Event Notification Report for April 20, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/19/2023 - 04/20/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56490
Rep Org: Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm
Licensee: Complete Cardiology
Region: 1
City: Atlanta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1337-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kaamilya Najeeullah
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: Complete Cardiology
Region: 1
City: Atlanta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1337-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kaamilya Najeeullah
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/26/2023
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2023
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Henrion, Mark (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Henrion, Mark (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE
The information below was provided by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources via email:
"During a routine sealed source inventory and subsequent leak test performed on April 20, 2023, a physicist discovered that a Cs-137 vial source (initial calibration activity was 0.224 mCi, Cs-137, with serial number: 1710-68-15) was leaking. The source was wiped several times and counted in a Capintec CRC-55t well counter (serial number 561108) to ensure reproducibility of counts in the 662 keV window. Repeat wipe samples yielded the same counts and conclusively confirmed that the source was leaking. A picture was taken to document the visible damage of the vial. Area surveys and wipe tests performed in the location where the source was stored indicated no signs of contamination. The source has been taken out of service. As such, the leaking source has been fully contained and is currently secure in a hot lab. The licensee is currently in the process of obtaining quotes from several hazardous waste disposal companies in their region."
Georgia Radioactive Materials Program incident number: 64.
The information below was provided by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources via email:
"During a routine sealed source inventory and subsequent leak test performed on April 20, 2023, a physicist discovered that a Cs-137 vial source (initial calibration activity was 0.224 mCi, Cs-137, with serial number: 1710-68-15) was leaking. The source was wiped several times and counted in a Capintec CRC-55t well counter (serial number 561108) to ensure reproducibility of counts in the 662 keV window. Repeat wipe samples yielded the same counts and conclusively confirmed that the source was leaking. A picture was taken to document the visible damage of the vial. Area surveys and wipe tests performed in the location where the source was stored indicated no signs of contamination. The source has been taken out of service. As such, the leaking source has been fully contained and is currently secure in a hot lab. The licensee is currently in the process of obtaining quotes from several hazardous waste disposal companies in their region."
Georgia Radioactive Materials Program incident number: 64.
Agreement State
Event Number: 56493
Rep Org: Minnesota Department of Health
Licensee:
Region: 3
City: East Grand Forks State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Tyler Kruse
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee:
Region: 3
City: East Grand Forks State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Tyler Kruse
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 04/27/2023
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2023
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Stoedter, Karla (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Stoedter, Karla (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE
The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email:
"An unlicensed engineering company found a portable nuclear density gauge in their storage garage while cleaning. They state that they have never been licensed and have never acquired a gauge. [The company] estimates that it has been in the garage since the early 1990s without their knowledge. The gauge is currently being stored in the locked garage. The company has been instructed to place a second tangible barrier on the device while [MDH] continues to investigate and discuss next steps. The licensee reported this discovery to MDH on 4/25/2023, and MDH was able to verify the gauge make, model and activity on 4/27/2023. Below is the information we [MDH] currently have:
"- Company name: Widseth Engineering, Inc. (formerly Floan-Sanders, Inc.) 1600 Central Avenue NE, East Grand Forks MN
"- Gauge manufacturer: Soiltest, Inc. 2205 Lee Street, Evanston IL
"- Gauge Model: NIC-5 DT
"- Gauge Serial Number: 75C047
"- Sources (assay date August 1975): Am-241/Be: 60 mCi (decayed to 55 mCi); Cs-137: 10 mCi (decayed to 3.3 mCi)
"MDH is conducting an investigation and will provide more information in a report within 30 days."
MN State Event Report ID No. MN230002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Radioactive Materials Unit via email:
"An unlicensed engineering company found a portable nuclear density gauge in their storage garage while cleaning. They state that they have never been licensed and have never acquired a gauge. [The company] estimates that it has been in the garage since the early 1990s without their knowledge. The gauge is currently being stored in the locked garage. The company has been instructed to place a second tangible barrier on the device while [MDH] continues to investigate and discuss next steps. The licensee reported this discovery to MDH on 4/25/2023, and MDH was able to verify the gauge make, model and activity on 4/27/2023. Below is the information we [MDH] currently have:
"- Company name: Widseth Engineering, Inc. (formerly Floan-Sanders, Inc.) 1600 Central Avenue NE, East Grand Forks MN
"- Gauge manufacturer: Soiltest, Inc. 2205 Lee Street, Evanston IL
"- Gauge Model: NIC-5 DT
"- Gauge Serial Number: 75C047
"- Sources (assay date August 1975): Am-241/Be: 60 mCi (decayed to 55 mCi); Cs-137: 10 mCi (decayed to 3.3 mCi)
"MDH is conducting an investigation and will provide more information in a report within 30 days."
MN State Event Report ID No. MN230002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56478
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Chris Denton
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Chris Denton
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 04/20/2023
Notification Time: 05:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 01:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2023
Notification Time: 05:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2023
Event Time: 01:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0148 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 20, 2023, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. Turbine Bypass valves did not open on the trip due to Turbine Protection system power supply failure; the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor Pressure reached approximately 1095 psig on the trip; exceeding the 1060 psig RPS trip setpoint.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Operations was able to transition from SRVs to main steam line drains to the condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained via the Condensate / Feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the main steam line drains. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) following the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves), and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the valid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation and RPS actuation from the reactor pressure signal, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Unit 2 is not affected by this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0148 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 20, 2023, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. Turbine Bypass valves did not open on the trip due to Turbine Protection system power supply failure; the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor Pressure reached approximately 1095 psig on the trip; exceeding the 1060 psig RPS trip setpoint.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Operations was able to transition from SRVs to main steam line drains to the condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained via the Condensate / Feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the main steam line drains. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) following the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves), and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the valid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation and RPS actuation from the reactor pressure signal, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Unit 2 is not affected by this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."