Event Notification Report for May 05, 2023

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ACTUATION AT ZERO PERCENT POWER

"At 2149 EDT on April 5, 2021, with the power plant in Mode 2 at zero percent power, an actuation of the RPS system occurred following the decision to abort plant start-up. The reason for the RPS actuation was to align the plant to Mode 3, from Mode 2, following manually inserting all control rods using the Rod Control System. The RPS system initiated as designed when the mode switch was taken from 'Start-up' to 'Shutdown' to align the plant to Mode 3 from Mode 2.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION ON 5/12/21 AT 1345 EDT FROM JOHN NAKEL TO KERBY SCALES * * *

"This is a retraction of an event notification made on 4/6/2021 at 0432 EST (EN#55172). This event was initially reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS System. This event was later determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Technical Specifications, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"On the evening of April 4, 2021, while commencing reactor start up, it was determined that control rod withdrawal to add positive reactivity for the start-up would not overcome the negative reactivity of plant heat up. The control room team determined that the proper course of action would be to insert all control rods . The control room briefed and notified the Outage Control Center about its decision, then proceeded to insert all control rods. The control room manually inserted all control rods using the control rod hydraulic system.

"Following insertion of all control rods, the mode switch was taken to the shutdown position to meet the prerequisites of the procedure for maintaining hot shutdown. This action establishes Mode 3 in accordance with Technical Specifications and aligns the plant to perform the necessary work prior to a plant restart. By placing the mode switch in the shutdown position, a scram signal is generated for 10 seconds.

"NUREG-1022 offers guidance that states 'Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event.' The actions the operating crew took that night are accurately described by this statement in NUREG-1022 'shifting alignment of makeup pumps or closing a containment isolation valve for normal operational purposes would not be reportable.' In this situation, the Mode switch was taken to shutdown to align the plant to mode 3 for normal operational purposes, and not to mitigate a significant event.

"When the mode switch was taken to shut-down, RPS initiated as designed, there was no mis-operation or unnecessary actuation.

"This actuation was determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Tech Specs, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The NRC Resident has been notified.

Notified R3DO (McGraw).

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEMS INOPERABLE

"At 0905 EDT, it was discovered both trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) were simultaneously INOPERABLE due to the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) being inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

ABSCE and ABGTS were returned to operable.

* * * RETRACTION ON 10/14/2021 AT 0756 EDT FROM TRACY SUDOKO TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

"This is a retraction of the 8-hour Immediate notification (EN55421) made to the NRC by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant on August 20, 2021.

"Sequoyah is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory Guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73', Sections 2.8 'Retraction and Cancellation of Event Reporting', and 4.2.3 'ENS Notification Retraction'.

"On August 20, 2021 personnel found door A-118 open. This door is part of the ABSCE. During the initial investigation, it was found that other personnel had the door open using Precaution A of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 which allows material access through ABSCE doors if the door is closed within three minutes. It was found that A-118 door had been open for greater than three minutes. With this door open the ABSCE was beyond its capability for ABGTS fan to maintain the required pressure during an Aux. Building Isolation. Thus, the site declared the ABSCE and both Trains of ABGTS inoperable per LCO 3.7.12 Conditions A, B and E. With the ABSCE being a single train system, this caused a condition that "could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function" which requires an Immediate Notification to the NRC within eight hours under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). This Immediate Notification was reported on August 20, 2021 at 1600 EDT.

"It was later determined that at 'Time of Discovery', although Door A-118 was open, it was not obstructed, the door was open by normal means, was capable of being closed and was now attended. The time requirement per 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 for closure of an open ABSCE door is within three minutes of notification. Although the individual found holding the door was unaware of the requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 to close the door, communications were established and the Main Control Room (MCR), upon discovery of the 'Open Door', could have directed closure starting at the Time of Discovery if required. Since the MCR was aware the door was open, had communications established with personnel at the door, the door was capable of closure and not restricted, the three minute closure requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 was met. Subsequently, the door was closed within approximately two minutes of notification to close. The closure of the door with these procedural measures met confirmed the integrity of the ABSCE and therefore Operability of ABGTS.

"Based on the above critical thinking, entry into LCO 3.7.12 Condition A, B, and E was retracted on August 22, 2021 at 2044 EDT. With the LCO conditions retracted and the above determination that at the Time of Discovery safety function was maintained, the Immediate Notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) was not required. The issue of Past Operability remains for instances in time that the door did not have appropriate compensatory measures in place. Any further notification required for this event will be submitted as a Licensee Event Report."

Notified R2DO (Miller)

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0400 EST on November 28, 2022, during the performance of Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling tower fan operability and RHR Service Water valve lineup verification, it was reported that the Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan 'B' was making a loud metallic noise. The cause of the metallic noise is unknown at this time. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on inoperable cooling water to the HPCI room cooler, per LCO 3.0.6.

"Investigation into the Division 2 MDCT Fan 'B' abnormal noise is in progress.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF MYERS TO LLOYD DESOTELL AT 1615 EST ON 12/09/2022 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification 56241 reported on 11/28/2022. On 11/28/22, an event notification to the NRC was made when mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) Fan B was declared inoperable and issued Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 2022-0428 for Division 2 MDCT Fan B abnormal noise. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) (Technical Specification [TS] 3.7.2). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system (TS 3.7.2), which cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler (TS LCO 3.0.6).

"Subsequent inspection and evaluation determined that the brake noise is expected while fans are running at low speeds. This is supported by plant technical procedure, 24.205.10 `Div. 2 RHR Cooling Tower Fan Operability and RHRSW Valve Line-up Verification' (line item 2.2 in Precautions and Limitations) which states `Chatter from the brakes of the MDCT Fans is expected and no cause for discontinuing the test.' The equipment vendor stated that brake chatter is possible and common given that the internal components are free to move along the splined connections. Internal Operating Experience from experienced station operators and maintenance technicians confirmed that the condition is normal and expected. Both Division 2 MDCTs exhibited the same behavior at low speed and passed surveillance testing satisfactorily.

"No other concerns were noted during fan operation. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"EN 56241 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0148 EST on January 4, 2023 it was identified that P4400F603B, Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Supply Isolation Valve, lost position indication. Division 2 EECW System was declared inoperable due to the potential that this valve may not be capable of performing its safety function to automatically isolate the safety related Division 2 EECW system from the non-safety related Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. Because the Division 2 EECW system provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler, HPCI was also declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non--emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"At 0240 EST, position indication was restored and Division 2 EECW and HPCI was returned to operable following inspection of the associated motor control center (MCC) and testing of the associated fuses. The cause of the loss of indication is under investigation.

"The Senior NRC resident inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 3/6/23 AT 1740 EST FROM GREGORY MILLER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following retraction was received from the licensee via email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification, EN 56295, reported on 1/4/2023.

"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a gothic analysis model to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and Suppression Pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.

"No other concerns were noted during the event. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56295 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Ruiz).

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email:

"At 0800 on February 12, 2023, it was discovered that both trains of control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to a safety injection relief valve discharging to a Unit 1 sump. This leakage in conjunction with design basis loss of coolant accident may result in radiological dose exceeding limits to the exclusion area boundary and to the control room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 'Unanalyzed Condition and a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.'

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT TAYLOR TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0530 EDT ON 3/17/2023 * * *

"Retraction of EN56350, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable:

"Based on subsequent evaluation, it was determined that the control room emergency ventilation system remained operable due to the maximum measured leak rate being within the bounds of the analysis. The maximum measured leak rate of 32,594 cc/hr from the safety injection system did not challenge the calculated maximum engineered safety features leak rate of 45,600 cc/hr and remained within the current dose analysis limits. As such, this was not an unanalyzed condition and did not prevent the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R1DO (Bickett).

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) BOUNDARY DEGRADED CONDITION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2257 [CDT] on 3/14/2023 during the 2R22 refueling outage on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2, it was determined there was RCS boundary leakage from five of eight sensing lines that pass through containment penetrations X-30 and X-34 that did not meet the requirements of Section XI, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 03/28/2023 AT 1059 EST FROM CASEY CARTWRIGHT TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification, EN 56411 reported on 3/14/23.

"Following the initial notification, further analysis of the condition was performed. It was determined that the leaking pipe weld was ASME Section XI Code Class 2 piping which falls under the requirements of ASME Section XI Subsection IWC and not Subsection IWB. Therefore, this condition does not represent a serious degradation of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers. Based upon the above, the leaks identified on the ASME Section XI Code Class 2 equivalent Main Steam sense lines are not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) report was not required and the NRC report 56411 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is required to be submitted."

Notified R2DO (Miller)

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/4/2023

EN Revision Text: FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT - SUBVERSION OF THE FFD PROCESS

A non-licensed contract supervisor was confirmed to have violated the FFD policy by attempting to subvert the testing process. The individual's authorization for site access was immediately terminated.

The licensee notified the R4 Branch Chief (Josey)

* * * RETRACTION FROM TITUS FOLDS TO JOHN RUSSELL AT 1606 EDT ON 05/03/2023 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The Medical Review Officer [MRO] was provided with additional information on the collection process in question. Based on this additional information, the MRO was unable to conclude with a high degree of certainty that an attempt to subvert the FFD collection process had occurred."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and via email the FFD Group.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE

The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email:

"An unlicensed engineering company found a portable nuclear density gauge in their storage garage while cleaning. They state that they have never been licensed and have never acquired a gauge. [The company] estimates that it has been in the garage since the early 1990s without their knowledge. The gauge is currently being stored in the locked garage. The company has been instructed to place a second tangible barrier on the device while [MDH] continues to investigate and discuss next steps. The licensee reported this discovery to MDH on 4/25/2023, and MDH was able to verify the gauge make, model and activity on 4/27/2023. Below is the information we [MDH] currently have:
"- Company name: Widseth Engineering, Inc. (formerly Floan-Sanders, Inc.) 1600 Central Avenue NE, East Grand Forks MN
"- Gauge manufacturer: Soiltest, Inc. 2205 Lee Street, Evanston IL
"- Gauge Model: NIC-5 DT
"- Gauge Serial Number: 75C047
"- Sources (assay date August 1975): Am-241/Be: 60 mCi (decayed to 55 mCi); Cs-137: 10 mCi (decayed to 3.3 mCi)

"MDH is conducting an investigation and will provide more information in a report within 30 days."

MN State Event Report ID No. MN230002

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A non-licensed, non-supervisor contractor was found to be in possession of alcohol in the protected area. The individual's site access has been terminated."

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.