Event Notification Report for November 16, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/15/2023 - 11/16/2023
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 56859
Rep Org: Cleveland Cliffs Steel Corporation
Licensee: Cleveland Cliffs Steel Corporation
Region: 3
City: Dearborn State: MI
County:
License #: 21-26151-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Wayne Langdon
HQ OPS Officer: John Russell
Licensee: Cleveland Cliffs Steel Corporation
Region: 3
City: Dearborn State: MI
County:
License #: 21-26151-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Wayne Langdon
HQ OPS Officer: John Russell
Notification Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2024
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 08:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
Person (Organization):
Feliz-Adorno, Nestor (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Feliz-Adorno, Nestor (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 7/16/2024
EN Revision Text: NON-AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED INDICATING LIGHT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
On November 11, 2023, at about 1330 EST, at the Cleveland Cliffs Steel Corporation in Dearborn Michigan, the licensee staff noted that the indicating light for a 1 curie Am-241 thickness gauge shutter position was malfunctioning. The light indicated open continuously even though the shutter was closing normally. Operation of the plant continued and the shutter remained in its normally open position measuring the product steel thickness. Shutter position was subsequently checked by radiation measurements to confirm that the indicating light was not indicating correctly. No abnormal exposure resulted and the vendor will troubleshoot and repair. The location of the gauge is not normally manned.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/23 AT 1509 EST FROM WAYNE LANGDON TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following update was received from the licensee via email:
"Today, a Thermo Fisher Scientific technician came on site to diagnose the shutter position indicator light issue. It was found that the shutter arm flag was bad. The technician replaced the shutter arm flag with a new one and verified that the unit was properly working. No Cleveland Cliffs employees nor the Thermo Fisher Scientific technician were exposed at any time during the event."
Notified R3DO (Feliz-Adorno) and NMSS Event Notifications (E-mail).
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/15/24 AT 1430 EDT FROM WAYNE LANGDON TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
The licensee is withdrawing the event following further analysis. The failure only affected the indicator light, and all safety devices (the shutter) continued to function normally. There was no exposure to personnel.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
EN Revision Text: NON-AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED INDICATING LIGHT
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
On November 11, 2023, at about 1330 EST, at the Cleveland Cliffs Steel Corporation in Dearborn Michigan, the licensee staff noted that the indicating light for a 1 curie Am-241 thickness gauge shutter position was malfunctioning. The light indicated open continuously even though the shutter was closing normally. Operation of the plant continued and the shutter remained in its normally open position measuring the product steel thickness. Shutter position was subsequently checked by radiation measurements to confirm that the indicating light was not indicating correctly. No abnormal exposure resulted and the vendor will troubleshoot and repair. The location of the gauge is not normally manned.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/18/23 AT 1509 EST FROM WAYNE LANGDON TO IAN HOWARD * * *
The following update was received from the licensee via email:
"Today, a Thermo Fisher Scientific technician came on site to diagnose the shutter position indicator light issue. It was found that the shutter arm flag was bad. The technician replaced the shutter arm flag with a new one and verified that the unit was properly working. No Cleveland Cliffs employees nor the Thermo Fisher Scientific technician were exposed at any time during the event."
Notified R3DO (Feliz-Adorno) and NMSS Event Notifications (E-mail).
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/15/24 AT 1430 EDT FROM WAYNE LANGDON TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
The licensee is withdrawing the event following further analysis. The failure only affected the indicator light, and all safety devices (the shutter) continued to function normally. There was no exposure to personnel.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56856
Facility: Calvert Cliffs
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Corey Donahoo
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Corey Donahoo
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 05:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 02:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 05:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 02:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Defrancisco, Anne (R1DO)
Defrancisco, Anne (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0227 EST on 11/16/23, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from the reactor protection system (RPS) based on reactor trip bus undervoltage (UV). At that time, a loss of U-4000-22 (13 kV to 4 kV transformer) caused a loss of 22, 23, and 24 4 kV busses. This resulted in a loss of both motor generator (MG) sets causing the reactor trip bus UV. The loss of 22 and 23 4 kV non-safety related busses resulted in a loss of main feedwater. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated and is feeding both steam generators. The 2B diesel generator (DG) started and restored the 24 4 kV safety related bus. Heat removal is via the normal turbine bypass valves to the main condenser.
"RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4 hour report
"ESFAS (engineering safety features actuation system) actuation (2B DG start on UV) is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report
"AFW operation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) - 60 day report
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All rods fully inserted. There was no impact on Unit 1 operations. Unit 2 is stable in mode 3.
* * * UPDATE ON AT 0940 EST FROM KERRY HUMMER TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"ESFAS actuation (AFW manual initiation) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report"
Notified R1DO (Defrancisco).
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0227 EST on 11/16/23, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from the reactor protection system (RPS) based on reactor trip bus undervoltage (UV). At that time, a loss of U-4000-22 (13 kV to 4 kV transformer) caused a loss of 22, 23, and 24 4 kV busses. This resulted in a loss of both motor generator (MG) sets causing the reactor trip bus UV. The loss of 22 and 23 4 kV non-safety related busses resulted in a loss of main feedwater. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated and is feeding both steam generators. The 2B diesel generator (DG) started and restored the 24 4 kV safety related bus. Heat removal is via the normal turbine bypass valves to the main condenser.
"RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4 hour report
"ESFAS (engineering safety features actuation system) actuation (2B DG start on UV) is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report
"AFW operation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) - 60 day report
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All rods fully inserted. There was no impact on Unit 1 operations. Unit 2 is stable in mode 3.
* * * UPDATE ON AT 0940 EST FROM KERRY HUMMER TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"ESFAS actuation (AFW manual initiation) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report"
Notified R1DO (Defrancisco).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56858
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jason Williamson
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jason Williamson
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 09:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 12:12 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 09:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0906 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on November 16, 2023, it was determined that a non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the Fitness for Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been removed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0906 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on November 16, 2023, it was determined that a non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the Fitness for Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been removed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56861
Facility: South Texas
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Neil Rocha
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Neil Rocha
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 15:41 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 15:41 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ESSENTIAL CHILLER TRAINS INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"11/05/23, 2200 CST: Essential Chiller 'B' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE for planned maintenance. Unit 2 entered the Configuration Risk Management Program as required by Technical Specifications on 11/12/23 at 2200.
"11/16/23, 1541: Essential Chiller 'C' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE due to an unexpected material condition causing the Essential Chiller to trip. The most limiting [Limiting Condition of Operability] LCO is 3.7.7, Action c.
"This condition resulted in the INOPERABILITY of two of the three safety trains required for the accident mitigating function including: High Head Safety Injection, Low Head Safety Injection, Containment Spray, Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC, Control Room Envelope HVAC, Essential Chilled Water.
"This is an 8 hour reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because it could affect the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"A risk analysis was performed for the equipment INOPERABILITY and mitigating actions have been taken per site procedures. All 'A' train equipment remains operable."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generator was also inoperable due to planned maintenance and continues to be inoperable. It was considered in the Configuration Risk Management Program and it was determined this condition could be maintained. LCO 3.7.7, Action c requires reactor shutdown within 72 hours.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"11/05/23, 2200 CST: Essential Chiller 'B' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE for planned maintenance. Unit 2 entered the Configuration Risk Management Program as required by Technical Specifications on 11/12/23 at 2200.
"11/16/23, 1541: Essential Chiller 'C' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE due to an unexpected material condition causing the Essential Chiller to trip. The most limiting [Limiting Condition of Operability] LCO is 3.7.7, Action c.
"This condition resulted in the INOPERABILITY of two of the three safety trains required for the accident mitigating function including: High Head Safety Injection, Low Head Safety Injection, Containment Spray, Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC, Control Room Envelope HVAC, Essential Chilled Water.
"This is an 8 hour reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because it could affect the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"A risk analysis was performed for the equipment INOPERABILITY and mitigating actions have been taken per site procedures. All 'A' train equipment remains operable."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generator was also inoperable due to planned maintenance and continues to be inoperable. It was considered in the Configuration Risk Management Program and it was determined this condition could be maintained. LCO 3.7.7, Action c requires reactor shutdown within 72 hours.
Part 21
Event Number: 57068
Rep Org: Transco Products Inc.
Licensee:
Region: 3
City: Streator State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kevin Hawks
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Licensee:
Region: 3
City: Streator State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kevin Hawks
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Notification Date: 04/09/2024
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2024
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Edwards, Rhex (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
PART 21 - INTERIM REPORT FOR UNVERIFIED CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DARMATT KM-1 FLAT BOARD
The following is a summary of the information provided by Transco Products Inc. via email:
10 CFR Part 21 Initial Notification: TPI-LTR-2024-01-01-0
On November 16, 2023, during an audit review, it was determined that the dedication plan was inadequate. The dedication plan lists chemical properties as one of the critical characteristics with the acceptance criteria. The extent of condition is limited to Darmatt KM-1 flat board supplied to Energy Northwest (Columbia Generating Station). The issue has been entered into Transco Products Inc.'s corrective action program. Testing to verify the chemical properties of the supplied flat board is in process. Energy Northwest was the only impacted licensee and they have been notified.
Notified R4DO (Azua) and Part 21 Group via email.
The following is a summary of the information provided by Transco Products Inc. via email:
10 CFR Part 21 Initial Notification: TPI-LTR-2024-01-01-0
On November 16, 2023, during an audit review, it was determined that the dedication plan was inadequate. The dedication plan lists chemical properties as one of the critical characteristics with the acceptance criteria. The extent of condition is limited to Darmatt KM-1 flat board supplied to Energy Northwest (Columbia Generating Station). The issue has been entered into Transco Products Inc.'s corrective action program. Testing to verify the chemical properties of the supplied flat board is in process. Energy Northwest was the only impacted licensee and they have been notified.
Notified R4DO (Azua) and Part 21 Group via email.