Event Notification Report for March 03, 2023

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the Ohio Bureau of Radiological Protection via email:

"On 2/17/2023, the licensee's [Alternate Radiation Safety Officer] ARSO entered the radioactive material storage room where a technician was opening the housing on a device containing a Kr-85 source.

"Upon the initial attempt to withdraw a bolt of the device housing, an area radiation monitor began to alarm. The ARSO and the technician took a second reading with a Victoreen 451 [radiation detector] to confirm that it was Kr-85 gas leakage and exited the room. A radiation survey meter indicated that there was no contamination on either person. Removable swipes of the area outside of the room also were indicative of no contamination. The entry door was sealed and access restricted until additional information was available.

"Follow-up entries were completed by the ARSO on 2/20/2023 and 2/21/2023 using 1 meter by 1 meter grids to identify specific areas of testing for removable contamination. Radiation and contamination survey results identified no readings above background. The licensee did not report results of any personnel testing or estimates of uptake.

"The licensee is investigating the cause of the Kr-85 leak. [Ohio Department of Health] ODH will travel to the site to conduct an investigation on 02/28/2023."

Ohio Item Number: OH230003

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/MISSING GAUGE

The following was received from the state of South Carolina via email:

"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on 02/23/23 at 1546 [EST] via telephone that a Humboldt Model 5001 device (serial number 4686) portable moisture density gauge was lost or missing. The Humboldt Model 5001 device contains a maximum activity of 11 millicuries (407 MBq) of Cs-137 and 44 millicuries (1628 MBq) of Am-241:Be. The licensee is reporting that the Humboldt Model 5001 device was lost or missing while in transit via a common carrier. The Humboldt Model 5001 device was picked up by the common carrier at a temporary jobsite in South Carolina on 01/18/23 and was intended to be delivered to the manufacturer in Raleigh, NC. The licensee is reporting that the Humboldt Model 5001 device was delivered to a common carrier facility in Durham, NC on 01/19/23. The licensee is reporting that the Humboldt Model 5001 device has not been delivered to the intended destination and the licensee is reporting that the common carrier has indicated that the shipment cannot be located.

"This event is under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."

* * * UPDATE ON 2/24/23 AT 1112 EST FROM SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL TO KAREN COTTON * * *

"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on 02/24/23, at 1056 EST via telephone that the Humboldt Model 5001 device (serial number 4686) has been found by the common carrier and retrieved by the licensee from the common carrier facility in Durham, NC.

"This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."

Notified R1DO (Carfang), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL,

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) via email:

"At 1730 CST on 2/23/2023, the IEMA was contacted by the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Rubino Engineering to advise of a portable moisture/density gauge involved in an accident at a temporary jobsite. Reportedly, a Troxler 3400 series gauge was in use at a construction site in Maple Park, IL when it rolled down an embankment and was struck by a skid steer. The licensee's technician remained on scene and assessed minor damage to the case. The source rod was not extended at the time of the accident. Both sources were reported as intact and the area secured until the RSO could arrive within an hour with a survey meter. No exposure concerns were reported or anticipated. The RSO arrived on site approximately an hour later to assess, survey, package, and return the device to safe storage. The IEMA advised that they were available to respond if contamination was suspected or if there were complications in retrieving and returning the sources to storage. At approximately 1900, the RSO advised IEMA that the device had been returned to storage. Surveys of the device and source holders were consistent with an undamaged device.

"On 2/24/2023, IEMA inspectors initiated a reactionary inspection to verify the presence of both sources, assess for removeable contamination, advise on proper return of the unit to the manufacturer, determine root cause of the incident and evaluate compliance with IEMA regulations. Updates from that inspection, as well as specifics on the device serial number and sources will be provided once available."

Illinois Item Number: IL230005

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1312 CST on March 2, 2023, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 initiated voluntary communication to the state of Alabama and local officials as part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI), after receiving analysis results for leakage from a demineralized water storage tank that contained activity above the GPI voluntary communication threshold. All these results are significantly less than the limits established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for effluents from the station. Further samples obtained of the water prior to entering the Tennessee River were less than detectable. The leakage source has been isolated and additional corrective actions are in progress. This condition did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT - SUPERVISOR FAILED FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"A non-licensed supervisor tested positive in accordance with the FFD [fitness-for-duty] testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated."

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

PART 21 - DEFECT IDENTIFIED IN AUTOMATIC TRANSFER SWITCH

The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing initial notification of the identification of a defect potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard.

"The subject Automatic Transfer Switches contain Mar-Bal bus insulators. Based on Paragon testing performed, the insulators may have developed stress cracking due to over tightening of required mounting hardware during the assembly process which was not detected by inspection at Paragon. Stress cracks in the insulators could degrade the structural integrity of the automatic transfer switch to withstand seismic conditions which could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.

"Only one customer, Talen Energy-Susquehanna, is affected by this issue. Serial numbers of the potentially effected units (QTY 4): 351029663-1 through 351029663-4.

"It is recommended the licensee inspect the insulators for the supplied automatic transfer switches for stress cracking and contact Paragon for any needed assistance to resolve any deficiencies identified.

"The date of discovery was 1/29/2023, and the date of the Part 21 Reportability determination was 3/2/2023. Formal notification will be submitted on or before 3/31/2023."

Point of Contact:
Richard Knott
Vice President Quality Assurance
Paragon Energy Solutions
817-284-0077
rknott@paragones.com

PART 21 - DEVIATION TO QUALIFIED DESIGN

The following information was provided by United Controls International via email:

"Schneider Electric part number: ASP840-000 Modicon Primary/Secondary Power Supply units failed to operate several days after installation at Dominion's Surry Power Station with hard failures that shutdown the associated programable logic controller. The units were returned to UCI and initial observations indicated heavy shipping damage that was not present when initially supplied. Further evaluation of the damaged components requires manufacturer evaluation due to item complexity and proprietary design documentation. Investigation into the root cause(s) of the failures is ongoing. Evaluation of whether these failures represent deviations or failures to comply that would be associated with substantial safety hazards will be complete by July 2, 2023."

For questions concerning this potential 10 CFR 21 issue, please contact:
Anu Kulkarni
Quality Assurance Manager
United Controls International
(470) 610-0851

AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0910 [CST], with Unit 2 in Mode 4 at 0 percent power, an actuation of a reactor scram on low charging water header pressure occurred during restoration from hydrostatic test conditions. All control rods were already fully inserted prior to the receipt of the scram signal.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Unit 2 RPS system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

TRANSPORT OF A POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED PERSON OFFSITE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2300 CST on March 4, 2023, River Bend Station (RBS) was shut down in Mode 5 when an individual was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical condition, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel.

"This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."