Event Notification Report for August 07, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/06/2023 - 08/07/2023
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 56664
Rep Org: Defense Health Agency
Licensee: Defense Health Agency
Region: 4
City: Biloxi State: MS
County: Harrison
License #: 45-35423-1
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Ricardo Reyes
HQ OPS Officer: Michael Bloodgood
Licensee: Defense Health Agency
Region: 4
City: Biloxi State: MS
County: Harrison
License #: 45-35423-1
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Ricardo Reyes
HQ OPS Officer: Michael Bloodgood
Notification Date: 08/07/2023
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2023
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2023
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2023
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - Surface Contam Levels > Limits
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - Surface Contam Levels > Limits
Person (Organization):
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NON-AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNALLY CONTAMINATED PACKAGE
The following information was provided by the Defense Health Agency via email:
The licensee made a 10 CFR 20.1906 report of receipt of a shipment of Tc-99m with external contamination present on the "high-tech solution bag." The licensee reported this event due to contamination levels potentially exceeding regulatory limits prior to receipt during transit.
At approximately 0900 (CDT) IonSouth delivered a package to the licensee's facility at Keesler Air Force Base Medical Center's hotlab. The licensee identified that the bag had external contamination present. The licensee performed 300 square centimeter wipes at approximately 1130 (CDT) resulting in 50544 disintegrations per minute (dpm) inside the package and 5920 dpm outside the package. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) projected that the contamination level outside the bag was 7917.5 dpm at time of delivery. The package was placed in a plastic bag and secured for decay.
The licensee notified IonSouth to inform them of the contaminated package. The RSO is awaiting additional information from the vendor.
The following information was provided by the Defense Health Agency via email:
The licensee made a 10 CFR 20.1906 report of receipt of a shipment of Tc-99m with external contamination present on the "high-tech solution bag." The licensee reported this event due to contamination levels potentially exceeding regulatory limits prior to receipt during transit.
At approximately 0900 (CDT) IonSouth delivered a package to the licensee's facility at Keesler Air Force Base Medical Center's hotlab. The licensee identified that the bag had external contamination present. The licensee performed 300 square centimeter wipes at approximately 1130 (CDT) resulting in 50544 disintegrations per minute (dpm) inside the package and 5920 dpm outside the package. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) projected that the contamination level outside the bag was 7917.5 dpm at time of delivery. The package was placed in a plastic bag and secured for decay.
The licensee notified IonSouth to inform them of the contaminated package. The RSO is awaiting additional information from the vendor.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56779
Facility: Vogtle 3/4
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [4] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: William Garrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [4] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: William Garrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 10/05/2023
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2023
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2023
Notification Time: 12:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2023
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/6/2023
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1439 EDT on August 7, 2023, a spurious level spike on the unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) level instrument (4-RCS-LT160A, 'Hot Leg 1 Level') caused actuation of containment isolation, reactor trip, automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4, and in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) isolation signals. The spurious level changes caused an invalid signal based on the incidental response of the 4-RCS-LT160A instrumentation due to water spray that was being used for reactor vessel cleaning (being performed prior to initial fuel loading). The level fluctuations resulted in engineered safety features actuation signals (containment isolation, ADS stage 4, and IRWST isolation signals) and a reactor trip signal, with the reactor trip signal already present. Three containment isolation valves closed due to the containment isolation signal that was generated. These valves were: 4-CAS-V014, 'instrument air supply containment isolation, air-operated valve,' 4-SFS-V034, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve,' and 4-SFS-V035, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve.' The other automatic containment isolation valves were either already closed at the time of the event or properly removed from service. All affected equipment functioned properly. The other actuation signals that were observed during this event (ADS stage 4, IRWST isolation, and reactor trip) did not result in any equipment changing position or automatically operating (i.e., the actuation signals occurred while the systems were properly removed from service).
"Units 1, 2, and 3 were not affected. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 1439 EDT on August 7, 2023, a spurious level spike on the unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) level instrument (4-RCS-LT160A, 'Hot Leg 1 Level') caused actuation of containment isolation, reactor trip, automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4, and in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) isolation signals. The spurious level changes caused an invalid signal based on the incidental response of the 4-RCS-LT160A instrumentation due to water spray that was being used for reactor vessel cleaning (being performed prior to initial fuel loading). The level fluctuations resulted in engineered safety features actuation signals (containment isolation, ADS stage 4, and IRWST isolation signals) and a reactor trip signal, with the reactor trip signal already present. Three containment isolation valves closed due to the containment isolation signal that was generated. These valves were: 4-CAS-V014, 'instrument air supply containment isolation, air-operated valve,' 4-SFS-V034, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve,' and 4-SFS-V035, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve.' The other automatic containment isolation valves were either already closed at the time of the event or properly removed from service. All affected equipment functioned properly. The other actuation signals that were observed during this event (ADS stage 4, IRWST isolation, and reactor trip) did not result in any equipment changing position or automatically operating (i.e., the actuation signals occurred while the systems were properly removed from service).
"Units 1, 2, and 3 were not affected. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.