Event Notification Report for January 05, 2023

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS

The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

The licensee discovered two tritium exit signs were lost. The exit signs are SRB Technologies Model BX10WS containing 7.5 Ci of tritium (H-3) each. This is being reported under Colorado Regulations Section 4.51.1.1 (10 CFR 20.2202(a)(1)(i)).

Colorado Incident No.: CO220045

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:

"On December 29, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee's consultant that a fire had occurred at the licensee's location. The fire was near two Vega America SHD gauges both containing 120 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 sources. The licensee has not been able to determine if the gauges were affected by the fire as of this report. There is a concern that the fire could reflash, so the licensee is being cautious about approaching the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident No: 9977

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/22 AT 1325 FROM ART TUCKER TO LAUREN BRYSON * * *

"On December 30, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that they were able to inspect the gauges and neither gauge was affected by the fire."

Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Events Notification via email

CONCURRENT REPORT FOR ONSITE INJURY

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"A Framatome employee preparing an area for painting experienced a hand injury when a heavy object fell on his hand. The worker was surveyed out of the area and confirmed to be free from radioactive contamination above free release limits and was transported to the local hospital (Kadlec Regional Medical Center) for treatment.

"The Washington State Department of Labor and Industry (WSDLI) was notified of this injury on 01/02/2023 at 1628 [PST]. The work area has been quarantined pending investigation by WSDLI.

"This report is being made per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (c) concurrent reports because the nature of injury required reporting to WSDLI."

PART 21 - POWER SUPPLY FAILURES

The following information is a brief summary of the report provided by the licensee via fax:

Modicon Primary/Secondary Power Supply units that were supplied by United Controls International (UCI) to Dominion's Surry Power Station failed after installation. Hard failures that shutdown the associated programmable logic controller were observed. All units appeared to function properly at initial installation. When the subject items were returned to UCI for evaluation, substantial shipping damage was noted and can be attributed to poor shipping practices. Due to the complexity of the items, unavailability of design documentation, and noted shipping damage, further evaluation of item failures requires manufacturer evaluation and therefore additional time to complete the root cause evaluation. UCI continues to follow up with the manufacturer and plans to provide further evaluation by March 4, 2023.

Plant affected: Surry Power Station

For questions concerning this potential 10 CFR 21 issue, please contact:
Anu Kulkarni
Quality Assurance Director
United Controls International
(470) 610-0851

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2259 EST on 1/3/2023, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Bravo and Unit 2 Alpha emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, as well as an actuation of the associated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems on each unit occurred. The reason for the EDG auto-starts was due to a loss of an offsite power source (loss of one of the two reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) on each unit) to the Unit 1 Bravo and Unit 2 Alpha safety related buses. The EDG and AFW systems automatically started as designed when the valid undervoltage signal on the affected safety related bus was received.

"This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

SAFETY SYSTEMS INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0148 EST on January 4, 2023 it was identified that P4400F603B, Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Supply Isolation Valve, lost position indication. Division 2 EECW System was declared inoperable due to the potential that this valve may not be capable of performing its safety function to automatically isolate the safety related Division 2 EECW system from the non-safety related Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. Because the Division 2 EECW system provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler, HPCI was also declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non--emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"At 0240 EST, position indication was restored and Division 2 EECW and HPCI was returned to operable following inspection of the associated motor control center (MCC) and testing of the associated fuses. The cause of the loss of indication is under investigation.

"The Senior NRC resident inspector has been notified."

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION 6.1.f - EXPIRED LICENSE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"In accordance with [University of Missouri Research Reactor] MURR Technical Specification 6.6 paragraph 'c', MURR is reporting an abnormal occurrence. The NRC informed MURR's Reactor Manager today that an [Senior Reactor Operator] SRO's license could not be renewed due to MURR submitting the request within 30 days of the expiration date and the license expiring prior to the NRC being able to act on the application. This meant the license expired on September 22, 2022. The Reactor Manager informed the interim Reactor Facility Director of this issue.

"MURR validated the current SRO in the control room has a valid license and determined the reactor was in a safe condition, operating at 10 [Megawatts] MW. A review of the records shows that all other reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses are current.

"MURR reviewed all operating logs dating back to September 22, 2022 and has determined that there were three days during which this now unlicensed SRO was in the control room supervising evolutions that require an SRO to be present per Tech Spec 6.1. f. (Initial startup and approach to power, and relocation of any experiment with a reactivity worth greater than 0.0074 units).

"MURR will not let the individual with an expired license stand any control room positions until he obtains a license. MURR will follow up with a letter detailing an investigation into this issue and any other corrective actions from that investigation."

The Reactor Manager notified the NRC Project Manager and Branch Chief for Non-Power Reactors.