Event Notification Report for April 03, 2023

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/3/2023

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - DEFECT IDENTIFIED IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCH

The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing initial notification of the identification of a defect potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard.

"The subject Automatic Transfer Switches contain Mar-Bal bus insulators. Based on Paragon testing performed, the insulators may have developed stress cracking due to over tightening of required mounting hardware during the assembly process which was not detected by inspection at Paragon. Stress cracks in the insulators could degrade the structural integrity of the automatic transfer switch to withstand seismic conditions which could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.

"Only one customer, Talen Energy-Susquehanna, is affected by this issue. Serial numbers of the potentially effected units (QTY 4): 351029663-1 through 351029663-4.

"It is recommended the licensee inspect the insulators for the supplied automatic transfer switches for stress cracking and contact Paragon for any needed assistance to resolve any deficiencies identified.

"The date of discovery was 1/29/2023, and the date of the Part 21 Reportability determination was 3/2/2023. Formal notification will be submitted on or before 3/31/2023."

Point of Contact:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com

* * * UPDATE ON 03/31/23 AT 1607 EDT FROM PARAGON ENERGY SOLUTIONS TO BILL GOTT * * *

Paragon Energy Solutions submitted their final report in accordance with 10CFR 21.21(d)(4).

Paragon recommends inspection of the 4 automatic transfer switches supplied to Talen Susquehanna for insulator cracking at the next regularly scheduled maintenance period and replacement of any insulators found to exhibit stress cracking.

Notified R1DO (Schroeder) and Part 21/50.55 Group via email.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/3/2023

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1000 EDT on March 14, 2023, during valve diagnostic testing, the high pressure core injection (HPCI) lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not stroke open. This failure resulted in the Unit 2 HPCI system being inoperable.

"This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB BINGMAN TO BILL GOTT AT 2208 EDT ON 04/02/2023 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification (EN) 56409 reported on 03/14/2023.

"On March 09, 2023, Susquehanna Unit 2 entered a routine high pressure core injection (HPCI) maintenance outage. In support of this system outage, Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, Condition D was entered for an inoperable HPCI system. On March 14 as reported in EN 56409, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not electrically stroke open following engagement of manual clutch lever. Specifically, to support the maintenance evolution, electricians declutched the valve actuator to move it from the motor/electric operational mode to the manual operational mode as part of planned valve diagnostic data collection. In this testing configuration (i.e., manual operational mode), an attempt to electrically stroke the valve was made, resulting in the valve failure to stroke.

"Prior to this maintenance evolution, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve was found in the expected full-closed position with the motor/electric operational mode enabled, meaning prior to the HPCI maintenance outage, the affected valve was operating as designed and capable of performing all design functions. The described condition was therefore determined to be the result of the maintenance activity.

"NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, states: 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'

"Following completion of investigation and repair, Susquehanna determined that, per NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, the event was not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as part of a maintenance evolution which was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the TS. The described condition was not a pre-existing condition that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the planned maintenance activity."

Notified R1DO (Schroeder)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following information was provided by the New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau via email:

"The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau received a report from the licensee that, as they were conducting radiography work in a pipeline in southern New Mexico near Carlsbad, a source disconnected. While the source was being cranked back into the radiography camera, it disconnected. The area around the camera has been secured and only the licensee personnel are on location to keep the perimeter and the source secured while they await a crew to arrive to retrieve, secure, and return the source to the camera. A formal report will follow in a separate email."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ON-SITE FATALITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At approximately 0037 CDT on March 30, 2023, a non-responsive individual at South Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. The offsite medical facility notified STP Nuclear Operating Company that the individual had been declared deceased as of 0103 CDT.

"The fatality was not work-related, and the individual was outside of the radiologically controlled area.

"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for an on-site fatality and notification of another government agency. OSHA will be notified.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (CIVs)

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1432 EDT on 03/31/23, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of both recirculation pumps. The cause of the recirculation pump trips is under investigation. Additionally, closure of CIVs in multiple systems occurred during the trip as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via condensate / feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MANUAL ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER MOTOR DRIVEN PUMPS

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On April 2, 2023, at 0341 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 and the 2B main feedwater pump feeding the steam generators, the 2A main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-76, failed. Further, observation of the operating 2B main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-81, called into question its functionality. At 0352 EDT, operations manually started the auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps to feed the stream generators to allow maintenance on the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps started as designed. Flow to the steam generator was not adversely impacted during this sequence. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."