Event Notification Report for June 12, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/11/2023 - 06/12/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56571
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Sky Ridge Medical Center
Region: 4
City: Lone Tree State: CO
County:
License #: CO 1053-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Heather Gilbert
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: Sky Ridge Medical Center
Region: 4
City: Lone Tree State: CO
County:
License #: CO 1053-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Heather Gilbert
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 06/13/2023
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 11:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2023
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 11:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Warnick, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Warnick, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE
The following information was provided by the the Colorado Department of Health via email:
"On June 12, 2023, as the semi-annual leak tests/inventory were being performed at Sky Ridge Medical Center (RAML 1053-01), a leaking Co-57 Benchmark mini flood source (SN BM552021321103) was found. The exact timing of when the source started leaking is unknown. The source was last inventoried in December 2022, and was at background. [A staff member] from the Colorado Associates in Medical Physics (CAMP) found the source had 185 Bq (0.005 micro-Ci) or more removable contamination in excess of the regulatory limits. The initial removable contamination resulted in a wipe count of 3835 cpm (0.00525 micro-Ci) of removable contamination. The source was cleaned with paper towels and dish soap and when re-wiped had a lower count (1900 cpm), but remained above background even after additional wipes. All paper towels used for cleaning surveyed at background (0.03 mR/hr) and were disposed of in the hot trash in the hot lab.
"The source was wrapped in a thick trash bag, secured with tape and was placed in the shielded decay cabinet. The activity of the source on 6/12/2023 was 5.02 milli-Ci. The storage container, the cardiac single-photon emission computed tomography camera, and the hot lab counters were all wiped and surveyed, and all readings were at background (0.03 mR/hr).
"The source did not appear damaged or broken. CAMP will dispose of the source, and they have initiated a disposal inquiry. In the meantime, the source will remain in the shielded decay cabinet."
Colorado event report ID number: CO230016
The following information was provided by the the Colorado Department of Health via email:
"On June 12, 2023, as the semi-annual leak tests/inventory were being performed at Sky Ridge Medical Center (RAML 1053-01), a leaking Co-57 Benchmark mini flood source (SN BM552021321103) was found. The exact timing of when the source started leaking is unknown. The source was last inventoried in December 2022, and was at background. [A staff member] from the Colorado Associates in Medical Physics (CAMP) found the source had 185 Bq (0.005 micro-Ci) or more removable contamination in excess of the regulatory limits. The initial removable contamination resulted in a wipe count of 3835 cpm (0.00525 micro-Ci) of removable contamination. The source was cleaned with paper towels and dish soap and when re-wiped had a lower count (1900 cpm), but remained above background even after additional wipes. All paper towels used for cleaning surveyed at background (0.03 mR/hr) and were disposed of in the hot trash in the hot lab.
"The source was wrapped in a thick trash bag, secured with tape and was placed in the shielded decay cabinet. The activity of the source on 6/12/2023 was 5.02 milli-Ci. The storage container, the cardiac single-photon emission computed tomography camera, and the hot lab counters were all wiped and surveyed, and all readings were at background (0.03 mR/hr).
"The source did not appear damaged or broken. CAMP will dispose of the source, and they have initiated a disposal inquiry. In the meantime, the source will remain in the shielded decay cabinet."
Colorado event report ID number: CO230016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56570
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jonathan Holdwick
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jonathan Holdwick
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 06/13/2023
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 0 | Power Operation | 0 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 8/4/2023
EN Revision Text: ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2333 EDT on June 12, 2023, the division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan `D' was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while running in high speed. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI room cooler. The cause of MDCT Fan `D' trip is currently unknown with trouble shooting being developed for remediation of the condition. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1540 EDT ON 8/8/2023 FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO BILL GOTT * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous event notification (EN) 56570 reported on June 13, 2023, at 0602 EDT.
"The cause of the fan trip was a failed vibration switch. At 0429 EDT on June 14, 2023, the vibration switch was replaced, the MDCT fan "D" was tested satisfactory for operability, and the UHS, emergency diesel generator 13/14, and MDCT were declared operable.
"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a previously performed gothic analysis model (to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations) which bounded this condition. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and suppression pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The fan trip did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56570 can be retracted, and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen)
EN Revision Text: ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2333 EDT on June 12, 2023, the division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan `D' was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while running in high speed. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI room cooler. The cause of MDCT Fan `D' trip is currently unknown with trouble shooting being developed for remediation of the condition. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1540 EDT ON 8/8/2023 FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO BILL GOTT * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous event notification (EN) 56570 reported on June 13, 2023, at 0602 EDT.
"The cause of the fan trip was a failed vibration switch. At 0429 EDT on June 14, 2023, the vibration switch was replaced, the MDCT fan "D" was tested satisfactory for operability, and the UHS, emergency diesel generator 13/14, and MDCT were declared operable.
"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a previously performed gothic analysis model (to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations) which bounded this condition. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and suppression pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The fan trip did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56570 can be retracted, and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen)