Event Notification Report for April 03, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/02/2023 - 04/03/2023
Part 21
Event Number: 56387
Rep Org: Paragon Energy Solutions
Licensee: Paragon Energy Solutions
Region: 4
City: Forth Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: Paragon Energy Solutions
Region: 4
City: Forth Worth State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 03/03/2023
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2023
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Carey, Bickett (R1DO)
Vossmar, Patricia (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Carey, Bickett (R1DO)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/3/2023
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - DEFECT IDENTIFIED IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing initial notification of the identification of a defect potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard.
"The subject Automatic Transfer Switches contain Mar-Bal bus insulators. Based on Paragon testing performed, the insulators may have developed stress cracking due to over tightening of required mounting hardware during the assembly process which was not detected by inspection at Paragon. Stress cracks in the insulators could degrade the structural integrity of the automatic transfer switch to withstand seismic conditions which could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.
"Only one customer, Talen Energy-Susquehanna, is affected by this issue. Serial numbers of the potentially effected units (QTY 4): 351029663-1 through 351029663-4.
"It is recommended the licensee inspect the insulators for the supplied automatic transfer switches for stress cracking and contact Paragon for any needed assistance to resolve any deficiencies identified.
"The date of discovery was 1/29/2023, and the date of the Part 21 Reportability determination was 3/2/2023. Formal notification will be submitted on or before 3/31/2023."
Point of Contact:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com
* * * UPDATE ON 03/31/23 AT 1607 EDT FROM PARAGON ENERGY SOLUTIONS TO BILL GOTT * * *
Paragon Energy Solutions submitted their final report in accordance with 10CFR 21.21(d)(4).
Paragon recommends inspection of the 4 automatic transfer switches supplied to Talen Susquehanna for insulator cracking at the next regularly scheduled maintenance period and replacement of any insulators found to exhibit stress cracking.
Notified R1DO (Schroeder) and Part 21/50.55 Group via email.
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - DEFECT IDENTIFIED IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing initial notification of the identification of a defect potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard.
"The subject Automatic Transfer Switches contain Mar-Bal bus insulators. Based on Paragon testing performed, the insulators may have developed stress cracking due to over tightening of required mounting hardware during the assembly process which was not detected by inspection at Paragon. Stress cracks in the insulators could degrade the structural integrity of the automatic transfer switch to withstand seismic conditions which could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.
"Only one customer, Talen Energy-Susquehanna, is affected by this issue. Serial numbers of the potentially effected units (QTY 4): 351029663-1 through 351029663-4.
"It is recommended the licensee inspect the insulators for the supplied automatic transfer switches for stress cracking and contact Paragon for any needed assistance to resolve any deficiencies identified.
"The date of discovery was 1/29/2023, and the date of the Part 21 Reportability determination was 3/2/2023. Formal notification will be submitted on or before 3/31/2023."
Point of Contact:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com
* * * UPDATE ON 03/31/23 AT 1607 EDT FROM PARAGON ENERGY SOLUTIONS TO BILL GOTT * * *
Paragon Energy Solutions submitted their final report in accordance with 10CFR 21.21(d)(4).
Paragon recommends inspection of the 4 automatic transfer switches supplied to Talen Susquehanna for insulator cracking at the next regularly scheduled maintenance period and replacement of any insulators found to exhibit stress cracking.
Notified R1DO (Schroeder) and Part 21/50.55 Group via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56409
Facility: Susquehanna
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: John Teck
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: John Teck
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 03/14/2023
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2023
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2023
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2023
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Bickett, Brice (R1DO)
Bickett, Brice (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/3/2023
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1000 EDT on March 14, 2023, during valve diagnostic testing, the high pressure core injection (HPCI) lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not stroke open. This failure resulted in the Unit 2 HPCI system being inoperable.
"This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB BINGMAN TO BILL GOTT AT 2208 EDT ON 04/02/2023 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification (EN) 56409 reported on 03/14/2023.
"On March 09, 2023, Susquehanna Unit 2 entered a routine high pressure core injection (HPCI) maintenance outage. In support of this system outage, Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, Condition D was entered for an inoperable HPCI system. On March 14 as reported in EN 56409, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not electrically stroke open following engagement of manual clutch lever. Specifically, to support the maintenance evolution, electricians declutched the valve actuator to move it from the motor/electric operational mode to the manual operational mode as part of planned valve diagnostic data collection. In this testing configuration (i.e., manual operational mode), an attempt to electrically stroke the valve was made, resulting in the valve failure to stroke.
"Prior to this maintenance evolution, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve was found in the expected full-closed position with the motor/electric operational mode enabled, meaning prior to the HPCI maintenance outage, the affected valve was operating as designed and capable of performing all design functions. The described condition was therefore determined to be the result of the maintenance activity.
"NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, states: 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'
"Following completion of investigation and repair, Susquehanna determined that, per NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, the event was not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as part of a maintenance evolution which was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the TS. The described condition was not a pre-existing condition that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the planned maintenance activity."
Notified R1DO (Schroeder)
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1000 EDT on March 14, 2023, during valve diagnostic testing, the high pressure core injection (HPCI) lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not stroke open. This failure resulted in the Unit 2 HPCI system being inoperable.
"This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB BINGMAN TO BILL GOTT AT 2208 EDT ON 04/02/2023 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification (EN) 56409 reported on 03/14/2023.
"On March 09, 2023, Susquehanna Unit 2 entered a routine high pressure core injection (HPCI) maintenance outage. In support of this system outage, Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, Condition D was entered for an inoperable HPCI system. On March 14 as reported in EN 56409, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve did not electrically stroke open following engagement of manual clutch lever. Specifically, to support the maintenance evolution, electricians declutched the valve actuator to move it from the motor/electric operational mode to the manual operational mode as part of planned valve diagnostic data collection. In this testing configuration (i.e., manual operational mode), an attempt to electrically stroke the valve was made, resulting in the valve failure to stroke.
"Prior to this maintenance evolution, the HPCI lube oil cooling water supply isolation valve was found in the expected full-closed position with the motor/electric operational mode enabled, meaning prior to the HPCI maintenance outage, the affected valve was operating as designed and capable of performing all design functions. The described condition was therefore determined to be the result of the maintenance activity.
"NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, states: 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).'
"Following completion of investigation and repair, Susquehanna determined that, per NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.7, the event was not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as part of a maintenance evolution which was done in accordance with an approved procedure and the TS. The described condition was not a pre-existing condition that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the planned maintenance activity."
Notified R1DO (Schroeder)
Agreement State
Event Number: 56432
Rep Org: New Mexico Rad Control Program
Licensee: Protect
Region: 4
City: Carlsbad State: NM
County:
License #: IR575-00
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Santiago Rodriguez
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: Protect
Region: 4
City: Carlsbad State: NM
County:
License #: IR575-00
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Santiago Rodriguez
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 03/24/2023
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2023
Event Time: 12:10 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2023
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2023
Event Time: 12:10 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
O'Keefe, Neil (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
O'Keefe, Neil (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was provided by the New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau via email:
"The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau received a report from the licensee that, as they were conducting radiography work in a pipeline in southern New Mexico near Carlsbad, a source disconnected. While the source was being cranked back into the radiography camera, it disconnected. The area around the camera has been secured and only the licensee personnel are on location to keep the perimeter and the source secured while they await a crew to arrive to retrieve, secure, and return the source to the camera. A formal report will follow in a separate email."
The following information was provided by the New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau via email:
"The New Mexico Radiation Control Bureau received a report from the licensee that, as they were conducting radiography work in a pipeline in southern New Mexico near Carlsbad, a source disconnected. While the source was being cranked back into the radiography camera, it disconnected. The area around the camera has been secured and only the licensee personnel are on location to keep the perimeter and the source secured while they await a crew to arrive to retrieve, secure, and return the source to the camera. A formal report will follow in a separate email."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56439
Facility: South Texas
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Luke Netardus
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Luke Netardus
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 03/30/2023
Notification Time: 04:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2023
Event Time: 01:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2023
Notification Time: 04:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2023
Event Time: 01:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
Person (Organization):
Taylor, Nick (R4DO)
Felts, Russell (NRR)
Walker, Shakur (NRR)
Grant, Jeffery (IR)
Taylor, Nick (R4DO)
Felts, Russell (NRR)
Walker, Shakur (NRR)
Grant, Jeffery (IR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ON-SITE FATALITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 0037 CDT on March 30, 2023, a non-responsive individual at South Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. The offsite medical facility notified STP Nuclear Operating Company that the individual had been declared deceased as of 0103 CDT.
"The fatality was not work-related, and the individual was outside of the radiologically controlled area.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for an on-site fatality and notification of another government agency. OSHA will be notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 0037 CDT on March 30, 2023, a non-responsive individual at South Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. The offsite medical facility notified STP Nuclear Operating Company that the individual had been declared deceased as of 0103 CDT.
"The fatality was not work-related, and the individual was outside of the radiologically controlled area.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for an on-site fatality and notification of another government agency. OSHA will be notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56446
Facility: Hatch
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: John Long
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: John Long
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 03/31/2023
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2023
Event Time: 14:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2023
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2023
Event Time: 14:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AND AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (CIVs)
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1432 EDT on 03/31/23, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of both recirculation pumps. The cause of the recirculation pump trips is under investigation. Additionally, closure of CIVs in multiple systems occurred during the trip as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via condensate / feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1432 EDT on 03/31/23, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of both recirculation pumps. The cause of the recirculation pump trips is under investigation. Additionally, closure of CIVs in multiple systems occurred during the trip as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via condensate / feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56451
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Johnson
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Johnson
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 04/02/2023
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2023
Event Time: 03:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2023
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2023
Event Time: 03:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER MOTOR DRIVEN PUMPS
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On April 2, 2023, at 0341 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 and the 2B main feedwater pump feeding the steam generators, the 2A main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-76, failed. Further, observation of the operating 2B main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-81, called into question its functionality. At 0352 EDT, operations manually started the auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps to feed the stream generators to allow maintenance on the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps started as designed. Flow to the steam generator was not adversely impacted during this sequence. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On April 2, 2023, at 0341 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 and the 2B main feedwater pump feeding the steam generators, the 2A main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-76, failed. Further, observation of the operating 2B main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-81, called into question its functionality. At 0352 EDT, operations manually started the auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps to feed the stream generators to allow maintenance on the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps started as designed. Flow to the steam generator was not adversely impacted during this sequence. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 56436
Rep Org: Iowa Department of Public Health
Licensee: Whirlpool Corporation, AMANA Div.
Region: 3
City: Amana State: IA
County:
License #: 3367-1-48-FG
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Stuart Jordan
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: Whirlpool Corporation, AMANA Div.
Region: 3
City: Amana State: IA
County:
License #: 3367-1-48-FG
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Stuart Jordan
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 03/28/2023
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2023
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Havertape, Joshua (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Havertape, Joshua (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST DEVICE
The following information was provided by Iowa Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"In the process of a registrant closing out their general license, the registrant identified that a generally licensed 3M model 703 handheld static eliminator (s/n: 7030250) containing hydrogen-3 with a current activity of 20 millicuries (manufactured in 1982 with 200 millicuries) had been lost. In 2015, the registrant had three (3) 703 devices, in which two (2) were disposed of through the manufacturer. No other records of sale, transfer, or disposal could be identified.
"The registrant spent 400 man-hours searching their facility, methodically sectioning off and checking all storage locations, interviewing current and former employees, contacting vendors who had conducted leak test services on other devices, and contacting radioactive waste disposal groups who have handled waste in the past. None had any records of the missing unit. It is the registrant's belief that the unit was likely removed from the site sometime before 2018. No occupational illnesses or injuries have been reported or would likely occur from the loss of this device due to its age and characteristics."
Iowa Incident Number: IA230002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by Iowa Department of Health and Human Services via email:
"In the process of a registrant closing out their general license, the registrant identified that a generally licensed 3M model 703 handheld static eliminator (s/n: 7030250) containing hydrogen-3 with a current activity of 20 millicuries (manufactured in 1982 with 200 millicuries) had been lost. In 2015, the registrant had three (3) 703 devices, in which two (2) were disposed of through the manufacturer. No other records of sale, transfer, or disposal could be identified.
"The registrant spent 400 man-hours searching their facility, methodically sectioning off and checking all storage locations, interviewing current and former employees, contacting vendors who had conducted leak test services on other devices, and contacting radioactive waste disposal groups who have handled waste in the past. None had any records of the missing unit. It is the registrant's belief that the unit was likely removed from the site sometime before 2018. No occupational illnesses or injuries have been reported or would likely occur from the loss of this device due to its age and characteristics."
Iowa Incident Number: IA230002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf