Event Notification Report for May 31, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/30/2023 - 05/31/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56545
Rep Org: Florida Bureau of Radiation Control
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences
Region: 1
City: Orlando State: FL
County:
License #: 4696-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Seidensticker
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: Universal Engineering Sciences
Region: 1
City: Orlando State: FL
County:
License #: 4696-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Mark Seidensticker
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 05/31/2023
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2023
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Cahill, Christopher (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Cahill, Christopher (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"Universal Engineering Sciences Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) called the BRC Orlando [office] this morning to report one of their Troxler gauges was run over on a job site this morning. He stated the source rod was in the retracted and shielded position at the time of the accident. Unit apparently sustained housing damage. Local RSO was enroute with a radiation meter. A BRC inspector is also enroute."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The Troxler gauge involved contains nominal activity of 40 mCi of Am-241:Be and 8 mCi of Cs-137.
FL incident number: FL23-081
The following information was provided by the Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:
"Universal Engineering Sciences Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) called the BRC Orlando [office] this morning to report one of their Troxler gauges was run over on a job site this morning. He stated the source rod was in the retracted and shielded position at the time of the accident. Unit apparently sustained housing damage. Local RSO was enroute with a radiation meter. A BRC inspector is also enroute."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The Troxler gauge involved contains nominal activity of 40 mCi of Am-241:Be and 8 mCi of Cs-137.
FL incident number: FL23-081
Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 56579
Rep Org: Oregon State University (OREG)
Licensee: Oregon State University
Region: 0
City: Corvallis State: OR
County: Benton
License #: R-106
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000243
NRC Notified By: Steve Reese
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Licensee: Oregon State University
Region: 0
City: Corvallis State: OR
County: Benton
License #: R-106
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000243
NRC Notified By: Steve Reese
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Notification Date: 06/16/2023
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2023
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2023
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2023
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
Balazik, Michael (NRR PM)
Waugh, Andrew (NPR ENC)
Balazik, Michael (NRR PM)
Waugh, Andrew (NPR ENC)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS POWER LIMIT VIOLATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"[Oregon State University Radiation Center is] providing this information as a follow-up with the phone call to the Headquarters Operations Center made today at 1325 EDT (EN-56579). On the morning of 5/31/2023, a senior reactor operator and a trainee operator were performing a square-wave operation to raise power from 100 W to 1 MW. After firing the transient rod, the reactor immediately scrammed on both safety and percent power channels. Review of the chart recorder shows that reactor power likely reached 1.45 MW. This is potentially a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.1 which limits power to 1.1 MW during steady-state operations.
"Reviewing the power chart recorder, it appears that two immediately adjacent steps required for the square-wave operation were performed inadvertently out of order. The chart's sample rate is 1 Hz, so the resolution on the data is limited. Within 10 seconds, the final procedure steps for square-wave operation were performed (with the mode switch in square-wave mode). Once the transient rod air actuation button was pushed, starting the square-wave, the safety channel shortly thereafter (approximately 1 second) went from 0.02 percent to 145.91 percent of 1 MW. The reactor immediately scrammed and shut down the reactor as the safety and percent power channels exceeded their scram setpoints of 106 percent of 1 MW, which were checked on the daily startup checklist. The cause of the event was that two steps in the procedure were performed out of order, causing the regulating rod to withdraw to match demand power as the transient rod withdrew. As a result, this caused an additional 18 cents of reactivity to be inserted above the planned reactivity insertion of 80 cents.
"[Oregon State University Radiation Center plans] on following this up with a more thorough report within 14 days."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"[Oregon State University Radiation Center is] providing this information as a follow-up with the phone call to the Headquarters Operations Center made today at 1325 EDT (EN-56579). On the morning of 5/31/2023, a senior reactor operator and a trainee operator were performing a square-wave operation to raise power from 100 W to 1 MW. After firing the transient rod, the reactor immediately scrammed on both safety and percent power channels. Review of the chart recorder shows that reactor power likely reached 1.45 MW. This is potentially a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.1 which limits power to 1.1 MW during steady-state operations.
"Reviewing the power chart recorder, it appears that two immediately adjacent steps required for the square-wave operation were performed inadvertently out of order. The chart's sample rate is 1 Hz, so the resolution on the data is limited. Within 10 seconds, the final procedure steps for square-wave operation were performed (with the mode switch in square-wave mode). Once the transient rod air actuation button was pushed, starting the square-wave, the safety channel shortly thereafter (approximately 1 second) went from 0.02 percent to 145.91 percent of 1 MW. The reactor immediately scrammed and shut down the reactor as the safety and percent power channels exceeded their scram setpoints of 106 percent of 1 MW, which were checked on the daily startup checklist. The cause of the event was that two steps in the procedure were performed out of order, causing the regulating rod to withdraw to match demand power as the transient rod withdrew. As a result, this caused an additional 18 cents of reactivity to be inserted above the planned reactivity insertion of 80 cents.
"[Oregon State University Radiation Center plans] on following this up with a more thorough report within 14 days."