23, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/22/2024 - 04/23/2024
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57046
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Trevor Jarrait
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Trevor Jarrait
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 03/23/2024
Notification Time: 03:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2024
Event Time: 00:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2024
Notification Time: 03:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2024
Event Time: 00:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Hills, David (R3DO)
Hills, David (R3DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | A/R | Y | 23 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/23/2024
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0004 EDT on March 23, 2024, with the unit in Mode 1 at 23 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to high reactor pressure vessel pressure when the turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closed while attempting to lower generator MW to 55 MWe to support shutdown for a refueling outage. The scram was not complex, with systems responding normally post-scram, with the exception of the pressure control system. The transient occurred while lowering on turbine speed/load demand which caused a rise in pressure and power until the reactor protection system setpoint for reactor pressure high was exceeded and resulted in an automatic reactor scram. The plant was preparing to shut down for a refueling outage when the trip occurred.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained at normal level. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the main condenser using manual operation of the turbine bypass valves. All control rods inserted into the core.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, received expected [primary containment] isolations for Level 3: Group 13 drywell sumps, Group 15 [traverse in-core probe] TlPs (which was already isolated) and Group 4 [residual heat removal - shutdown cooling] RHR-SDC (which was already isolated). The primary containment isolation event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Also, due to the main turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closing, this is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 4/22/24 AT 1448 EDT FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria of event notification 57046 reported on March 23,2024. Based on further evaluation, Fermi 2 has concluded that there was no event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function that was needed to mitigate the consequence of an accident. Although discussed in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, the turbine bypass valves do not provide a safety related function and are not credited safety related components for accident mitigation. Therefore, Fermi 2 is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria that was included on the March 23, 2024 event notification."
Notified R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan)
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0004 EDT on March 23, 2024, with the unit in Mode 1 at 23 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to high reactor pressure vessel pressure when the turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closed while attempting to lower generator MW to 55 MWe to support shutdown for a refueling outage. The scram was not complex, with systems responding normally post-scram, with the exception of the pressure control system. The transient occurred while lowering on turbine speed/load demand which caused a rise in pressure and power until the reactor protection system setpoint for reactor pressure high was exceeded and resulted in an automatic reactor scram. The plant was preparing to shut down for a refueling outage when the trip occurred.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained at normal level. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the main condenser using manual operation of the turbine bypass valves. All control rods inserted into the core.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, received expected [primary containment] isolations for Level 3: Group 13 drywell sumps, Group 15 [traverse in-core probe] TlPs (which was already isolated) and Group 4 [residual heat removal - shutdown cooling] RHR-SDC (which was already isolated). The primary containment isolation event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Also, due to the main turbine bypass valves unexpectedly closing, this is also being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 4/22/24 AT 1448 EDT FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria of event notification 57046 reported on March 23,2024. Based on further evaluation, Fermi 2 has concluded that there was no event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function that was needed to mitigate the consequence of an accident. Although discussed in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, the turbine bypass valves do not provide a safety related function and are not credited safety related components for accident mitigation. Therefore, Fermi 2 is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) reporting criteria that was included on the March 23, 2024 event notification."
Notified R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57076
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Nondestructive & Visual Inspection
Region: 4
City: Northglenn State: CO
County:
License #: CO1241-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Carrie Romanchek
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: Nondestructive & Visual Inspection
Region: 4
City: Northglenn State: CO
County:
License #: CO1241-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Carrie Romanchek
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/15/2024
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2024
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN LOCK ON RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
"This letter is serving as notification of an equipment failure under [Colorado Regulation] Section 4.52.2.3 and 5.38.1.3. A QSA Global 880 Delta camera was received from Source Production and Equipment Company, Inc. (SPEC), after being resourced. During the check-in procedure and mechanism check, it was discovered that the lock that controls access to the pigtail attachment was broken in the locked position. The camera was tagged out until it could be sent to Industrial Nuclear Company (INC), for repairs on 04/04/2024. The lock was repaired at INC, and the camera was returned to the licensee on 04/10/2024 with no issues."
Colorado Event Report ID: CO240011
The following information was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:
"This letter is serving as notification of an equipment failure under [Colorado Regulation] Section 4.52.2.3 and 5.38.1.3. A QSA Global 880 Delta camera was received from Source Production and Equipment Company, Inc. (SPEC), after being resourced. During the check-in procedure and mechanism check, it was discovered that the lock that controls access to the pigtail attachment was broken in the locked position. The camera was tagged out until it could be sent to Industrial Nuclear Company (INC), for repairs on 04/04/2024. The lock was repaired at INC, and the camera was returned to the licensee on 04/10/2024 with no issues."
Colorado Event Report ID: CO240011
Agreement State
Event Number: 57078
Rep Org: California Radiation Control Prgm
Licensee: Testing Engineers, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Concord State: CA
County:
License #: 3691-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. Arunika Hewadikaram
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: Testing Engineers, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Concord State: CA
County:
License #: 3691-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. Arunika Hewadikaram
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 04/16/2024
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2024
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (EMAIL)
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN GAUGE
The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) via email:
"On 4/15/2024, the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) forwarded a report from Testing Engineers, Inc. The radiation safety officer (RSO) notified OES that one of their nuclear gauges (CPN MC-1, serial number MD71108870 containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241) was stolen from a storage unit that is located within a public storage facility in Concord, CA. The gauge was stolen from the storage unit at an unknown time between 04/13/2024 and 04/14/2024, but was discovered missing at 1541 [PDT] on 04/15/2024. A car was used to ram the door of the storage unit, and a pry bar was used to remove the gauge from a locked cabinet. Local law enforcement was notified, and a reward was posted on Craigslist, Facebook, and Nextdoor for the safe return of the gauge.
"RHB will investigate the incident."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) via email:
"On 4/15/2024, the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) forwarded a report from Testing Engineers, Inc. The radiation safety officer (RSO) notified OES that one of their nuclear gauges (CPN MC-1, serial number MD71108870 containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241) was stolen from a storage unit that is located within a public storage facility in Concord, CA. The gauge was stolen from the storage unit at an unknown time between 04/13/2024 and 04/14/2024, but was discovered missing at 1541 [PDT] on 04/15/2024. A car was used to ram the door of the storage unit, and a pry bar was used to remove the gauge from a locked cabinet. Local law enforcement was notified, and a reward was posted on Craigslist, Facebook, and Nextdoor for the safe return of the gauge.
"RHB will investigate the incident."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Part 21
Event Number: 57088
Rep Org: Global Nuclear Fuel
Licensee: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC
Region: 2
City: Wilmington State: NC
County:
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Ralph Hayes
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC
Region: 2
City: Wilmington State: NC
County:
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Ralph Hayes
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 04/22/2024
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2024
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Werkheiser, Dave (R1DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Betancourt-Roldan, Diana (R3DO)
Warnick, Greg (R4DO)
Werkheiser, Dave (R1DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Betancourt-Roldan, Diana (R3DO)
Warnick, Greg (R4DO)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/29/2024
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - FUEL ASSEMBLY SPACER RELOCATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email:
Global Nuclear Fuel discovered instances of GNF3 fuel assembly spacers relocating within the fuel bundle. A safety communication was issued in 2022 following the discovery of a raised water rod (WR) at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Shutdown inspections in February 2024 at Lasalle identified five spacers out of position. Shutdown inspections at Limerick in April 2024 identified one spacer out of position. Those discoveries prompted this Part 21 report. An evaluation concluded that the relocated spacers could result in a degraded critical power margin, but the evaluation of this condition indicates it will not compromise or greatly reduce protection to public health and safety.
Plants with suspect bundles installed:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Raised WR but no defective spacers)
Lasalle (1 bundle with 5 relocated spacers found)
Limerick (1 bundle with 4 relocated spacers found)
Nine Mile Point (No defects found)
Fermi (No defects found)
Peach Bottom (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024)
Fitzpatrick (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024)
* * * UPDATE ON 4/26/24 AT 1220 EDT FROM LISA SCHICHLEIN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
Updated to correct administrative errors in the summary of defects. Corrections were made above.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan), R4DO (Warnick), Part 21/Reactor Group (email)
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - FUEL ASSEMBLY SPACER RELOCATION
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email:
Global Nuclear Fuel discovered instances of GNF3 fuel assembly spacers relocating within the fuel bundle. A safety communication was issued in 2022 following the discovery of a raised water rod (WR) at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Shutdown inspections in February 2024 at Lasalle identified five spacers out of position. Shutdown inspections at Limerick in April 2024 identified one spacer out of position. Those discoveries prompted this Part 21 report. An evaluation concluded that the relocated spacers could result in a degraded critical power margin, but the evaluation of this condition indicates it will not compromise or greatly reduce protection to public health and safety.
Plants with suspect bundles installed:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Raised WR but no defective spacers)
Lasalle (1 bundle with 5 relocated spacers found)
Limerick (1 bundle with 4 relocated spacers found)
Nine Mile Point (No defects found)
Fermi (No defects found)
Peach Bottom (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024)
Fitzpatrick (Shutdown scheduled in Fall 2024)
* * * UPDATE ON 4/26/24 AT 1220 EDT FROM LISA SCHICHLEIN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
Updated to correct administrative errors in the summary of defects. Corrections were made above.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser), R3DO (Betancourt-Roldan), R4DO (Warnick), Part 21/Reactor Group (email)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57080
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: The Dow Chemical Company
Region: 4
City: Lake Jackson State: TX
County:
License #: L 00451
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: The Dow Chemical Company
Region: 4
City: Lake Jackson State: TX
County:
License #: L 00451
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 04/17/2024
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2024
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE SHUTTER
The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On April 16, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that they had removed a Natco model B-20-06 nuclear gauge containing a 175 millicurie (original activity) Cs-137 source from a vessel to allow work on the vessel. The gauge shutter was in the closed position and was functioning normally. Dose rates taken at the gauge before removal were normal at 0.65 millirem per hour.
"After the gauge was removed from the vessel, it was placed on a pallet with other gauges that had been removed from the vessel. At this time, the licensee performed additional radiation surveys, and the dose rate taken within a foot at the top of the gauge shutter was now reading 8.65 millirem per hour. The gauges were all moved to a locked storage location.
"The licensee has contacted a service company to inspect the gauge and determine the cause for the increased dose rates. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) stated the shutter may have been damaged as the gauge was being moved to the pallet. The RSO stated no overexposures had occurred.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No.: 10099
Texas NMED No.: TX240012
The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On April 16, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that they had removed a Natco model B-20-06 nuclear gauge containing a 175 millicurie (original activity) Cs-137 source from a vessel to allow work on the vessel. The gauge shutter was in the closed position and was functioning normally. Dose rates taken at the gauge before removal were normal at 0.65 millirem per hour.
"After the gauge was removed from the vessel, it was placed on a pallet with other gauges that had been removed from the vessel. At this time, the licensee performed additional radiation surveys, and the dose rate taken within a foot at the top of the gauge shutter was now reading 8.65 millirem per hour. The gauges were all moved to a locked storage location.
"The licensee has contacted a service company to inspect the gauge and determine the cause for the increased dose rates. The licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) stated the shutter may have been damaged as the gauge was being moved to the pallet. The RSO stated no overexposures had occurred.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident No.: 10099
Texas NMED No.: TX240012